Ktng v. Empire Collieries Co

• Citation: 139 S.E. 478
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 22 September 1927
• Parties: KTNG. v. EMPIRE COLLIERIES CO. INTERMONT COAL & IRON CO. v. NICHOLS.

139 S.E. 478

KTNG.

v.EMPIRE COLLIERIES CO.

INTERMONT COAL & IRON CO.

v.NICHOLS.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 22, 1927.

[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Willful— Willfully.]

Certified Questions from the Industrial Commission.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by one King against the Empire Collieries Company, and by one Nichols against the Intermont Coal & Iron Company. On questions certified by the Industrial Commission In both of such proceedings. Questions answered, and award of Commission in second case affirmed.

In King Case: R. L. Lindsay, of Pulaski, for appellant.

H. M. Bandy, of Norton, for appellee.

In Nichols Case: H. M. Bandy, of Norton, for appellant.

BURKS, J. In the first-mentioned case, the Industrial Commission, in pursuance of section 61 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1924, p. 478), has certified to this court for its decision the following case:

"An employee is injured by an accident which arises out of and in the course of his employment and would be entitled to receive compensation, unless the fact that he was at the time of the accident engaged in doing an act which is forbidden under the general law of the state, and for the violation of which a penalty is prescribed, prevents it. The contention is made before this commission that, if such be the situation, then, under the terms of section 14 of the Compensation Act, such employee is guilty of willful misconduct, and neither he nor his dependents (in case of his death) may receive compensation. It is also contended that the commission can go no farther in such cases than merely to ascertain if the act in question is contrary to the law, and if it is, then the claim must be dismissed.

"The hearing commissioner has taken a different view, and has held that, since no willful violation of the statutory inhibition has been shown, compensation must be paid.

"From this decision the insurance carrier has asked for a review before the full commission. The commission therefore desires to certify the question to this honorable court."

Section 14 of the Compensation Act (Acts 1918, c. 400), above referred to, is as follows:

"No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's willful misconduct, including intentional self-inflicted injury, or growing out of his attempt to injure another, or due to intoxication or willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty required by statute, or the willful breach of any rule or regulation adopted by the employer and approved by the Industrial Commission, and brought prior to the accident to the knowledge of the employee. The burden of proof shall be upon him who claims an exemption or forfeiture under this section."

The paragraph we are asked to construe is that denying compensation for an injury due to a "willful failure or refusal to * * * perform a duty required by statute."

There has been so much confusion and conflict among the decisions, English and American, construing the compensation laws that precedents are of but little value, and we have determined to follow the example of the Minnesota court, and decline to "review the decisions in England and in this country, rapidly increasing in number." State v. District Ct., 134 Minn. 16, 158 N. W. 713, L. R. A. 1916P, 957. This conflict is discussed in 28 R. C. L. 798-800, where Lord Chancellor Haldane is quoted as saying:

"Having regard to the conflict which exists between judicial opinions expressed in some of the decided cases, the only safe guide appears to me to be the language of the act of Parliament itself."

We shall follow this rule.

It is to be borne in mind that the Compensation Act is a statute apart to itself, providing compensation for the beneficiaries thereunder upon the terms prescribed, and changing many rules of the common law. It abolishes the doctrine of fellow servants, contributory negligence, assumption of risk. It is in the light of such changes and other ameliorations of the hardships of the common law that we are to ascertain the legislative intent from the language used in section 14.

It is an elementary canon of construction of statutes, that "courts are bound, if it is possible, to give effect to all its several parts. No sentence, clause, or word should be construed as unmeaning or surplusage, if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute." Black Inter. Laws, p. 83.

As stated, the language to be construed is a "willful failure or refusal to * * * perform a duty required by statute." We cannot omit the word "willful." If we did, there could be no recovery by the employee if the failure was simply negligent, but contributory negligence does not bar recovery, and it is conceded generally that the language used covers something more than negligence, however gross. "Willful, " as used in the statute, imports something more than a mere exercise of the will in doing the act. It imports a wrongful intention. An intention to do an act that he knows, or ought to know, is wrongful, or forbidden by law. It involves the idea of premeditation and determination to do the act, though known to be forbidden. There cannot, however, be a willful failure to perform an unknown duty. If the duty is unknown, the employee cannot deliberately determine that he will not perform it. Usually, ignorance of the law is no excuse, and every one is conclusively presumed to know the law; that is, he is estopped from denying such knowledge, but it is entirely competent for the Legislature to make exceptions to the rule. With the innumerable penal statutes on our books, the Legislature might well provide that a workman should not be barred from recovering under...