Krzyston v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 18 March 1977
• Citation: Krzyston v. Industrial Commission, 52 Ohio App.2d 109, 368 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio App. 1977)
• Parties: , 6 O.O.3d 71 KRZYSTON, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 109

52 Ohio App.2d 109

368 N.E.2d 74, 6 O.O.3d 71

KRZYSTON, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Ohio et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Lucas County.

March 18, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

Where an employee is given additional duties by her employer which are beyond her work capacity and pressures from such employer and co-workers generate in her a reasonable belief that a failure to perform such duties would result in her discharge, her resignation does not constitute a "quitting" of her work without just cause, within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).

George N. Fell, Toledo, for appellant.

William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., and Jerry Arthur Jewett, Toledo, for appellees.

CLIFFORD F. BROWN, Judge.

The plaintiff, Karen M. Krzyston, appeals from a final judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which affirmed a decision of the board of review, Bureau of Employment Services, which denied unemployment compensation benefits to plaintiff for the stated reason that plaintiff "quit work without just cause" within the meaning of R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).

Although counsel for appellant sets forth no assignments of error, as required by App.R. 16, the thrust of her argument is that the decision of the board of review and the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the board, were unreasonable, unlawful, and not supported by credible, probative evidence and that plaintiff was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.

Plaintiff, early in 1973, was employed as a secretary by the Toledo Regional Board of Review, Industrial Commission of Ohio. She had a Clerk IV job classification rating. Her main responsibilities required her to provide office management and secretarial services for the three-member regional board of review at its Toledo office.

In March 1975, plaintiff was requested in a telephone call from Columbus, Ohio, from someone in the office of the administrator of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, to help in the typing of decisions rendered in hearings on C-92 applications. These applications dealt with determinations of permanent partial disability in workmen's compensation cases. Plaintiff agreed to help if time permitted. Within a few days approximately 300 files were placed on the floor of plaintiff's office. Mr. Stoll, deputy administrator of the Toledo office of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, told plaintiff that typing the permanent partial disability decisions in each of the 300 files was her responsibility. Mr. Stoll was not plaintiff's employer, but worked in close coordination with the Toledo Regional Board of Review.

Mr. Stoll and his employees in the Toledo office exerted pressure on plaintiff either to type the C-92 decisions in the 300 files or face probable discharge from employment. The regular duties of plaintiff as secretary for the Toledo Regional Board of Review were so heavy that she had insufficient time to type any of the C-92 decisions. Two members of the regional board tried but failed in their efforts to find a solution in Columbus for plaintiff's problem.

Solely to avoid probable discharge from employment for the failure to type the C-92 decisions, plaintiff submitted her resignation, effective April 18, 1975, to her employer, the Toledo Regional Board of Review. In another two weeks, an additional 300 files with C-92 decisions requiring typing were expected to be delivered to plaintiff. The secretary who succeeded plaintiff does not have the responsibility of typing C-92 decisions.

The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated substantially by two members of the Toledo Regional Board of Review which employed her. No evidence was offered to oppose plaintiff and no evidence existed to create a factual conflict. We agree with plaintiff's contentions. We reverse.

R.C. 4141.29 provides, in part:

"(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may serve a waiting period or be paid benefits under the following conditions: * * *

"(2) For the duration of his unemployment if the Administrator finds that:

"(a) He quit his work without just cause * * *."

Here an employee was given additional duties by her employer, the regional board of review, or by the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation, with the assent of the regional board, and such additional duties were...