Kuehne v. Town Council of Town of East Hartford

• Decision Date: 28 February 1950
• Citation: 136 Conn. 452,72 A.2d 474
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: KUEHNE et al. v. TOWN COUNCIL OF TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 474

72 A.2d 474

136 Conn. 452

KUEHNE et al. v. TOWN COUNCIL OF TOWN OF EAST HARTFORD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Feb. 28, 1950.

Ralph C. Dixon, Hartford, for appellants.

Leon A. Winslow, Hartford, for appellee.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, DICKENSON and BALDWIN, JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs, certain property owners, appealed to the Court of Common Pleas from the granting by the defendant of an application for a change in the zoning of a piece of property owned by Wilfred H. Langlois from an A residence to an A business zone. The trial court dismissed the appeal and the plaintiffs have appealed.

We are met at the outset with a claim by the plaintiffs that the defendant town council was without authority to grant the application. This claim is based on the following statutory situation: Prior to 1929 the powers with respect to zoning were by statute vested in 'the zoning authority' of the various municipalities; but it was also provided that the 'zoning authority' should be a 'zoning commission,' except that in cities and boroughs where there was no zoning commission the zoning authority should be its board of aldermen or other body having power to adopt ordinances. Public Acts, 1925, c. 242, § 1. Before 1929 the town of East Hartford was, as regards zoning, divided into three parts--two fire districts and the portion of the town lying outside those districts; each fire district had established zoning within its area and the town had appointed a zoning commission for the rest of the town. See State ex rel. Bezzini v. Hines, 133 Conn. 592, 593, 53 A.2d 299. In 1929, under a special law, the various municipalities in the town were consolidated. 20 Spec.Laws 1113. Section 43 of that act provided: 'The town council shall be the zoning commission of and for the entire town. The zoning by-laws and ordinances existing at the time of the taking effect of this act are validated and approved, and such by-laws and ordinances shall continue in force and effect until such time as the same shall be amended or repealed in accordance with the general statutes. The powers and duties of the zoning commission shall be those powers and duties prescribed by the general statutes.'

Section 1 of the 1925 act became § 423 of the Revision of 1930. In 1931 that section was amended; it still vested zoning powers in the zoning authority in each municipality and provided that the zoning authority should be a zoning commission, with an exception as to any 'city or borough' like that in the 1925 act. General Statutes, Sup. 1931, § 42a; Cum. Sup. 1935, § 88c. In 1939 certain amendments to the 1929 special law consolidating the municipalities in East Hartford were enacted, and among them was one which altered the language of § 43 of that act to read: 'The town council shall be the zoning authority of and for the entire town'; the act went on to provide that existing zoning regulations should continue in force, and the amendment concluded: 'The powers and duties of the zoning authority shall be those powers and duties prescribed by the general statutes.' 23 Spec. Laws 38, § 7. The apparent purpose of this act was to give to the town council of East Hartford the same powers as by the 1931 act were vested in the legislative bodies of cities and boroughs.

In 1947 the General Assembly enacted a statute which in effect rewrote a large part of the law as to zoning. General Statutes, Sup. 1947, c. 29. In this act the words 'zoning authority' were omitted. The act provided in the first section, § 121i, that any town, city or borough might adopt the act and exercise through a zoning commission the powers granted in it; that, in each town except as otherwise provided by special act, the zoning commission should consist of five electors chosen in a specified way; and that in a city or borough the board of aldermen or other body having power to adopt ordinances or regulations should be the zoning commission. In subsequent sections the powers granted were vested in the 'zoning commission' of the municipality. In September, 1947, the town council of East Hartford voted that the provisions of the act should be adopted and that the town through a zoning commission should exercise the powers granted in it; and it instructed the town counsel to prepare an ordinance to carry out the vote. In November, 1947, apparently before any such ordinance had been adopted, the council rescinded that vote and passed another, in which it simply adopted the provisions of the 1947 act.

The claim of the plaintiffs is that as, under the express terms of the 1939 special law, the town council of East Hartford is its 'zoning authority' and the 1947 act vests all powers with reference to zoning in the 'zoning commission' of each municipality, the town council cannot legally exercise those powers, that is to say, that the town of East Hartford is within the exception of the 1947 act which provides that in each town, 'except as otherwise provided by special act,' there shall be a zoning commission chosen as specified, so that the town council still continues to be the 'zoning authority' in the town, but because all zoning powers in the act are vested in a 'zoning commission' the town council is shorn of all power to exercise them. ¹ That the General Assembly could not have intended such a result hardly need be said. In construing the terms of the statute, we are justified in seeking a meaning which would avoid this result even at the expense of departing from the literal meaning of the words used. Bridgeman v. Derby, 104 Conn. 1, 8, 132 A. 25, 45 A.L.R. 728; Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 626, 169 A. 912. The interpretation 'must, if possible, be such as will effect the real purpose for which the statute was enacted.' Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Pettison, 112 Conn. 652, 655, 153 A. 789, 790, Town of West Hartford v. Thomas D. Faulkner Co., 126 Conn. 206, 211, 10 A.2d 592. 'The reason and purpose of the legislation as shown by its provisions may well be more significant than technical definitions in determining the meaning of the particular words employed.' Hartford Electric Light Co. v. McLaughlin, 131 Conn. 1, 5, 37 A.2d 361, 363. Thus in McLaughlin v. Poucher, 127 Conn. 441, 448, 17 A.2d 767, we construed the word 'state' to include the federal government and the District of Columbia, where it was necessary to do so to carry out the legislative intent.

The words 'zoning authority' used in the 1925 and 1931 acts were evidently adopted to give zoning powers to other bodies then zoning commissions where under special laws such bodies had been vested with authority to act in that capacity; and except for such situations 'zoning commission' and 'zoning authority' referred to the same instrumentalities of government. The 1947 act accomplished that purpose by expressly constituting such bodies zoning commissions, and then, in the enumeration of the powers of zoning bodies, used only the expression 'zoning commission.' There plainly was no intent to alter in any way the functions of the particular authority which in any municipality exercised zoning powers under a special law. The 1947 statute, literally applied, covered the situation in all cities and boroughs and in all towns except those, like East Hartford, where the legislative body was given 'zoning authority.' It is not possible to to suppose that by the use of the words 'zoning commission' in the grant of zoning powers, the General Assembly intended such an unreasonable discrimination as would follow if the 'zoning authority' could not exercise those powers. The words 'zoning commission' cannot be taken to mean only bodies constituted in strict compliance with the provisions as to their choice specified in the act; the only sensible conclusion to reach is that they include a body which had by special law been previously granted zoning powers, even though it had been designated as a 'zoning authority.' The town council of East Hartford can legally exercise the powers given zoning commissions by the 1947 act.

The appeal in this case was not one where the trial court was called to act in the absence of a full record of the proceedings before the zoning authority, and where therefore it was compelled itself to find the facts and decide the case upon the assumption that these were the facts the town council considered in reaching its decision. Berkman v. Board of Appeals, 135 Conn. 393, 397, 64 A.2d 875. The court had before it not only the formal record of the action taken by the council but a stenographic transcript of the evidence offered before it. Acting under the provision of § 429 of the 1930 Revision, Rev.1949, § 844, that if testimony appeared to be necessary for the equitable disposition of the appeal it might be received, the court heard certain witnesses and admitted certain exhibits. It made a finding which was in some respects based on the transcript of the testimony before the board. The finding in such a situation should only contain facts which a court finds upon the basis of the evidence taken by it. Dion v. Dion, 128 Conn. 416, 417, 23 A.2d 314; ...