Kuakini Hospital and Home v. Yamanoha
| Decision Date | 16 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 4121,4121 |
| Citation | 45 Haw. 90,363 P.2d 1006 |
| Parties | KUAKINI HOSPITAL AND HOME v. Margaret E. YAMANOHA and The First Trust Company of Hilo, Ltd., Executors of the Estate of Richard A. Yamanoha, Deceased. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A creditor of a decedent, required to 'present' his claim pursuant to R.L.H.1955, § 317-23, must as the first requisite seek payment out of the estate.
2. Knowledge of a claim against the deceased on the part of the executor of his estate will not excuse presentation of the claim.
3. A statement of a creditor of deceased addressed to the deceased at an old address in the form of an ordinary statement of account, which having been forwarded through the mail came into the hands of the widow, the coexecutrix of the estate, who discarded it, was not 'presented' as a creditor's claim as required by R.L.H. 1955, § 317-23, and the executors were not called upon to act with respect thereto.
4. When a creditor of deceased did not, within the period of four months from the first day of publication of notice to creditors, seek payment out of the estate, no amendment would save the claim.
5. Under R.L.H. 1955, § 317-24, it is not lawful to allow any claim that is barred by the nonclaim statute, R.L.H. 1955, § 317-23. An executor cannot waive the bar of the statute and likewise cannot be estopped to assert it, there being no statutory provision for relief against the nonclaim statute such as exists in some states.
Eichi Oki, Spark M. Matsunaga, Honolulu, for appellant.
Martin Pence, Hilo, for respondents.
Before TSUKIYAMA, C. J., and CASSIDY, WIRTZ, LEWIS and MIZUHA, JJ.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a summary judgment dismissing the action on the ground that plaintiff's averred claim, for 'hospitalization, services rendered and supplies furnished by plaintiff to the deceased,' Dr. Richard A. Yamanoha, is barred by the nonclaim statute, R.L.H. 1955, § 317-23. That statute provides that any claim 'not presented within four months from the first day of publication of the notice [to creditors], * * * shall be forever barred and the executor or administrator shall not be authorized to pay it.'
Dr. Yamanoha died on August 21, 1957. Defendants-appellees, Margaret E. Yamanoha and First Trust Company of Hilo, Ltd., the coexecutirx and coexecutor of his estate, hereinafter referred to as the 'executors,' duly published in the Hilo Tribune-Herald, commencing on September 28, 1957, a notice to creditors of the decedent requiring them to present their claims to the executors at 64 Keawe St., Hilo. This is the address of First Trust Company of Hilo in the County of Hawaii. The probate proceedings were had in the Third Circuit, County of Hawaii, and the Hilo Tribune-Herald, in which the notice was published, is a newspaper of general circulation in that county, as provided by R.L.H. 1955, § 213-10. Plaintiff, however, has its place of business in the City and County of Honolulu.
During the four months' period plaintiff, by mail addressed to the deceased, sent out on more than one occasion a statement in the following form:
"Kuakini Hospital and Home
"347 No. Kuakini St
"Honolulu, Hawaii
Nov. 9, 1957
"Dr. Richard A. Yamanoha
"57 Hina Street
"Hilo, Hawaii
"In-Patient Kuakini Hospital--Balance $2,292.74
88.95
------------
"Total $2,381.69"
These statements were forwarded through the mail to the widow, one of the executors, reaching her at her then residence in Hilo, a different address from that used by plaintiff. According to the widow's uncontested answer to written interrogatories the statements 'were thrown away in the rubbish when received.'
The four months' period expired in January, 1958. A verified claim filed by plaintiff with the clerk of the court on March 11, 1958, with copies to the executors, was rejected by the executors on the ground that time for filing had expired, and this suit followed.
