Kueppers v. Chrysler Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 July 1981
• Docket Number: Docket No. 51525
• Citation: 108 Mich.App. 192,310 N.W.2d 327
• Parties: Geraldine and Carl KUEPPERS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation, Defendant-Third PartyPlaintiff-Appellee. 108 Mich.App. 192, 310 N.W.2d 327
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 327

310 N.W.2d 327

Geraldine and Carl KUEPPERS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a Michigan Corporation Defendant-Third PartyPlaintiff-Appellee.

Docket No. 51525.

108 Mich.App. 192, 310 N.W.2d 327

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

July 28, 1981.

Released for Publication Sept. 28, 1981.

[108 MICHAPP 195] Daniel S. Goldsmith, Birmingham, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Ronald F. Denardis, Detroit, for defendant-third party plaintiff-appellee.

Before KAUFMAN, P. J., and ALLEN and RILEY, JJ.

KAUFMAN, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff Geraldine Kueppers was injured on October 8, 1973, when a press she was operating severed her right hand. At the time she was an employee of Gleason-Holbrook Manufacturing Company. This appeal results from the circumstances of that injury.

The procedural history of the instant case is quite lengthy and complex. For purposes of this appeal, however, only certain portions of this history[108 MICHAPP 196] are of import. Numerous defendants were sued by plaintiffs. Some were dismissed on stipulation or motion for summary judgment. Prior to the time of trial, others of these defendants settled with plaintiffs in amounts varying between $30,000 and $50,000, for a total settlement of $180,000.

On April 1, 1980, the sole defendant remaining in the case was Chrysler Corporation. A trial took place in Macomb County Circuit Court, at the conclusion of which a verdict of no cause of action was returned. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right, pursuant to GCR 1963, 806.1.

Prior to trial, plaintiffs brought a motion to strike any references to prior defendants or the fact that any settlements had been reached between them and plaintiffs. Defendant objected to plaintiffs' motion on the ground that the defendant desired to comment on the pleadings filed by other defendants in the case and that it would severely confuse the jury in that they would not know how to apportion the alleged negligence of Chrysler without knowing that there were other defendants that had settled with the plaintiffs. The trial court determined that it was best to let the jury hear what had actually transpired. If they were not allowed to do so, it would be "misleading".

In addition, plaintiffs made a motion to exclude any reference to subsequent repairs or modifications to the press made by Geraldine Kueppers' employer. The trial court, after noting that it was plaintiff's employer who made the modifications after the accident and that liability could not be imposed upon the employer, ruled that references to subsequent modifications would not be excluded.

On appeal, plaintiffs raise four issues, the first of which we believe to be dispositive of the case. [108 MICHAPP 197] Plaintiffs' initial allegation is that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to be informed of the existence of prior defendants and the fact that several of these defendants had settled with plaintiffs for certain specified amounts.

The trial judge ruled that evidence of prior settlements would not be violative of MRE 402 or MRE 408, neither rule, he felt, being applicable to the instant case. At issue is the following holding of the trial court:

"THE COURT: All right. Apparently it's within the sound discretion of the Court as to whether the motion should be granted.

"I am going to find, gentlemen, that the jury is entitled to hear everything that's transpired in this matter.

"In reading these cases, I do not find that the testimony should be excluded.

"The Brewer case is not on all fours. MGCR 402 and 408 are not applicable as cited.

"The general rule of materiality exists in any circumstance and cannot be used specifically to prevent evidence coming into this file that pertains to one injury in the succession of one machine. I just don't see how we can cut it. It would be misleading to the jury, and it would be attempting to establish a fact that is not truthful.

"I think the best movement is to allow the jury to hear the entire facts; take the charge of the Court and in the course of their performance, decide whether or not the remaining defendants are liable.

"The jury will understand that if an award is entered, the total award for damages, any settlement will be deducted from the total award; the remaining sum will be the net judgment to go against whoever the jury finds is liable.

