Krynski v. Chase

• Decision Date: 30 September 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06-CV-4766 (RRM)(JMA).,06-CV-4766 (RRM)(JMA).
• Citation: 707 F.Supp.2d 318
• Parties: Michael KRYNSKI, Plaintiff,v.Thomas H. CHASE, Jr., and Western Express, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

707 F.Supp.2d 318

Michael KRYNSKI, Plaintiff,v.Thomas H. CHASE, Jr., and Western Express, Inc., Defendants.

No. 06-CV-4766 (RRM)(JMA).

United States District Court E.D. New York.

Sept. 30, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael Flomenhaft, Michael Flomenhaft, Esq., Adrienne Deluca, Jacoby & Meyers, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Keith A. Raven, Ryan Emerson Dempsey, Raven & Kolbe, LLP, New York, NY, Joseph Fried, Fried Rogers Goldberg, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MAUSKOPF, District Judge.

Plaintiff Michael Krynski, a Brooklyn, New York resident, brings this personal injury lawsuit arising from a February 26, 2005 automobile accident. Krynski claims that the alleged negligence of Defendants Thomas H. Chase, Jr., a Maryland resident, and Western Express, Inc., a Tennessee corporation, caused Krynski serious personal injuries and economic loss.

Krynski initially filed suit in New York State Supreme Court, Kings County on August 1, 2006. Thereafter, on August 29 2006, Defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) and this Court's 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) diversity jurisdiction, removed the action to this Court. Krynski now seeks partial summary judgment on the issue of Defendants' liability, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)(2). The Court has thoroughly considered the parties' submissions and finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendants were liable; Krynski's motion for partial summary judgment is therefore GRANTED.

I.BACKGROUND

It is undisputed that on February 26, 2005, Chase's 18-wheeled Freightliner tractor-trailer struck the rear of Krynski's Pontiac minivan. At the time of the accident, both Chase and Krynski were proceeding southbound on the Bruckner Expressway in the Bronx, New York. All parties agree that the accident occurred mid-day on a clear day; that the roadway was both dry and level; and that, at the time of the accident, Chase was acting within the scope of his employment with Western Express, the corporate owners of Chase's truck. It is also undisputed that at the accident scene, Chase was ticketed by a New York City police officer for following Krynski's vehicle too closely, a violation of New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129(a).

As is common in automobile negligence cases, Krynski and Chase's characterizations of the February 26, 2009 accident vary. It is Krynski's position that his vehicle was struck from behind while he was proceeding at highway speed, approximately 50 mph, and that traffic conditions were light-to-moderate. Krynski estimated Chase's speed at approximately 75 mph.

In contrast, Chase denies that the vehicles were at speed. Instead, Chase claims that traffic conditions were bumper-to-bumper, and that he struck Krynski at less than 5 mph while attempting to decelerate. According to Chase, he had been following Krynski in the left lane of the highway for some time before the collision, and heavy traffic conditions had persisted for approximately an hour before the accident. During the bulk of that time, Chase claims to have been traveling at no more than 15 to 20 miles per hour. Immediately prior to the accident, Chase claims to have been distracted by another vehicle in the middle lane, which he states “had its left turn signal on and was speeding up and slowing down.” Chase claims that his attention was momentarily diverted by the actions of that third vehicle, which he believed was trying to enter the left lane between Chase's truck and Krynski's Pontiac. A few seconds later, Chase realized that ahead of him Krynski had come to a complete stop. It is Chase's deposition testimony that at that moment he was approximately one car-length behind Krynski, traveling at ten to fifteen miles per hour. Upon seeing Krynski at a full stop directly ahead, Chase braked but was unable to stop. At the time of impact, Chase claims that he was decelerating, and that when he actually struck Krynski, he had slowed to less than 5 miles per hour.

After the accident, a police officer at the scene issued Chase a traffic citation for driving too closely behind Krynski's vehicle. Chase's admission to the police officer that he was “too close” to Krynski's vehicle is allegedly recorded in the accident report, which is annexed as part of the summary judgment record.¹ Chase did not contest the traffic citation, but rather paid the $100 fine.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court may grant summary judgment only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Even if the parties dispute material facts, summary judgment will be granted unless the dispute is “genuine.” Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Throughout this inquiry, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Hanson v. McCaw Cellular Commc'ns, Inc., 77 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir.1996).

