Kubis v. Town of Cornwall

Decision Date21 February 1921
Citation112 A. 663,95 Conn. 720
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesKUBIS v. TOWN OF CORNWALL.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Litchfield County; James P Woodruff, Judge.

Action by Joseph Kubis against the Town of Cornwall. An appeal from a judgment of the justice of the peace in favor of the plaintiff was erased from the docket by the court of common pleas, and defendant appeals. Error, and cause remanded.

Leonard J. Nickerson, of Cornwall, for appellant.

John T. Hubbard, of Litchfield, for appellee.

BEACH J.

In an action before a justice of the peace claiming $100 damages for injuries caused by defective highway, the plaintiff, Kubis, recovered damages. Defendant appealed to the court of common pleas in Litchfield county, where the cause was erased from the docket on the ground that under chapter 178, P. A. of 1919, no appeal lies from the judgment of a justice of the peace in an action wherein exactly $100 is demanded. The defendant appeals.

Prior to the passage of the act, appeals from judgments of justice courts were by section 5561, G. S. of 1918, allowed in all civil actions except in summary process. Such has been our law for 50 years. Chapter 75, P. A. 1871. By the act of 1919 now in force section 5561 was amended by inserting into it the phrase italicized in the following quotation. No other change was made in the statute than by the insertion of this italicized phrase in two places and by the repeal of the original section. The material part of the statute now reads as follows:

" In all civil actions except summary process brought before a justice of the peace, or town, city or borough courts, in which damages less than $100 are demanded, an appeal from any judgment rendered therein on any issue, if taken within forty-eight hours after the rendition of such judgment, may be allowed to either party," etc.

By section 2, section 5561 of the General Statutes is repealed. By section 5555 the jurisdiction of justices of the peace extends to all civil actions for legal relief in which the matter in demand " does not exceed" $100; and therefore the words " less than" $100 in the act of 1919, if they apply to actions before justices of the peace, cut off the right of appeal in all justice cases in which the maximum damages of $100 are demanded, quite regardless of the amount of the judgment, if any, which may be rendered.

We think it is apparent from the act itself that such was not the intent of the General Assembly. Looking at the matter from the standpoint of public policy, there is something to be said in favor of the finality of de minimis judgments, and prior to 1871 judgments of justice court for small amounts were not appealable; the limit varying at different times from 10 shillings to $35. But no reasonable basis in public policy can be imagined for allowing appeals in all justice cases, except when the maximum amount of $100 is demanded, and thus putting the right of appeal in all justice cases wholly under the control of the plaintiff, so that he can by original averment or subsequent amendment determine whether or not he will permit an appeal to be taken.

Moreover the evident purpose of the inserted phrase, when taken by itself, is to enlarge, and not to cut off, the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • Soares v. Max Services, Inc.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • September 18, 1996
    ...punctuation may be disregarded when it leads to results inconsistent with the apparent intent of the legislature. Kubis v. Cornwall, 95 Conn. 720, 723, 112 A. 663 (1921); see 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed.1992) § In Dennis, the court laid great stress on the use of the disju......
  • Grievance Committee of Bar of Fairfield County v. Dacey
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 19, 1966
    ...merely because a comma was carried over from the statute as it stood prior to the amendment. See cases such as Kubis v. Town of Cornwall, 95 Conn. 720, 723, 113 A. 663. The vital point in each of the 1933 amendments is that the prohibition was clearly made applicable to the practice of law,......
  • Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Bennett, (1995)
    • United States
    • Suquamish Tribal Court of Appeals
    • November 14, 1995
    ...lead to results inconsistent with the apparent intention of the [legislature] as expressed in the statute itself . . . ." Nubis v. Cornwall, 95 Conn. 720, 723, 112 A 663 (1921). --------- ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT