Krostrzewa v. City of Troy, et al
| Decision Date | 09 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-1037,00-1037 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) Charles Kostrzewa, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. City of Troy, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit. No. 99-70590, Paul D. Borman, District Judge. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Kevin S. Ernst, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
Lori Grigg Bluhm, OFFICE OF CITY ATTORNEY, Troy, Michigan, for Appellees.
Before: SILER, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Kostrzewa ("Kostrzewa" or "plaintiff") appeals the district court's decision dismissing 1) his excessive force claims against the City of Troy, Michigan and two of its police officers, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C §1983, 2) his state law claim of gross negligence against the same two officers, and 3) his state law malicious prosecution claim against a third officer who, when plaintiff demanded medical attention following an allegedly overly tight application of handcuffs, charged him with obstructing a police officer.
We REVERSE the district court's decision dismissing plaintiff's claims, and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings.
On November 18, 1998, Officer Sewell of the City of Troy, Michigan Police Department stopped Charles Kostrzewa in the eastbound lane of Maple Road after Kostrzewa made an illegal left-hand turn. A routine traffic check revealed that Kostrzewa's license had been suspended for failing to pay a previous traffic ticket, and that a civil warrant had been issued by the Oakland County Circuit Court due to plaintiff's failure to pay child support. Officer Sewell placed plaintiff under arrest and then radioed Officers Kocenda and Jenkins, requesting that they pick up Kostrzewa and take him to the Troy Police Department.
Officers Kocenda and Jenkins arrived on the scene and, as plaintiff alleges in his complaint, "forcefully handcuffed" him. 1 Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 9 (Compl.). Plaintiff complained to the officers that the handcuffs were too small and tight, and that they were injuring his wrists. In Officer Kocenda's police report, he stated that "[t]he handcuffs were only able to be latched to the first tooth as the arrested [sic] has large wrists." J.A. at 60 (Kocenda Police Report). The officers, in response to plaintiff's continued complaints of pain, informed him that it was the City of Troy's policy to handcuff detainees no matter what the circumstances.
In his complaint, the plaintiff stated that his cuffed wrists were further injured by his "being tossed about in the back seat ... as the Defendant Officers amused themselves with unnecessary speeding, tailgating, abrupt braking, and general reckless driving along a winding road." J.A. at 9 (Compl.). While being thrown about the back seat of the car, "Plaintiff's head and shoulders were knocked against the plastic partition between the back seat and the officers, necessitating Plaintiff to wedge himself in the footrest portion of the back seat to keep from further injury." J.A. at 9-10 (Compl.).
Plaintiff asked for medical care as soon as he arrived at the Troy Police Station. The officers informed him that he had to be booked before he could receive medical attention. Sergeant McWilliams, on duty in the station when Kostrzewa was brought in for booking, was informed of plaintiff's requests for medical attention. Sergeant McWilliams informed plaintiff that if he continued to insist on obtaining medical care, he would be criminally prosecuted for hindering and obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties. Despite this warning, plaintiff still insisted on seeing a doctor, at which point Sergeant McWilliams began to scream and yell at him, further threatening him with prosecution for obstruction. Kostrzewa still insisted on medial attention.
Officers Kocenda and Jenkins were assigned to transport plaintiff to the hospital. Before doing so, they searched for and found a larger set of handcuffs to use on Kostrzewa while transporting him. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Kocenda then cuffed his wrists, which were already swollen, so that he could be taken to the hospital. Plaintiff's handcuffs were not removed at the hospital until he was examined by a doctor, at which point Kocenda agreed to free only one of his wrists, despite the fact that plaintiff's wrists were allegedly "extremely swollen, red and painful." J.A. at 11 (Compl.). The doctor conducted a brief examination and recommended elevating the wrists and applying ice to reduce the swelling, as well as ibuprofen for the pain. Plaintiff was cuffed for the transport back to the police station, and on the way back the officers allegedly drove in the same reckless manner.
Plaintiff was eventually charged with driving with a suspended license and obstructing a police officer's duties. At his arraignment, plaintiff was given a personal bond on these misdemeanor charges. 2
On February 11, 1999, Kostrzewa filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, including the following claims against the defendants-appellees in this case: 1) that Officers Kocenda and Jenkins violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force when arresting him; 2) a state law claim alleging that Officers Kocenda and Jenkins were grossly negligent in effecting his arrest; 3) that Sergeant McWilliams violated his Fourth Amendment rights by prosecuting him on obstruction charges without probable cause to do so; 4) a state law claim of malicious prosecution against McWilliams; and 5) a claim alleging that Troy's policy of handcuffing all detainees regardless of the circumstances violated his constitutional rights.
The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On August 27, 1999, the district court granted the defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss with respect to all of the claims except the federal Fourth Amendment claim against Defendant McWilliams. Plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) concerning his excessive force claim, which the district court denied. The plaintiff and McWilliams subsequently agreed to dismiss, without prejudice, the federal Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiff's appeal to this court from the final judgment followed.
This court reviews a district court's decision dismissing a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo.Performance Contracting, 163 F.3d at 369. This court treats all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and dismissal is proper only "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claims that would entitle it to relief[.]" Id. (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that Officers Kocenda and Jenkins used excessive force when arresting him, taking him to the police station, and transporting him to and from the hospital following his request for medical attention. The Supreme Court has held that excessive force claims are best analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In determining whether excessive force was used, courts must ask whether the officer's actions, in light of the totality of the circumstances, were objectively reasonable. Id. at 396-97. Because this is a test of objective reasonableness, the underlying motivations of the officer in making the arrest should not be examined. Id. at 397.
In determining whether an officer's actions were reasonable, the specific facts of each case are key. Id. at 396. Courts should pay particular attention to "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. While courts must look to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a seizure was reasonable, they must be sure to view those facts "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."Id.
When making an arrest or investigatory stop, the government has "the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Id. Law enforcement officers are inevitably required to make difficult, split-second decisions regarding the amount of force needed in a particular situation, and "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 396-97 (quotation omitted).
In looking to the facts of this case as stated in the complaint, it appears clear that none of the specific factors mentioned by the Supreme Court weigh in favor of a greater use of force. Plaintiff was stopped by police because he made an illegal left-hand turn, and was arrested following a routine traffic check when it was discovered that his license was suspended and that there was an outstanding civil warrant for his failure to pay child support. These crimes are not particularly severe, nor do they indicate that the plaintiff had a tendency toward violence. There is also no evidence that the plaintiff attempted to flee from the officers, or that he resisted arrest in any way.
The district court stated in its opinion dismissing plaintiff's excessive force claim that, even for individuals like Kostrzewa who are arrested for non-violent misdemeanors, an officer's decision to apply handcuffs when arresting an individual is objectively reasonable. While this circuit has noted that...
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