"To hold otherwise, I think would be an absolute charade. I just don't think it would be a search for the truth. It would be a fiction of some sort in view of what's happened with some prior defendants.

[108 MICHAPP 198] "The motion in limine is denied."

We believe that the trial court's reasoning on this matter was not correct.

MRE 408 provides:

"Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution."

This Court has given little guidance in the interpretation of the aforementioned rule but rather has decided issues similar to the one in question under MRE 402. This rule requires that any evidence presented meet a threshold prerequisite of relevancy to issues remaining at trial. The rule provides:

"All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."

The relevancy issue was addressed in Wilson v. W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital, 91 Mich.App. 90, 96-97, 284 N.W.2d 126 (1979); lv. held in abeyance [108 MICHAPP 199] 409 Mich. 868 (1980), in a case concluded at the trial level prior to the effective date of MRE 408. The Wilson Court addressed the issue of the propriety of informing the jury of a prior settlement and decided that admission of proof of a prior settlement agreement between a defendant and the plaintiff is a matter of judicial discretion. See also Stitt v. Mahaney, 403 Mich. 711, 272 N.W.2d 526 (1978); Croda v. Sarnacki, 106 Mich.App. 51, 307 N.W.2d 728 (1981).

However, in Brewer v. Payless Stations, Inc., 94 Mich.App. 281, 284, 288 N.W.2d 352 (1979); lv. gtd. 409 Mich. 871 (1980), another panel of this Court held:

"Under the new rules of evidence, evidence that is not relevant, that is, has no bearing on a material issue of fact, is inadmissible at trial. MRE 402. In the instant case, unlike that of Stitt, evidence of plaintiff's settlement with General Motors had no bearing on the issue of fact for the jury.

"In the case at bar, plaintiff has stipulated to permit the trial court to deduct the total amount of his settlement with General Motors from any verdict the jury may render against Payless. Thus, plaintiff has waived the right to have the jury consider whether only a portion of the General Motors settlement should be deducted from a possible judgment against Payless. Further, defendant in this case, Payless, does not argue as the defendant in Stitt did that this settlement purports to release it from any liability.

"As is obvious, the reasons supporting the Supreme Court's decision in Stitt have no application here. Because plaintiff has stipulated to permit the trial court to deduct the total amount of the settlement with General Motors from any jury verdict against Payless, plaintiff will not receive a double recovery. As long as the jury can fairly determine the portion of plaintiff's damages caused by the negligence of Payless, assuming that Payless has any liability at all, there is no need for [108 MICHAPP 200] the jury to know the amount of plaintiff's settlement with General Motors or, in fact, to even know that a settlement occurred." (Emphasis added.)

The identical question was recently addressed by a panel of this Court in Silisky v. Midland-Ross Corp., 97 Mich.App. 470, 480-481, 296 N.W.2d 576 (1980). The Silisky Court reviewed cases involving the issue before us and Judge Allen stated:

"However, the decisions (as to whether evidence of settlements may be offered on the issue of damages) can largely be reconciled. It is evident that the principal reason in favor of admitting evidence of settlements is to prevent double recovery. Wilson v. W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital, 91 Mich.App. 90, 96-97, 284 N.W.2d 126 (1979). Where, as in the case before us, the parties have stipulated that from the damages ultimately determined by the jury there would be deducted the dollar amount of the settlement and that settlement with one party was not a release of the other parties, double recovery is precluded.

"The facts in the instant case are not distinguishable from Brewer. In both cases plaintiff agreed that the court could subtract from the jury award of damages the amount of the settlement. Accordingly, we find that the trial court's exclusion of evidence of the settlement was proper for failure of such evidence to meet the MRE 402 threshold requirement of relevancy." (Footnote omitted, emphasis added.)

Thus, the admission of evidence of settlements was held to be improper where the evidence did not meet the threshold requirement of relevancy. It was not demonstrated that the jury could not fairly determine the portion of plaintiffs' damages allegedly caused by defendant without knowledge of the previous settlements.

As in Silisky and Brewer,...