Although “summary judgment is highly unusual in a negligence action, where the assessment of reasonableness generally is a factual question to be addressed by the jury King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir.1997), “ ‘the mere fact that a case involves a claim of negligence does not preclude a granting of summary judgment.’ ” Maizous v. Garraffa, 2002 WL 1471556, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2002) (quoting Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F.Supp. 1183, 1186 (S.D.N.Y.1989)).

DISCUSSION

Chase's Liability

To avoid summary judgment, Chase highlights the discrepancy between his version of events and Krynski's. Chase argues that because there are two starkly contrasting versions of the accident, there is necessarily a triable issue of material fact. This Court disagrees. The fact that opposing parties assert competing versions of the same event is not in itself sufficient to preclude summary judgment. See Berk v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 380 F.Supp.2d 334, 346 n. 19 (S.D.N.Y.2005). Contradictory testimony establishes a “genuine” issue for trial only where the conflicting testimony, if credited, would lead to a different legal outcome. Id. In this case, the Court finds nothing outcome determinative in adopting Chase's version over Krynski's, or vice-versa; as discussed below, under either theory Chase's liability is inescapable. See id.; Jacino v. Sugerman, 10 A.D.3d 593, 595, 781 N.Y.S.2d 663 (2d Dep't 2004) (finding no triable issue of fact in auto accident negligence action where under either party's view, defendant's negligence was established as a matter of law).

A. Presumption of Negligence in Cases Involving Slowing or Stopped Vehicles

“Under New York law, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of liability against the rear vehicle and imposes a duty of explanation on the operator of that vehicle.” See Hong v. Maher, No. 02-CV-7825, 2004 WL 771127, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2004) (citing Sekuler v. Limnos Taxi, Inc., 264 A.D.2d 389, 389, 694 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2d Dep't 1999)); Itingen v. Weinstein, 260 A.D.2d 440, 441, 688 N.Y.S.2d 582 (2d Dep't 1999); Inzano v. Brucculeri, 257 A.D.2d 605, 605, 684 N.Y.S.2d 260 (2d Dep't 1999); Barba v. Best Sec. Corp., 235 A.D.2d 381, 381, 652 N.Y.S.2d 71 (2d Dep't 1997).² That presumption arises from both common law principles and New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law, both of which establish that any driver approaching another automobile from the rear “is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his or her vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle.” Hong, 02-CV-7825, 2004 WL 771127 at *2 (citations omitted); N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1129(a); ³see also Chepel v. Meyers, 306 A.D.2d 235, 236, 762 N.Y.S.2d 95 (2d Dep't 2003); Power v. Hupart, 260 A.D.2d 458, 688 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1999). Accordingly, “[t]he operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision.” Lopez v. Minot, 258 A.D.2d 564, 564, 685 N.Y.S.2d 469 (2d Dep't 1999) (internal citations omitted). “If the operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may properly be awarded judgment as a matter of law.” Barile v. Lazzarini, 222 A.D.2d 635, 636, 635 N.Y.S.2d 694 (2d Dep't 1995) (internal citations omitted).

The presumption applies here, where Chase admits that in the midst of bumper to bumper traffic, he struck Krynski's stationary vehicle. While the presumption of negligence is not limited to rear-end collisions with slowing or stationary vehicles, it applies with particular force in these instances, see, 8B N.Y. Jur.2d Automobiles and Other Veh. § 1214 (2009) Collision between moving and parked or standing vehicle, as motorists in heavy traffic must anticipate stopping or slowing by motorists ahead. Harrington v. Kern, 52 A.D.3d 473, 473, 859 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 2008); Argiro v. Norfolk Contract Carrier, Inc., 275 A.D.2d 384, 385, 712 N.Y.S.2d 599 (2d Dep't 2000); Guzman v. Schiavone Const., Co., 4 A.D.3d 150, 150, 772 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1st Dep't 2004); Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392, 393, 638 N.Y.S.2d 110 (2d Dep't 1996). A defendant can overcome the presumption of negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision. See Mangual v. Pleas, No. 02 Civ. 8311, 2004 WL 736817, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2004). “Such a non-negligent explanation may include mechanical failure, unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, a sudden stop of the...