Kruse v. Iron Range Snowmobile Club
| Decision Date | 26 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:93-CV-297.,2:93-CV-297. |
| Parties | David KRUSE, Plaintiff, v. IRON RANGE SNOWMOBILE CLUB, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
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Vincent R. Petrucelli, Petrucelli & Petrucelli, Iron River, MI, for plaintiff.
Ronald D. Keefe, Kendricks Bordeau P.C., Marquette, MI, for defendant.
This action arises out of a snowmobile accident that occurred on a snowmobile trail in Iron County, Michigan. Plaintiff David Kruse proceeds in negligence and gross negligence against defendant Iron Range Snowmobile Club ("Snowmobile Club"). The Snowmobile Club was responsible for grooming and signing the trial. This Court's jurisdiction is based solely on the parties' diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Now before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment.
On February 19, 1993, plaintiff, a Wisconsin resident, was driving a snowmobile on a state-owned "designated" snowmobile trail in Iron County in the darkness of the evening at approximately 8:00 p.m. when he struck a four-foot, unmarked, steel bridge parapet that divided two-way traffic on a railroad bridge. Plaintiff was traveling at about 30 miles per hour and did not see the bridge parapet before impact. At the time of the accident, no warning signs were posted on the bridge. Plaintiff's most serious injury is a shattered right leg that has required two knee operations, with another expected.
Defendant Snowmobile Club is said to be liable because it had contractually promised the Michigan Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") to maintain and groom some 219 miles of trails on state-owned property in Michigan's upper peninsula in exchange for reimbursement of expenses. It appears the Snowmobile Club's maintenance and grooming obligations included signing the trails. Defendant does not dispute that it had undertaken the duty to place and maintain necessary signage at the accident site.1 Plaintiff alleges defendant breached this duty by failing to ensure that the requisite signs were in place on the night of the accident and alleges this failure constitutes negligence and gross negligence.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is three-pronged. First, defendant contends it owed plaintiff no duty that could form the basis for plaintiff's claims. Second, defendant asserts immunity from liability for simple negligence under the Michigan Recreational Use Act, M.C.L. § 300.201(1). Third, with respect to the gross negligence claim, defendant contends plaintiff has adduced no evidence that could conceivably warrant a finding by a reasonable jury that its conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury resulted.
Summary judgment is appropriate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 when the record reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The question posed by defendant Snowmobile Club's motion is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id., 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12. The Court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The substantive law identifies which facts are "material." "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. An issue of fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
Defendant Snowmobile Club questions whether its contract with the Michigan Department of Natural Resources can have given rise to a duty of ordinary care owed to a third person in plaintiff's position. It is well-settled in Michigan law that a contractual relationship between two parties may give rise to a duty owed to a third party enforceable in tort. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 272 (6th Cir.1992); Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 18-19, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974); Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich. 251, 260-61, 150 N.W.2d 755 (1967); Freeman-Darling, Inc. v. Andries-Storen-Reynaert Multi-Group, Inc., 147 Mich.App. 282, 284-85, 382 N.W.2d 769 (1985); Talucci v. Archambault, 20 Mich. App. 153, 160-61, 173 N.W.2d 740 (1969). Here, defendant's agreement to groom and sign the trails gave rise to a common law duty to use ordinary care in its performance so as not to endanger the person or property of members of the public reasonably expected to use the trails. Clark, supra, 379 Mich. at 261, 150 N.W.2d 755. Plaintiff is clearly a member of the public to whom the benefit of this duty flows. This duty forms a proper basis for plaintiff's tort claims.
Notwithstanding the existence of such a duty, defendant claims entitlement to the protection of the Recreational Use Act ("Act"). On the date of the accident, the Act provided in relevant part as follows:
A cause of action shall not arise for injuries to a person who is on the lands of another without paying to the owner, tenant or lessee of the lands a valuable consideration for the purpose of.... snowmobiling or any other outdoor recreational use, with or without permission, against the owner, tenant, or lessee of the lands unless the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant, or lessee.
M.C.L. § 300.201(1). It is undisputed that plaintiff paid no consideration for the use of the trail. It is also undisputed that the Snowmobile Club was not, in the traditional sense of the terms, an "owner, tenant or lessee" of the subject trail. Yet, considering the liberal construction given the Act by the Michigan courts, defendant argues it is properly considered a "lessee."
In Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., 58 Mich.App. 486, 491, 228 N.W.2d 786 (1975), aff'd, 394 Mich. 459, 460, 231 N.W.2d 653 (1975), the Michigan Court of Appeals observed that the Act should be liberally construed:
The act in question has the undoubted purpose of furthering recreational activities in Michigan by making certain areas available for such purposes while clearly restating the common-law liability of owners to those who come gratuitously upon their land. Under these circumstances and to carry out the undoubted intention of the legislature, it would seem the statute should be liberally construed. Courts should lean toward that construction which will give the statute force and validity, not to that construction which would nullify it.
The Thomas court went on to hold that an easement holder was an "owner" of an interest in land or an owner of property within the meaning of the Act.
The Thomas reasoning was carried one step further by this Court in a recent unpublished ruling by the Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, Bradshaw v. Tri-County of Southwestern Michigan Snowmobile Club, W.D.Mich. No. 1:93-CV-834, Summary Judgment Opinion dated December 19, 1994. In Bradshaw, a snowmobile club that had been granted a permit, allowing entry onto private farmland for the purpose of making and maintaining snowmobile trails, was held to be a "lessee" under the Act. To hold otherwise, Judge Bell reasoned, would be to defeat the purpose of the Act "to further recreational activities by limiting the liability of those who make it possible." Id., at p. 10.
The facts of the instant case are materially indistinguishable from the facts of Bradshaw. Granted, the Snowmobile Club was not given a "trail permit" to enter onto state-owned land, but its contract with the DNR, conferring the privilege to exercise substantial ongoing control upon the land, is the substantial equivalent of the Bradshaw permit. To deny the Snowmobile Club the Act's immunity simply because it does not appear to be an owner, tenant or lessee under traditional notions would be to exalt the importance of the defendant's relationship to the land in a manner disfavored by the Michigan courts. See Wilson v. Thomas L. McNamara, Inc., 173 Mich.App. 372, 377, 433 N.W.2d 851 (1988), lv. app. denied, 437 Mich. 872 (1989) (). To hold the Snowmobile Club outside the Act's immunity would undeniably undermine the Act's purpose to promote tourism by opening up vast areas of vacant lands and making them available for use by the general public. See Wymer v. Holmes, 429 Mich. 66, 77-79, 412 N.W.2d 213 (1987). Where the Michigan courts have construed the Act liberally to effectuate this purpose, not nullify it, so must this Court. See Ray Ind., Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 758 (6th Cir.1992) ().
Accordingly, for purposes of the immunity granted by the Recreational Use Act, the Court concludes the Snowmobile Club is a "lessee" of the trails it contractually agreed to maintain.
Plaintiff challenges the applicability of the Act for a second reason. The construction of the bridge is said to have altered the land...
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