Kucera v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs
| Citation | 956 F.Supp.2d 842 |
| Decision Date | 09 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:03–cv–593.,3:03–cv–593. |
| Parties | David KUCERA and Vickie F. Forgety, Plaintiffs, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
George F. Legg, Matthew Todd Ridley, Eric J. Morrison, Stone & Hinds, PC, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiffs.
Arthur F. Knight, III, Jonathan Swann Taylor, Taylor, Fleishman, & Knight, Knoxville, TN, for Defendants.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This is an action brought under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution by plaintiffs, David Kucera and Vickie F. Forgety. The Plaintiffs' initial complaint argued that, by contracting with Kingswood, the Defendants violated the teachers' 1) First Amendment Establishment Clause rights under the United States Constitution and similar rights under article I, Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution; and 2) procedural and substantive due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. On November 2, 2006, 2006 WL 3196919, the Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to a finding by the Court that the Plaintiffs lacked standing, denied as moot the Defendants' claims of absolute and qualified immunity, and dismissed the action without prejudice. [Doc. 76].
The Plaintiffs appealed the Court's finding to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on December 4, 2006. [Doc. 79]. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Court's grant of summary judgment to the Board on the teachers' procedural and substantive due-process claims, found that the Board is entitled to legislative immunity, reversed the Court's finding that the Plaintiff's lacked standing to bring their Establishment Clause claims 1, and remanded this matter back to the Court for further proceedings. [Doc. 82]. Consequently, the sole matter left for this Court to consider is whether the Board violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution when it contracted with Kingswood to provide alternative school education for the district.
The Court tried this civil action without a jury commencing on May 10, 2013. Following the trial, the parties filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Having heard the testimony at trial, having reviewed the exhibits introduced into evidence, and having considered the party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the following are the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
1. Vickie Forgety and David Kucera are municipal taxpayers of Jefferson County, Tennessee.
2. For the 2002–2003 school year, Plaintiffs Vickie F. Forgety (“Forgety”), and David Kucera (“Kucera”) were employed at the Jefferson County Alternative School.
3. Forgety was a tenured teacher and principle for the alternative school, and Kucera was a non-tenured teacher with a contract for the 2002–2003 school year.
4. During the 2002–2003 school year, the Defendant, Jefferson County Board of School Commissioners (“the Board”), operated its Alternative School at a site in Jefferson County, staffed by employees of the Board.
5. Around this time, Director Doug Moody Moody learned that the Commission Budget Committee would likely only allot 10 cents of the property tax rate compared to the 41 cents requested.
6. The Board started looking at “big ticket” items that could be cut from the budget, including the Board-run alternative school.
7. On July 10, 2003, the Board voted to eliminate the county Alternative School, and to contract with Kingswood School, Inc. (“Kingswood”) to operate its Alternative School for Jefferson County students during the 2003–2004 school year.
8. On July 11, 2003, Director Moody sent letters to Forgety and Kucera in which he advised that the Board voted to eliminate the alternative school program. The letters advised that the Plaintiffs' positions at the County—run alternative school program no longer existed due to the elimination of the Alternative School.
9. The letters concluded by noting that “every effort will be made to place [the Plaintiffs] in an area of [the Plaintiffs'] certification for the 2003–2004 school year.
10. Forgety rejected two teaching positions; requested that her name be placed on the “preferred rehire list” for an administrative or principalposition only, drew unemployment for seven months; and ultimately took the principal position in May of 2004 at New Market Elementary School.
11. Kucera did not continue employment with any school, but went back to a former job at Mountain View Youth Development Center.
12. For the school years 2003–2004 through 2009–2010, Kingswood educated students of the Jefferson County public school system who had been suspended or expelled from their regular schools; communicated with those students and their parents; furnished report cards to those students and their parents; determined the term of certain students' suspensions from their regular schools; hired, fired, supervised, and evaluated the staff of Jefferson County's Alternative School; managed and controlled the school's finances; and controlled the day-to-day operation of Jefferson County's Alternative School.
13. Kingswood had two separate programs during the time that Jefferson County contracted out its alternative school program to Kingswood.
14. The first program was called the day treatment program. The day treatment program included educational and therapeutic components.
15. The day treatment program was set up on a levels system where the students progressed to the next level by showing improvements in behavior and academics.
16. The second program, the residential program, included deliberate religious instruction.
17. It is admitted by all parties that the residential program maintains a religious character.
18. There is no evidence that there were religious symbols or messages in the building where students were taught.
19. There is no evidence that there was religious instruction at Kingswood. Kingswood's report cards reflected only secular courses were taught.
20. There is no evidence of Kingswood requiring, or encouraging, prayer, reflection, or spirituality in any form.
21. There is no evidence that Kingswood ever conducted or provided time for a “moment of silence,” or any similar exercise, with the Jefferson County Students.
22. The students in the day treatment program were taught in the school building by state licensed teachers.
23. Even after Kingswood took over the alternative school services for all of Jefferson County, Kingswood continued to refer to itself as a “Christian environment” in some of its documents.2
24. The Kingswood Easter 2006 letter quotes Luke 18:16 and displays crosses at the top of the page, with the words,
25. Kingswood's website indicates “Kingswood has survived independently by remaining true in faith to the principals of a Christian education without being bound to the doctrine of a particular denomination or sect's control.”
26. Kingswood did not produce at trail any written prohibition in any of its rules, regulations or policies of any kind, regarding religious teaching, counseling or other religious activity with regard to any of its Alternative School students.
27. Kingswood implemented a Family Feedback Policy, which required students to submit a Family Feedback form every week.
28. Failure to complete and return a weekly Family Feedback form would prevent a student from advancing at Kingswood.
29. Kingswood's weekly Family Feedback form contained biblical scripture and was required to be signed by the parents of all of Kingswood students.
30. Kingswood's Report Cards for Jefferson County Alternative School students contained biblical scripture quoting the Gospel of Luke 18:16 and were required to be signed by each parent.
31. Kingswood's Director testified that the biblical scripture from the Gospel of Luke could be interpreted as an invitation into the kingdom of God.
32. There is a Chapel on campus that is occasionally used for assemblies.
33. The public school students went to Kingswood's Chapel for assemblies inside the Chapel.
34. Kingswood organized these assemblies, and Jefferson County Alternative School and residential students were both invited to these assemblies.
35. The assemblies were held during regular school hours. The Chapel was located within walking distance and on the campus of Kingswood.
36. Reverend Steve Walker was the Campus Minister at Kingswood and would also perform intake for the public school children; there is no evidence that Reverend Walker intermingled his religious background with his intake duties.
37. The “School Improvement Plan” contained religious references. Though the school improvement plan was completed before the contract with Kingswood, it stayed in effect even after the merger.
38. The Jefferson County alternative school students were not required or encouraged to attend chapel or religious services at Kingswood or the Church at Rutledge.
39. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” U.S. Const. Amend. I.
40. This Amendment has been made applicable to the states by passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.
41. The seminal Supreme Court case discussing the Establishment Clause is Lemon v. Kurtzman, wherein the Supreme Court reasoned that the “three main evils against...
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