The executors, defendants herein, contend that the steps taken by plaintiff during the four months' period were insufficient for compliance with the statute, that the executors were not called upon to act with respect thereto, and that no steps taken after the expiration of the four months' period could perfect the claim. Plaintiff contends that the widow, who also is sole beneficiary under the will of deceased, failed to carry out her fiduciary duty to plaintiff as a creditor of deceased, that at the trial it would have appeared that she was fully informed in respect of the indebtedness of deceased to plaintiff, that enough was done during the four months' period to save the claim, that if more information should have been furnished by the plaintiff then the executors should have given plaintiff opportunity to do so, and that it is not too late for plaintiff to do so, even now, by amendment of the claim.
Primary emphasis is put by the executors on two things: (1) the absence of any information in the statement received by the widow, during the four months' period, as to the time when the hospitalization occurred, and (2) the statutory requirement that a creditor's claim shall be presented 'with proper vouchers or duly authenticated copies thereof.' However, this case does not require consideration of the necessity of furnishing--or the effect of not furnishing--the above. Whether the onus of calling for further information can be placed on the executor by a paper which is insufficient in the above respects, is a question we do not reach.
To 'present' his claim a creditor must, as the first requisite, seek payment out of the estate. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Love, 232 Ala. 327, 167 So. 703, 713; White v. Blair, 234 Ala. 119, 173 So. 493; Dime Savings Bank v. McAlenney, 76 Conn. 141, 55 A. 1019; Pfeiffer v. Suss, 73 Mo. 245; Horicon v. Langlois' Estate, 115 Vt. 81, 52 A.2d 888.
This rule was recognized in Bishop & Co. v. Williams, 1893, 9 Haw. 299. The case was decided under the Act of June 23, 1868, S.L.H. 1868, p. 51, which was different from the present nonclaim statute in several respects but like the present statute required that a creditor of the deceased present his claim to the executor within a stated time after publication of notice or be forever barred. The claim was based on deceased's endorsement of a note, which after his death was dishonored, and a notary thereupon, within the period fixed by the then nonclaim statute, addressed a notice of protest to the executors, stating therein that 'the holders look to you for the payment [of the note].' The court said at pages 302-303 of 9 Haw.:
'It is urged by defendants' counsel that the notice of protest is not sufficient presentation of a claim, because it was only intended to fix the liability of the indorser. We fail to see, even if this was its primary object, why it cannot also be considered as the presentation of a claim within the statute of non-claim. It afforded them all the particulars of the claim, as to character and amount. It also states a claim that 'the holder[s] look to you for the payment thereof,' a statement unnecessary to fix the liability of the indorser.'
It is well settled that knowledge of the claim on the part of the executor will not excuse presentation of the claim. Estate of S. Kaiu, 1906, 17 Haw. 514, 516. Presentation is required even if the claim appears from the books and papers of the deceased, who conceded his indebtedness. Pfeiffer v. Suss, supra. The nonclaim statute would be nullified if a creditor who did not seek payment from the estate were to be treated as if he had, merely because he continued to send out bills one of which came into the hands of the executor, confirming what he already knew.
In Dime Savings Bank v. McAlenney, supra, the court said 55 A. at page 1021.
In the present case, reliance is upon a statement addressed to the deceased, not to the executors or either of them, at an old address, not the place designated in the notice to creditors for the presentation of claims. It was an ordinary statement of account. It came into the hands of the widow, the coexecutrix, having been forwarded through the mail. The most that can be said is that the coexecutrix exercised her authority as such in receiving it in the mail. She did not treat it as a matter requiring her official attention in her fiduciary capacity. It did not purport to be such. There was not expressed or implied any intention to look to the estate for payment. We hold that there was no presentation of the claim within the four months' period. This is not to be taken as holding, tacitly or otherwise, that the statement here involved would have satisfied the statutory requirements of a valid claim, preventing the bar of the nonclaim statute from applying, if it had not been for the above enumerated circumstances. In view of our holding that not even the first requisite was met, and as we have said, we need not and do not reach the question whether this...
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