Kubiak v. City of Chi., No. 14–3074.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtFLAUM, Circuit Judge.
Citation810 F.3d 476
Parties Laura KUBIAK, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
Docket NumberNo. 14–3074.
Decision Date11 January 2016

810 F.3d 476

Laura KUBIAK, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 14–3074.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 7, 2015.
Decided Jan. 11, 2016.


810 F.3d 478

M. Megan O'Malley, Attorney, O'Malley & Madden, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Kerrie Maloney Laytin, Attorney, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Officer Laura Kubiak was working in the Chicago Police Department's Office of News Affairs ("ONA") when she was verbally assaulted by her colleague, Officer Veeja Zala. Kubiak reported Zala to (1) ONA Director Melissa Stratton, (2) Kubiak's supervising Lieutenant, Maureen Biggane, and (3) the Internal Affairs Division ("IAD"). Three months later, Biggane ordered Kubiak to leave ONA and

810 F.3d 479

return to her prior position as a beat patrol officer. Kubiak filed a complaint against the City of Chicago, Stratton, and Biggane, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Kubiak appeals. We affirm.

I. Background

Because we are reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we must take as true the facts alleged in Kubiak's complaint. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir.2008).

Kubiak worked as a beat patrol officer with the Chicago Police Department for fourteen years. Her primary duties were to patrol assigned areas, issue citations, make arrests, and conduct investigations. In 2000, Kubiak was detailed to the Office of News Affairs. Kubiak alleges that this was a "highly coveted detail" to a "prestigious desk job." At the ONA, Kubiak served as a liaison to the news media. Her responsibilities included "keeping members of the news media apprised of police activity by providing information on topics such as crimes committed, arrests made, and providing information with regard to community safety alerts."

On November 8, 2012, Officer Zala, another news media liaison at the ONA, allegedly verbally assaulted Kubiak as she was exiting the office at the end of her shift. Zala ran toward her, enraged by a work-related report Kubiak had drafted. He screamed, "Who the fuck do you think you are, you stupid bitch?" He shook his finger in Kubiak's face and swung his hand back as if to strike her. Kubiak quickly backed away in fear. Officer Robert Perez was with Kubiak at the time of the incident and tried to calm Zala, telling him to "stop it." Zala continued to yell at Kubiak, saying, "You are nothing, you are a stupid bitch, you don't know how to be the police, I am the police, I am the real police."

Kubiak returned to her desk and called ONA Director Stratton. She told Stratton about the incident and said she feared Zala was going to strike her. Kubiak informed Stratton that Zala had previously directed similar outbursts toward her. During this phone call, Zala stood by Kubiak's desk and continued to berate and intimidate her. An ONA employee who witnessed Zala's conduct later spoke with Kubiak and expressed fear that Zala was going to shoot Kubiak.

Kubiak alleges that Zala has a history of violence. According to her complaint, around 2009, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a suit against Zala for battery and excessive force. The City defended Zala at trial. Kubiak alleges that the City failed to correct Zala's behavior but rather gave him a prestigious news media liaison position in the ONA. Throughout his detail at the ONA, Zala often lost his temper and directed his outbursts toward his colleagues, including Kubiak.

The next day, Kubiak again spoke with Stratton. Stratton told Kubiak that she had already spoken with Zala and that she did not have time to discuss the incident further. On November 12, Kubiak requested a meeting with Biggane, her supervising Lieutenant, to discuss the incident. Biggane responded that she was too busy. Kubiak alleges that she continued to request meetings, but each time, Biggane responded that she was too busy. On November 27, Kubiak went to Biggane's office to discuss the incident, but Biggane refused to discuss it.

810 F.3d 480

On December 3, Kubiak submitted a memorandum to Biggane complaining about Zala, which initiated an Internal Affairs Division investigation. Kubiak subsequently gave a statement to the IAD investigators. Perez also provided a statement corroborating Kubiak's complaint. Kubiak alleges that after she gave her statement to the IAD, Officer Jose Estrada, who had been found guilty of excessive force and also worked at the ONA, told her that she "better be careful because [she] might be the one to get suspended or fired."

In mid-February, Kubiak learned that her IAD complaint against Officer Zala had been "sustained." Within days, Biggane cancelled Kubiak's detail to the ONA and reassigned Kubiak to a position as beat officer on a midnight shift in what Kubiak alleges is one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in Chicago. The same day, Perez was also removed from the ONA and reassigned as a beat officer. Kubiak and Perez were the only two officers who had their ONA details cancelled even though other members of the ONA had previously requested to transfer out of the ONA. At the time of her removal, Kubiak was the most senior member of the ONA and had not requested a transfer.

