Kroetch v. Hinnenkamp

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MAIN, J.
• Citation: Kroetch v. Hinnenkamp, 171 Wash. 518, 18 P.2d 491 (Wash. 1933)
• Decision Date: 31 January 1933
• Docket Number: 24125.
• Parties: KROETCH v. HINNENKAMP et al.

18 P.2d 491

171 Wash. 518

KROETCH v. HINNENKAMP et al.

No. 24125.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 31, 1933

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; R. M. Webster, Judge.

Action by Gertrude M. Kroetch against L. Hinnenkamp and others, who filed cross-complaint. From judgment for defendants plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Lawrence F. Connolly, of Chewelah, and Frank J. Blade, of Spokane, for appellant.

Lloyd E. Gandy, of Spokane, and Joseph E. Gandy, of Seattle, for respondents.

MAIN J.

This action was brought to quiet title to certain real property in the city of Spokane. The defendants, by cross-complaint sought to have the title to the property quieted in themselves. The trial to the court without a jury resulted in a judgment denying any relief to the plaintiff and quieting the title in the defendants L. E. Hinnenkamp and wife, from which judgment the plaintiff appeals.

The facts essential to be stated are these: March 8, 1910 William H. Houston and Mary Houston, his wife, being then the owners of lots 37 and 38 in block 33 of Spokane Terrace addition to Spokane, sold and conveyed the same, by warranty deed, to Gertrude M. Kroetch, the appellant, which deed was not filed for record until September 28, 1931. Between the time when the deed was given and the time when it was recorded, the appellant paid all the taxes assessed against the property. August 30, 1929, Houston and wife, by a quitclaim deed, conveyed the same lots covered in the deed to the appellant, together with other property to the Kennedy-Marsh Realty Company, a corporation. October 8, 1929, that corporation conveyed the same to Fred C. Johnson and Anna Johnson, his wife. April 23, 1931, by warranty deed, Johnson and wife conveyed the property to Hinnenkamp and wife, the respondents. All the deeds, beginning with the quitclaim deed to the Kennedy-Marsh Realty Company down to and including the deed to the respondents, were promptly filed for record, and were all recorded prior to the time that the deed to the appellant was filed for record. The respondents purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration. The property was at all times vacant, unoccupied, and unimproved.

The question presented for determination is whether the appellant or the respondents have the superior title. The appellant contends that, since she held under a warranty deed, not recorded, and paid taxes on the property for seven successive years and more, her title was paramount. Section 789, Rem. Rev. Stat. provides: 'Every person having color of the title made in good faith to vacant and unoccupied land, who shall pay all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven successive years, he or she shall be deemed and adjudged to be the legal owner of said vacant and unoccupied land to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title. * * *'

If that statute was the only one for our consideration, it would be plain that the appellant had acquired good title, even though her deed had not been placed upon record, by the payment of taxes for seven successive years. Considering that statute alone, it may be admitted that the warranty deed would constitute color of title. That statute, however, must be considered in connection with other statutory provisions which are applicable to the present situation.

Section 10596, Rem. Comp. Stat. provides that: 'All deeds, mortgages, and assignments of mortgages, shall be recorded in the office of the county auditor of the county where the land is situated, and shall be valid as against bona fide purchasers from the date of their filing for record in said office; and when so filed shall be notice to all the world.'

By chapter 278, Laws of 1927, that section of the statute was expressly repealed, and section 2 of that chapter provides 'A conveyance of real property, when acknowledged by the person executing the same (the acknowledgment being certified as required by law), may be recorded in the office of the recording officer of the county where the property is situated. Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration from the same vendor, his heirs or devisees, of the same real property or any portion thereof whose conveyance is first duly...