Kuffler v. List
Decision Date | 02 October 1956 |
Parties | Harry KUFFLER, Plaintiff, v. Albert A. LIST, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Schreiber, Klein & Opton, New York City, for plaintiff, Copal Mintz, Robert J. Sands, New York City, of counsel.
O'Brien, Driscoll & Raftery, New York City, for defendant, Arthur F. Driscoll, William D. Friedmann, New York City, of counsel.
This is a motion by the defendant under Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. for summary judgment on the principal ground that the two causes of action alleged in the complaint are unenforceable because of the provisions of § 31 of the Personal Property Law of the State of New York, McK. Consol.Laws, c. 41.
The first cause of action, which sounds in contract, seeks $89,350 because of the alleged refusal of defendant to pay the amount allegedly agreed upon.
The second cause of action asserts an action for work, labor and services on the allegation that Kuffler performed certain services for defendant, at defendant's instance and request, in connection with the acquisition of the aforesaid shares of stock; and asserts that the reasonable value of the services was $89,350.
It is conceded by both sides that the contract alleged in the first cause of action and the request alleged in the second cause of action were oral, and that no note or memorandum thereof was in writing or subscribed by defendant. It is also conceded that the contract or request, if made, was made in New York.
Section 31 of the Personal Property Law of the State of New York provides, in part:
The questions presented are: (1) Was the contract alleged in the first cause of action a contract which, under the terms of this statute, was void unless it was in writing; and (2) Is this statute applicable to a cause of action based not upon the contract but brought in quantum meruit to recover for services rendered?
In determining these questions, the Court must, of course, be guided by the interpretation of the statute by the Courts of the State of New York.
The answer to the second question is...
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