Stratton and Biggane made the decision to remove Kubiak and Perez from the ONA. Stratton and Biggane had the final authority to make these personnel decisions, which were not subject to further review. Kubiak alleges that Zala was never reprimanded and remains detailed to the ONA.

On February 18, 2014, Kubiak filed a complaint against the City of Chicago, Stratton, and Biggane. Kubiak asserted a claim against all defendants alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment pursuant to § 1983, and a claim against Stratton and Biggane alleging conspiracy in deprivation of constitutional rights pursuant to § 1983.1 Kubiak argued that by cancelling her detail to the ONA and assigning her to work as a beat patrol officer, defendants retaliated against her for engaging in protected speech. According to Kubiak, defendants engaged in a pattern of protecting and rewarding officers accused of violent misconduct while retaliating against those who exposed and reported the misconduct.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion and dismissed the claims with prejudice, concluding that Kubiak's speech was not constitutionally protected since Kubiak did not speak as a private citizen and did not speak on a matter of public concern. Kubiak appeals.

II. Discussion

We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6). Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081. Rule 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To properly state a claim, a plaintiff's complaint must contain allegations that "plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level[.]" EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the

810 F.3d 481

complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081.

A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim

To establish a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a public employee first must prove that her speech is constitutionally protected. Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir.2013). For a public employee's speech to be protected under the First Amendment, the employee must establish that she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). The determination of whether speech is constitutionally protected is a question of law. Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 489 (7th Cir.2008).

1. Kubiak Did Not Speak as a Private Citizen

The district court held that Kubiak failed to allege facts that plausibly suggest that she spoke as a citizen. We agree. The Supreme Court has held that "when public employees make statements pursuant...

To continue reading

Request your trial
418 practice notes
  • Candy Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee Cnty., Case No. 17–CV–569–JPS
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • July 20, 2017
    ...suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level[.]" Kubiak v. City of Chicago , 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). In reviewing the complaint, the Court is required to "accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complai......
  • McCrary v. Knox Cnty., No. 2:16-cv-00095-JMS-DKL
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of Indiana)
    • August 4, 2016
    ...omitted). "The determination of whether speech is constitutionally protected is a question of law." Kubiak v. City of Chicago , 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir.2016). The threshold issue with respect to this inquiry is whether the speech was made by the employee in his capacity as a pr......
  • Charette v. St. John Valley Soil & Water Conservation Dist., Docket no. 1:17-CV-35-GZS
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Court (Maine)
    • August 17, 2018
    ...concern" when she complains that she personally has been harassed or discriminated against. See, e.g., Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 482-83 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Brooks v. Arthur, 685 F.3d 367, 372 (4th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between complaints by an employee that he is bein......
  • Gierum v. Glick (In re Glick), No. 13 B 20989
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • June 8, 2017
    ...right to relief above a "speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Kubiak v. City of Chicago , 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 491, 196 L.Ed.2d 402 (2016). The plausibility standard "is not akin to a 'probab......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
429 cases
  • Candy Lab Inc. v. Milwaukee Cnty., Case No. 17–CV–569–JPS
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • July 20, 2017
    ...suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level[.]" Kubiak v. City of Chicago , 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). In reviewing the complaint, the Court is required to "accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and dra......
  • McCrary v. Knox Cnty., No. 2:16-cv-00095-JMS-DKL
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 7th Circuit. United States District Court (Southern District of Indiana)
    • August 4, 2016
    ...citation omitted). "The determination of whether speech is constitutionally protected is a question of law." Kubiak v. City of Chicago , 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir.2016). The threshold issue with respect to this inquiry is whether the speech was made by the employee in his capacity as a pri......
  • Charette v. St. John Valley Soil & Water Conservation Dist., Docket no. 1:17-CV-35-GZS
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Court (Maine)
    • August 17, 2018
    ...public concern" when she complains that she personally has been harassed or discriminated against. See, e.g., Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 482-83 (7th Cir. 2016) ; Brooks v. Arthur, 685 F.3d 367, 372 (4th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between complaints by an employee that he is be......
  • Gierum v. Glick (In re Glick), No. 13 B 20989
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • June 8, 2017
    ...plaintiff's right to relief above a "speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Kubiak v. City of Chicago , 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir.), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 491, 196 L.Ed.2d 402 (2016). The plausibility standard "is not akin to a 'probabili......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT