Kroll v. U.S., 93-2264

• Decision Date: 10 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-2264,93-2264
• Citation: 58 F.3d 1087
• Parties: 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769 Mark KROLL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and United States Postal Service, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1087

58 F.3d 1087

149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2769

Mark KROLL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America and United States Postal Service Defendants-Appellees.

No. 93-2264.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 11, 1994.

Decided July 10, 1995.

Charles A. Butler, Trenton, MI (argued and briefed), for plaintiff-appellant.

Francis L. Zebot, Asst. U.S. Atty., Detroit, MI (argued and briefed), for defendants-appellees.

Before: JONES and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; BECKWITH, District Judge. ^*

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Mark Kroll is an employee of Defendant-Appellee United States Postal Service ("USPS"), and he is appealing the district court's dismissal of his case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Kroll has alleged at various stages of this litigation that USPS's failure to compensate him for use of his suggestion, as required by the USPS Employee Suggestion Program ("ESP"), gave rise to various causes of action including breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and tortious conversion of his ideas without just compensation. We find that the ESP is a working condition governed by the collective bargaining agreement between the American Postal Workers' Union ("APWU") and USPS. We further find that the Postal Reorganization Act ("PRA"), which governs the collective bargaining agreement, provides a comprehensive scheme for employment relations within USPS, and as such it preempts recourse to other possible statutory bases for federal district court jurisdiction over Kroll's claims. Additionally, we find that because the ESP mandates that the reevaluation decisions of the Management Awards Review Committee are final, the district court correctly determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear the case. We AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

I.

During the time of his employment with USPS, Kroll has at all times been a member of the bargaining unit represented by APWU. In chapter 12 of the PRA, 39 U.S.C. Secs. 1201-1209, Congress has given postal employees rights to bargain collectively over their wages, hours, and working conditions through collective bargaining representatives.

The ESP is an employee suggestion program by which USPS employees can make suggestions to management for increased efficiency in postal service operations, and if a suggestion is actually adopted and results in savings to the USPS, the employee is compensated for the use of the idea. The official policy document for the ESP is the USPS Employee & Labor Relations Manual ("ELM"). Handbook EL-601, Suggestion Program Administrator's Guide ("Administrator's Guide"), sets forth the ESP in detail, and notes that it is intended to serve as a basic reference document for the ESP. The Administrator's Guide states that should a discrepancy between the Administrator's Guide and the ELM ever arise, the ELM is to prevail. ¹ The Administrator's Guide explains that "[a]ction on a suggestion or an award is solely a management function; therefore, it is not subject to formal grievance procedures." The ESP does include a reevaluation process: a suggester may request reevaluation of a suggestion that has not been adopted as long as the suggester (1) submits new material; (2) takes a new approach; or (3) clarifies significant issues or questions. The suggester must submit the request for reevaluation within fifteen days of receipt of management's rejection. The Administrator's Guide states that "[a]ll decisions under this request for reevaluation process are final."

On January 11, 1983, Kroll submitted a suggestion under the ESP, which was rejected on February 23, 1983. On January 26, 1986, and November 23, 1986, Kroll again submitted suggestions which were rejected on February 28, 1986, and September 15, 1987, respectively. Kroll explains that because he did not have any different information at the time of these rejections, he did not seek reevaluation of any of his suggestions. Kroll alleges that in early 1990 he discovered that the USPS was in fact using his rejected ideas. In 1991, Kroll submitted new versions of his old ideas, and when they were rejected, he submitted them for reevaluation. They were again rejected, and thereafter Kroll submitted a Standard Form 95, the form used for administrative claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), demanding $8,602,200.00 in damages because of the rejection of his suggestions.

On July 28, 1992, pursuant to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a), Kroll filed the complaint in this case. ² He brought suit against both the United States and the USPS, alleging that USPS's actions constituted a breach of contract and the "tort of unjust enrichment." He implicitly claimed that the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to the FTCA. ³ On April 30, 1993, Defendants moved for dismissal under either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or (6), or alternatively for summary judgment. On August 30, 1993, the district court granted Defendants' motion on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Kroll v. United States, 832 F.Supp. 199 (E.D.Mich.1993). Kroll appealed to this court.

II.

This court reviews the district court's dismissal of Kroll's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Greater Detroit Resource Recovery Auth. v. EPA, 916 F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir.1990). "[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to 'satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.' " Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 165, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934)). Usually, when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, this court is to construe the complaint liberally, and to take as true all uncontroverted factual allegations on the face of the complaint. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Stevens v. Employer-Teamsters Joint Council No. 84 Pension Fund, 979 F.2d 444, 455 (6th Cir.1992); Ecclesiastical Order of the ISM of Am, Inc. v. IRS, 725 F.2d 398, 402-03 (6th Cir.1984). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test." Ecclesiastical Order, 725 F.2d at 403. When this court reviews a motion to dismiss that mounts a factual attack on the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it is not to presume that the factual allegations asserted in the complaint are true. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.1990).

III.

The district court held that the ESP is governed by the collective bargaining agreement between APWU and USPS because the ESP directly relates to wages and working conditions. Kroll v. United States, 832 F.Supp. 199 (E.D.Mich.1993). Kroll argues that the ESP is not governed by the collective bargaining agreement and points to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hayes v. USPS, 859 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.1988).

In Hayes, a former postal employee filed suit alleging that the USPS's failure to compensate him for ideas he had proposed pursuant to the ESP was breach of an implied employment contract between him and the USPS. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Despite the adverse result in Hayes, Kroll argues that the findings in Hayes support the view that the collective bargaining agreement does not govern the ESP.

In Hayes, the Fifth Circuit assessed whether the "implied contract arising out of the USPS Employee Suggestion Program" was part of Hayes' employment contract with the USPS, or instead was a contract separate from his employment. The court found that the contract implied from the ESP was authorized by statute, and thus was not part of the employment contract. 859 F.2d at 356. We disagree. ⁴ We determine that 5 U.S.C. Sec. 4503 does not authorize the USPS's ESP, and therefore it is not an appropriate basis on which to determine that Kroll's claims with regard to the ESP, whether contractual or tortious in nature, exist independently of his employment relationship with the USPS. Indeed, we find that the extent to which the PRA removed the USPS and its employees from the general provisions related to government organization and employees as expressed in Title 5 clearly illustrates the intent to make the PRA, as codified in Title 39, a comprehensive scheme governing the USPS and its employees.

We agree with the district court's determination that the ESP is incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement through the ELM which delineates the ESP. Article 19 of the collective bargaining agreement with APWU incorporates by reference all parts of postal handbooks, manuals, and regulations "that directly relate to wages, hours, or working conditions."

We find the United States Claims Court's decision in Hayes v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 150, 1990 WL 44327 (Cl.Ct.1990) ("Hayes II" ) ⁵ to be a well-reasoned and persuasive opinion that clearly supports this view. ⁶ The Claims Court, disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit's conclusions, found that the ESP, and therefore Hayes' claims regarding the ESP, were "directly related to the labor/management relationship existing between the agency and the employee." Id. at 154. The Claims Court emphasized the comprehensive nature of the PRA. Id. at 153-56. The court determined that although the PRA does not explicitly mention employee suggestion programs, such programs infer benefit or compensation to employees and the PRA provides that all benefits and compensation are to be determined through collective bargaining. Id. at 154; see 39 U.S.C. Sec. 1003(a). In addition, the court found that even though the collective bargaining...