Krum v. Sheppard

• Citation: 255 F. Supp. 994
• Decision Date: 30 June 1966
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 5152.
• Parties: Jean Cobb KRUM, Plaintiff, v. Richard D. SHEPPARD and Gordon P. Hurley, jointly and severally, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

255 F. Supp. 994

Jean Cobb KRUM, Plaintiff, v. Richard D. SHEPPARD and Gordon P. Hurley, jointly and severally, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 5152.

United States District Court W. D. Michigan, S. D.

June 30, 1966.

Wickett & Erickson, Kalamazoo, Mich., Charles C. Wickett, Kalamazoo, Mich., of counsel, for plaintiff.

Robert C. Goussy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.

OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

FOX, District Judge.

The central issue in this case is whether the plaintiff's cause of action, if any. under the federal civil rights act, is barred by the Michigan statute of limitations relating to "actions to recover damages for injuries to person or property."

The complaint alleges that the defendants, Richard D. Sheppard and Gordon P. Hurley, state police officers, deprived the plaintiff of rights guaranteed him by the Constitution and laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985. The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground, among others, that the statute of limitations is a bar to this action.

Since the factual background of this case is fully set out in People v. Krum, 374 Mich. 356, 132 N.W.2d 69 (1965), the following summary of the facts should be adequate.

The defendants were maintaining a road block at the Mackinac Bridge, searching for two escaped convicts. When a passenger in the back seat of plaintiff's car refused to move a duffel bag and some equipment after being requested to do so by defendant Sheppard, and after the car had been moved to the side of the bridge, as ordered by the officers, the plaintiff got out and told the officers that there was no reason for them to search the car. The defendants claimed that this aroused their suspicions, and a rather animated discussion followed.

At some point during this discussion, Trooper Hurley resumed checking other cars. While checking another car, he claimed that the plaintiff stepped between him and the car, asking for his name and badge number, and that finally the plaintiff brushed against him, moving his carbine to one side. The plaintiff was then arrested and taken to the Mackinac County jail.

Following the plaintiff's arrest, his companions allowed the car to be searched, and no fugitives or illegal articles were discovered.

In April of 1961, the plaintiff was convicted of interfering with an officer in the performance of his duties, and the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed his conviction.

Section 1983 of Title 42 U.S.C.A. was derived from, "Act Apr. 20, 1871 c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13." This Act grew out of a message sent to Congress by President Grant on March 23, 1871, in which he said:

"A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States * * *.7

7. Cong Globe 42d Cong, 1st Sess, p. 244." (Emphasis supplied.) Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 497. (1961).

The Section in question creates a federal right to be enforced by federal courts. Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d at 501. Section 1983 of Title 42 U.S.C.A. states:

"Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

There is no federal statute of limitations applicable to actions under that Section of the Civil Rights Act, and the Civil Rights Act does not itself contain any provision limiting the time within which such actions may be brought.

It is settled that: "There being no federal statute fixing a limitation on civil rights actions, the applicable statute of the forum state would control. Citing O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980, 982; Mohler v. Miller, 235 F.2d 153, 155 (CA 6, 1956); Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F.2d 914, 915 (CA 10, 1949), cert. den. 336 U.S. 970, 69 S.Ct. 933, 93 L.Ed. 1121; Kenney v. Killian, 133 F.Supp. 571, 575-576 (W.D.Mich., 1955)." Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119, 121 (CA 6, 1964).

The Michigan statute provides: "All actions and rights shall be governed and determined according to the law under which the right accrued, in respect to the limitations of such actions or right of entry." M.S.A. § 27A.5869, Comp. Laws Supp. 1961, § 600.5869.

The search of plaintiff's automobile and the arrest of the plaintiff, which are alleged to have been illegal in Counts I and II, both occurred on September 26, 1959. Plaintiff's cause of action, if any, on these two Counts accrued on that date.

Count III alleges that the defendant Hurley filed a false complaint against the plaintiff and that both of the defendants testified falsely at the two preliminary hearings and at the trial, all of which is alleged to be in deprivation of the plaintiff's civil rights. The complaint which charged the plaintiff with obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties, was filed on September 27, 1959. Following a preliminary examination in February of 1960, an amended complaint was signed in October of 1960, and a second preliminary examination was held in November of 1960. The trial was held in April of 1961.

Therefore, any rights which plaintiff has under Count III accrued before the end of April 1961. Since Count IV alleges a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights by means of the acts alleged in the other three Counts, any cause of action for conspiracy accrued not later than the end of April 1961.

The statute which was in effect at the time any cause of action may have accrued to the plaintiff is M.S.A. § 27.605, Comp.Laws 1948, § 609.13, which read in pertinent parts, as follows:

"All actions in any of the courts of this state shall be commenced within 6 years next after the causes of action shall accrue, and not afterward, except as hereinafter specified: Provided, however,

1. * * *

2. Actions to recover damages for injuries to person or property and actions for trespass upon lands shall be brought within 3 years from the time said actions accrue, and not afterwards;

3. Actions * * * for false imprisonment, for malicious prosecution, * * * shall be brought within 2 years from the time the cause for action accrues, and not afterwards." (Emphasis supplied.)

The plaintiff contends that none of the enumerated exceptions apply to a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act, and that the general six-year provision therefore governs. The defendants contend that subsection 2 applies.¹ If defendants' contention is correct, then plaintiff's action is barred inasmuch as the complaint in this action was filed on September 24, 1965, 5 years and 363 days after the alleged illegal search and arrest, and four years and five months after the criminal trial.

The question which this court must decide is whether an action for deprivation of civil rights is one "for injuries to person or property" within the meaning of M.S.A. § 27.605(2), Comp.Laws 1948, § 609.13(2).

The Civil Rights Act was enacted primarily to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. As was said in Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. at 476, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, at 496:

"Its purpose is plain from the title of the legislation, `An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes.' 17 Stat. 13."

The Fourteenth Amendment protects the most fundamental personal rights and liberties guaranteed to any citizen of the United States. When one is deprived of his civil rights, it is clear that the injury is to his person and that he is the only one who has standing to sue.

In Williams v. Kansas City, Mo., 104 F.Supp. 848, 857 (W.D.Mo., 1952), the court concluded:

"It is an elementary principle in constitutional law that it is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the law, and if he is denied a facility or convenience which, under substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to another citizen, the individual alone may complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded, and he has no standing to sue for the deprivation of similar civil rights of others." (Emphasis supplied.)

A deprivation of civil rights may, of course, involve an injury to property. However, even in a civil rights action where property has been damaged, the basis of the civil rights action is still the violation of personal rights. Indeed, if an injury to property were all that was involved, the plaintiff would be left to an action for trespass in the state courts. Nonetheless, having decided to bring this action under the Civil Rights Act, the rights which the plaintiff claims were violated are in their very nature personal rights. Moreover, in each Count of his complaint, plaintiff charges the defendants with conduct violative of the rights, privileges and immunities secured to him under the Constitution of the United States. This indicates quite clearly that the plaintiff's claim must be for "injuries to the person" within the ordinary meaning of that term.

The only basis for federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act is the...