Kronish v. Provasoli
| Decision Date | 16 March 1962 |
| Citation | 149 Conn. 368,179 A.2d 823 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Julius KRONISH v. Anthony PROVASOLI. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Dennis N. Garvey, New Haven, with whom was Alan R. Weiner, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).
Kevin T. Gormley, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Martin E. Gormley, New Haven, for appellee (defendant).
Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, SHEA and ALCORN, JJ.
This action arose out of a collision between a car owned and operated by the plaintiff and one owned and operated by the defendant. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant, in accordance with § 234 of the Practice Book, had moved for a directed verdict in his favor and, after the return of the verdict, moved that it be set aside on the ground that it was against the evidence and, further, that judgment be entered for the defendant. The court granted the motion in toto, and from judgment for the defendant the plaintiff appeals. The court filed a memorandum of decision setting forth with considerable care its reasons for setting aside the verdict. In brief, the court held that the jury could not find otherwise than that the defendant had proven contributory negligence.
If, on the evidence as presented and under the pleadings, the jury could reasonably have found in accordance with the verdict as rendered, then it could not be set aside as being against the evidence. Goodman v. Norwalk Jewish Center, Inc., 145 Conn. 146, 154, 139 A.2d 812. Even if the court below, or this court, felt that the jury would have used better judgment if they had returned a defendant's verdict on the basis of contributory negligence this, without more, would give no right to set the verdict aside. Labbee v. Anderson, 149 Conn. 58, 60, 175 A.2d 370, and cases cited therein. Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, and only if the jury were compelled to find it proven could the verdict be set aside on the ground adopted by the trial court. Tarzia v. Koopman, 147 Conn. 540, 544, 163 A.2d 320.
The facts which are material to the issue involved in this appeal and which the jury might have found may be rather briefly summarized. Helen Street in Hamden runs generally east and west and is about thirty-four feet wide. It is intersected on the south, but not crossed, by Fairview Avenue, which runs generally north and south and is about thirty feet wide. An overhead traffic control light flashes yellow for traffic moving in either direction on Helen Street. Traffic also moves in both directions on Fairview Avenue. About 8:30 a. m. on September 19, 1957, which was a bright, clear, dry day, the plaintiff was operating his car westerly on Helen Street. The defendant had stopped his car, to take on a passenger, at the curb on the south side of Helen Street, facing east, at a point about 100 feet west of the intersection. At some time, the defendant put his car in motion and proceeded easterly along Helen Street toward the intersection. The plaintiff's car was not equipped with a mechanical signaling device, but as he approached the intersection he slowed down and put out his left hand to signal his intention to make a left turn south into Fairview Avenue. His car and that of the defendant collided in the southwest quadrant of the intersection. The plaintiff testified that the collision occurred within the intersection but that the impact pushed his car ten or twelve feet to the east. The front of the plaintiff's car and the front and left front of the defendant's car were damaged. The plaintiff's car was proceeding through the intersection at about ten or fifteen miles an hour at the time of the impact. The plaintiff did not see the defendant's car until the plaintiff had partially made his left turn and the defendant's car 'shot directly in front of' the plaintiff. The defendant first saw the plaintiff's car before it reached the intersection, and thereafter he had it in sight; he saw it slowing down and assumed that the plaintiff might be going to make a turn; nevertheless the defendant continued on, at a claimed speed of about fifteen miles an hour, and did not sound his horn or apply his brakes. He thought that the plaintiff would let him through and kept going.
The evidence discloses no action on the part of the plaintiff which would warrant the defendant's claimed assumption. The jury were fully justified in finding the defendant negli...
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...Michaud v. Gagne, 155 Conn. 406, 409, 232 A.2d 326; Marcio v. Helm's Express, Inc., 154 Conn. 615, 618, 228 A.2d 128; Kronish v. Provasoli, 149 Conn. 368, 371, 179 A.2d 823. Section 14-246, in effect at the time of the accident, provides that '(t)he driver of a vehicle intending to turn to ......
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Turbert v. Mather Motors, Inc.
...Ramonas v. Zucker, 163 Conn. 142, 147, 302 A.2d 242; Michaud v. Gagne, 155 Conn. 406, 409, 232 A.2d 326; Kronish v. Provasoli, 149 Conn. 368, 371, 179 A.2d 823. The legislature has recognized that a standard of reasonable safety applies both to left turns into private alleys and left turns ......
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Petrizzo v. Commercial Contractors Corp.
...of proving that Petrizzo was chargeable with contributory negligence and had assumed the risk of what befell him. Kronish v. Provasoli, 149 Conn. 368, 370, 179 A.2d 823. In our approach to that issue, the evidence must be given the most favorable construction to which it is reasonably entit......
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Marcio v. Helm's Exp., Inc.
...14-241(b), 14-242(a) and (b), 14-244 and 14-246 of the General Statutes in effect on the date of the collision. See Kronish v. Provasoli, 149 Conn. 368, 371, 179 A.2d 823. The pertinent provisions of these sections appear in the footnote. In three of his requests the plaintiff asked that th......