KS v. State
| Decision Date | 05 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A04-0308-JV-383.,49A04-0308-JV-383. |
| Citation | 807 N.E.2d 769 |
| Parties | K.S., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Katherine A. Cornelius, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
K.S. appeals the juvenile court's order committing him to the custody of the Department of Correction ("DOC") after finding him in violation of probation. We reverse.
The sole restated issue we address is whether the juvenile court properly obtained jurisdiction in this matter.
On May 2, 2002, K.S., who was thirteen at the time, was arrested on suspicion of having committed Class A misdemeanor battery. On May 3, 2002, the State filed a petition alleging K.S. to be a delinquent child; a preliminary inquiry and investigation report was also completed on that date by the probation department. The juvenile court also conducted an initial hearing on that date, during which it advised K.S. and his mother of their rights, stated "that it has jurisdiction over this matter" after ascertaining K.S.'s age, and provided K.S. and his mother with a copy of the delinquency petition. App. p. 35.
After K.S. admitted to the battery charge on May 10, 2002, the juvenile court adjudicated him to be delinquent and placed him on probation. The probation department filed several allegations that K.S. violated his probation during 2002 and 2003. On December 4, 2002, the juvenile court ordered a suspended commitment to the DOC for K.S. On April 23, 2003, after another finding of a probation violation, the juvenile court continued K.S.'s suspended commitment to the DOC and additionally placed him on intensive probation. On May 10, 2003, K.S. was arrested on suspicion of battering his sister, K.J. K.S. denied the allegation, but the juvenile court found the allegation to be true after hearing testimony from K.J. and K.S.'s mother. As a result of this violation of probation, on June 18, 2003, the juvenile court granted wardship of K.S. to the DOC for a recommended period of six months. K.S. now appeals.
K.S.'s argument is that the juvenile court never properly obtained jurisdiction during the entirety of these proceedings because it failed to strictly follow the statutory prerequisites for obtaining jurisdiction at the time of the original delinquency filing in May 2002. Indiana courts have held for many years that strict compliance with the statutory prerequisites for obtaining jurisdiction at the commencement of delinquency proceedings is required of juvenile courts. See, e.g., Shupe v. Bell, 127 Ind.App. 292, 300-01, 141 N.E.2d 351, 355 (1957)
() (emphasis added).
141 N.E.2d at 355; Seay v. State, 167 Ind.App. 22, 37, 337 N.E.2d 489, 498 (1975) (); Collins v. State, 540 N.E.2d 85, 86 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (). Noncompliance with the statutory prerequisites precludes the assumption of jurisdiction over a juvenile. Taylor, 438 N.E.2d at 277. Currently, the statutory requirement that juvenile courts authorize the filing of a delinquency petition is found at Indiana Code Section 31-37-10-2, which provides:
The juvenile court shall do the following:
Juvenile delinquency proceedings are different from adult criminal proceedings in many respects. One crucial difference relevant to this case is that in adult criminal proceedings, the decision whether to file and prosecute charges against a defendant rests exclusively with the State, through the filing of an information or indictment by a prosecuting attorney. See Ind.Code § 35-34-1-1. A trial court has no independent power to refuse the filing of an information or indictment. Where juveniles are concerned, however, Indiana Code Section 31-37-10-2 expressly provides that the State does not make the final decision whether to proceed with a juvenile delinquency action. Instead, juvenile courts are vested with the responsibility of reviewing a proposed delinquency petition and an accompanying preliminary investigation form, and making an independent decision whether there is probable cause that (1) the juvenile is delinquent and (2) it is in the best interests of the child or the public to commence a delinquency proceeding. Pursuant to the clear language of the statute, probable cause of the juvenile having committed a criminal act is not enough by itself to require an official juvenile delinquency proceeding; particularly in cases involving less heinous crimes, it may not always be in the best interests of the child or the public to submit the child to the full authority of the judicial system.2
There is no indication in the record that the juvenile court made an independent determination in this case of the necessity of proceeding with a delinquency action. Instead, all that can be gleaned from the record is that the State's delinquency petition was treated like an information or indictment in an adult criminal proceeding, that is, the mere filing of the petition was viewed as sufficient to commence the delinquency proceeding. The chronological case summary reveals that K.S. was arrested and placed in detention on May 2, 2002. The prosecutor filed a delinquency petition on May 3, 2002, and the probation officer also filed a preliminary investigation report on that date. The juvenile court also conducted an initial hearing on that date and issued a post-hearing written order. In it, the court notes the filing of the petition and preliminary investigation report. It notes K.S.'s date of birth and then states that it has jurisdiction over the action.3 It notes the advisement of rights given to K.S. and his mother, the decision to release K.S. from custody, and the decision to exclude the public from any proceedings in the case. However, there is nothing in the initial hearing order or elsewhere in the record demonstrating that the juvenile court assessed whether there was probable cause that (1) K.S. was delinquent or (2) it was in K.S.'s or the public's best interests to allow the State to initiate a delinquency proceeding.
The State does not argue that the juvenile court's approval of the filing of a delinquency petition is not a statutory jurisdictional requirement. Instead, it argues that Taylor should control the outcome of this case. In that case, the juvenile court's order book originally failed to reflect that all of the procedural prerequisites for juvenile jurisdiction had been followed. However, the juvenile court later made a nunc pro tunc amendment to the docket clarifying that all of the steps had, indeed, been followed. Under these circumstances, and because the juvenile did not argue that any of the prerequisites had not, in fact, been discharged or discharged inadequately, our supreme court concluded that "the omissions in the order book, which apparently were the product of clerical oversight, cannot be characterized as reversible error." 438 N.E.2d at 277.
We conclude Taylor is not on point. First, Taylor concerned a situation in which the juvenile court concededly had followed all of the statutory prerequisites to jurisdiction, and had simply failed to officially record them at the time. Here, by contrast, there is no concession by K.S. and no evidence in the record that the juvenile court made an independent determination that it would approve the filing of the delinquency petition on the grounds provided for in Indiana Code Section 31-37-10-2. Second, the Taylor court stated, "The purposes of the procedural requirements had been satisfied; the interests of the public and the juvenile had been evaluated and considered." Id. In K.S.'s case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the interests of K.S. and the public were considered and evaluated by the juvenile court as required by Section 31-37-10-2. To the extent the State notes that K.S. and his mother were informed of their rights and the allegations against K.S. at the initial hearing, and that a preliminary investigation report was filed, such requirements are separate from the requirement that a juvenile court independently approve a delinquency petition filing.4 We conclude that the outcome in Taylor is not controlling here and that the juvenile court did not properly obtain jurisdiction in this matter because of the...
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