Krites v. Plott
Decision Date | 17 March 1943 |
Docket Number | 241. |
Citation | 24 S.E.2d 531,222 N.C. 679 |
Parties | KRITES et ux. v. PLOTT et ux. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
The plaintiffs sued the defendants in ejectment for the recovery of the tract of land described in the complaint. The defendants answered the complaint, denying plaintiffs' title and claiming the land by adverse possession under colorable title for seven years next preceding the institution of the action. C.S. § 428. The plaintiffs replied, setting up the deed under which they allege the defendants claim title, alleging that it conveys no title but constitutes a cloud upon plaintiffs' title, which they ask to have removed.
By consent of parties, the cause was heard before Judge Felix E Alley at the November Term, 1942, of Yadkin Superior Court without the intervention of a jury. The parties entered into a stipulation, whereby it was agreed that the deed referred to in the pleading was that same deed executed by U.J Thompson to Cora Thompson July 21, 1932, and recorded in Book 37, page 20, in the office of the Register of Deeds for Yadkin County, reading as follows: "This Deed, Made this 21st day of July, A.D.1932, by U.J. Thompson of Yadkin County and State of North Carolina, of the first part, to Cora Thompson of Yadkin County and State of North Carolina, of the section part:
It was further stipulated that U.J. Thompson died August 7, 1932, Cora Thompson, his wife, surviving him. Cora Thompson died August 24, 1933. She left a son by a former marriage, E.L. Krites, the plaintiff in this action, who is married to Lillian Krites, co-plaintiff, and is the only son and heir at law of Cora Thompson. Roy Plott is not related by blood or marriage to U.J. Thompson, but was reared by the said Thompson, having lived with him until he reached a majority.
It was agreed that both plaintiffs and defendants are claiming under the deed above set out; that defendants are in possession of the property described in the pleadings and have been in possession since the death of Cora Thompson.
Upon the call of the case for trial, plaintiffs and defendants, in open court, waived a jury trial and agreed that the only question involved was a question of law for the court in the interpretation of the aforesaid deed.
Thereupon, Judge Alley, finding the facts, signed judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed.
S. Carter Williams, of Yadkinville, and Whitman & Motsinger, of Winston-Salem, for plaintiffs, appellants.
A.T. Grant, of Mocksville, and Hall & Zachary, of Yadkinville, for defendants, appellees.
We agree with the construction placed upon the deed by the trial judge.
In the construction of deeds, the Court has endeavored to follow and apply the principles adopted and promulgated in Triplett v. Williams, 149 N.C. 394, 63 S.E. 79, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 514, rather comprehensively expressed in the rule that such an instrument must be construed from "its four corners" in order that its true intent may be given effect. Seawell v. Hall, 185 N.C. 80, 82, 116 S.E. 189. Triplett v. Williams, supra, cites with approval 1 Jones, Real Property, Section 568: "The inclination of many courts at the present day is to regard the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions." [ 149 N.C. 394, 63 S.E. 80, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 514.] With the Triplett case passed into discard, many of the artificial rules and doctrines, which put the construction of deeds of conveyance in a class separate and apart from other instruments to which more liberal rules have been applied for the purpose of ascertaining their intent. Especially, the order in which its different clauses are arranged is not considered of such technical importance as to be controlling against the intent of the deed, when that could be reasonably ascertained by a consideration of the whole instrument. Jones v. Whichard, 163 N.C. 241, 79 S.E. 503. Cited with approval in the Triplett case are the following: "All parts of a deed should be given due force and effect." Doren v. Gillum, 136 Ind. 134, 35 N.E. 1101. "Words deliberately put in a deed and inserted there for a purpose, are not to be lightly considered, or arbitrarily thrust aside." Fountain County Coal & Mining Co. v. Beckleheimer, 102 Ind. 76, 1 N.E. 202, 52 Am.Rep. 645.
To adopt now the rule that the effect of repugnant clauses in a deed must be determined by their order of precedence--the first expression controlling--and that technical and formal expressions of conveyancing must control at any cost, would be to put the rules of construction back to the condition which prevailed prior to Triplett v. Williams, Jones v. Whichard, and other cases adopting the more liberal construction canons which put the intent uppermost. The true test is to take all of the provisions together and in the case of an apparent repugnance, to adopt that construction which is most consonant with the intent of the deed; and it cannot be questioned that this 'intent is not infrequently found in the later expressions of the instrument, and that they are sometimes of a character so impressive as to override the more formal technical expressions in which conveyances are sometimes couched.
In Brown v. Brown, 168 N.C. 4, 84 S.E. 25, 27, we find the expression: "Words deliberately put in a deed, and inserted there for a distinct purpose, are not to be lightly considered, or arbitrarily thrust aside, the discovery of the intention of the parties being the first and main object in view; and, when it is ascertained, nothing remains to be done but to execute it, without excessive regard for merely technical inaccuracies or formal divisions of the deed."
In the deed under consideration, inserted after the conveyance clause and description of the property, we have the following rather impressive statement:
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