Krogh, In re

Decision Date06 June 1975
Docket NumberNo. CD,CD
Citation85 Wn.2d 462,536 P.2d 578
PartiesIn the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceedings of Egil KROGH, Jr., Attorney at Law. 6269.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Washington State Bar Assn., Michael E. Jacobsen, Seattle, for appellant.

Culp, Dwyer, Guterson & Grader, William L. Dwyer, Seattle, for respondent.

ROSELLINI, Associate Justice.

Egil Krogh, Jr., was admitted by this court to the practice of law in the state of Washington on September 20, 1968. On February 4, 1974, he was suspended as a result of his having been convicted of a felony, and on February 19, 1974, a formal complaint was filed by the president of the Washington State Bar Association containing a single item.

It alleged that on November 30, 1973, an information was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Criminal No. 857--73) charging the respondent with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy against rights of citizens), a felony. According to the allegations, the respondent attorney thereafter pleaded guilty to the information and on January 25, 1974, a judgment and commitment order was entered, finding the respondent attorney guilty of the crime charged in the information. The respondent was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 2 to 6 years, provided, however, that he would be committed for a period of 6 months, with the execution of the remainder of the sentence suspended and the respondent attorney placed on unsupervised probation for a period of 2 years.

The complaint charged that the acts and omissions of the respondent constituted violations of rule 1.1(a) and rule 1.1(c) of the Rules for Discipline for Attorneys.

DRA 1.1(a) provides that an attorney may be censured, reprimanded, suspended, or disbarred for the commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether it be committed in the course of his relations as an attorney, or otherwise, and whether it constitutes a felony or misdemeanor. It provides that his conviction shall be conclusive evidence, at the disciplinary hearing, of his guilty of the crime described in the indictment of information and of his violation of the statute upon which it is based.

The rule further provides for a disciplinary hearing, according to the provisions of DRA 3.2, to determine whether moral turpitude was in fact an element of the crime committed by the attorney, and the disciplinary action recommended to result therefrom. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the hearing panel are subject to adoption, modification or reversal by the disciplinary board upon its review of the record. If suspension or disbarment is recommended, the matter must be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. DRA 5.6(h).

Rule 1.1(c) makes violation of an attorney's oath or duties grounds for disbarment.

It was also alleged that the respondent's conduct constituted a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1--102 (misconduct), providing in pertinent part that '(A) A lawyer shall not: . . . (e)ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.' Later the complaint was amended to charge in addition a violation of DR 1--102(A)(5), which provides, in part, that a lawyer shall not '(e)ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.'

The information referred to in the complaint charged that while the respondent was an officer and employee of the United States Government, first as Deputy Assistant for Domestic Affairs to the President of the United States and later as Undersecretary of Transportation, and acting in his official capacity, in conjunction with others who were officials and employees of

the United States Government, the defendant unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree with his co-conspirators to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, a citizen of the United States, in the free exercise and enjoyment of a right and privilege secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to conceal such activities. It further charged that the co-conspirators did, without legal process, probable cause, search warrant or other lawful authority, enter the offices of Dr. Fielding in Los Angeles County, California, with the intent to search for, examine and photograph documents and records containing confidential information concerning Daniel Ellsberg, and thereby injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Dr. Fielding in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege secured to him by the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The information alleged that the actual entry was made by co-conspirators with the knowledge, consent, approval and assistance of the respondent. Various overt acts were alleged. To all of these allegations, the respondent had pleaded guilty.

In response to the filing of the complaint by the president of the bar association, a hearing panel was convened. The respondent, represented by counsel, appeared before it and explained that his admitted participation in the conspiracy came about in the following manner:

In 1968, when the respondent graduated from law school, he went to work for the firm of Hullin, Ehrlichman, Roberts and Hodge in Seattle. He practiced there about 3 months and was offered a job at the White House in Washington, D.C., which he accepted. He spent 4 1/2 years in Washington. Upon returning from a trip to Viet Nam in 1971 he was asked to be one of the directors of a White House 'special intelligence unit,' which became known as the 'plumbers.' The respondent was told that the President wanted him to undertake an assignment in connection with the unauthorized disclosure of the Pentagon Papers. He was told that the President wanted him to pursue the investigation with utmost zeal and he was instructed to read the first chapter of the President's book 'My Six Crises,' dealing with his investigation and pursuit of Alger Hiss. The respondent understood that his work was to be kept secret and that he was to apply the maximum effort and utilize whatever means the government had at its disposal to terminate any leaks in what the President termed 'national security' information.

The respondent acted in accordance with his instructions.

It was suggested to him that it would be well to obtain a psychiatric profile of Daniel Ellsberg. Such a profile was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, but this profile was deemed unsatisfactory, since it did not show Ellsberg to be an untrustworthy person.

The respondent and his co-director adopted a plan suggested by E. Howard Hunt, who was also a member of the investigative unit, to break into the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and photograph whatever materials could be found in the files regarding Dr. Ellsberg. The respondent was told that both the CIA and the FBI had engaged in similar clandestine activities, the one abroad and the other at home, prior to 1966. 1 Insofar as his testimony revealed, he voiced no objection to the legality of the break-in, although he understood the FBI would ordinarily have been the proper agency to conduct domestic investigations, whether legal or illegal. The FBI was not asked to conduct this clandestine investigation, according to the respondent, because it was feared that it would give the director a position of advantage over the White House.

The respondent received assurance from Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy that the persons they would employ to conduct the entry into Dr. Fielding's office would effect the procedure in such a manner as to leave no evidence that a break-in had occurred. However, after the deed was perpetrated, he was shown pictures of the interior of Dr. Fielding's office which revealed that it had been left in great disorder. 2 Respondent was much distressed by this fact, not it appears, because of concern for Dr. Fielding's property but rather because of the fear that an investigation of the burglary might lead to a discovery of the identity of the perpetrators.

Shortly after this incident the special investigative unit ceased to function as such. The respondent testified that he had never participated in any other enterprise of this nature.

When the break-in of the Democratic National Headquarters at the Watergate Hotel became a subject of investigation by the Senate, inquiries made by the investigating committee revealed the existence of the special investigative unit and the clandestine nature of its mission, as well as the identities of its directors and at least some of its members. It was during this investigation that Daniel Ellsberg was being tried for alleged violations of federal law in disclosing the Pentagon Papers. In April 1973 the respondent was informed that a memorandum describing the break-in in California had been presented to the President and that the President 'as a matter of principle' decided that this memorandum should go to the judge presiding in the Ellsberg case. The memorandum was turned over to the defense, and public disclosure immediately followed. Judge Byrne, the judge conducting the Ellsberg case, had asked for affidavits from all individuals who had any knowledge about the break-in.

After some days of deliberation and after discussing his problem with Elliott Richardson, the Attorney-General designate, and with John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, the respondent concluded that he should disclose what he knew about the break-in by way of affidavit. He asked Ehrlichman to ask the President to relieve him from all 'executive privilege' and 'national security' requirements. Ehrlichman told him on May 2nd that the President had relieved him of the executive privilege restriction to the extent that he could describe the meeting with the President at...

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  • In re Disciplinary Proceeding against Haley
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    • January 26, 2006
    ...that "in a disciplinary proceeding, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the attorney." In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Krogh, 85 Wash.2d 462, 483, 536 P.2d 578 (1975). See also In re Discipline of Little, 40 Wash.2d 421, 430, 244 P.2d 255 (1952). Because lawyers "are subject to ......
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    ...lawyer to forget the oath of attorney in the future. In re Walgren, 104 Wash.2d 557, 572, 708 P.2d 380 (1985); In re Krogh, 85 Wash.2d 462, 479, 536 P.2d 578 (1975). Rosellini has fully realized the severity of his offense. The Board of Governors agreed with the conclusion of Dr. Vath and o......
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    ...the punishment suffered is sufficient to guarantee the oath of office will not again be forgotten by the attorney. In re Krogh, 85 Wash.2d 462, 479, 536 P.2d 578 (1975). In In re Krogh, 93 Wash.2d 504, 507, 610 P.2d 1319 (1980), the court found Egil Krogh had suffered enough punishment by h......
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