Kuflom v. Bureau of Motor Vehicle Serv., 87-211.

Decision Date20 April 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-211.,87-211.
Citation543 A.2d 340
PartiesAbraham KUFLOM, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICES, Respondent.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Edward F. Kearney, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Mary L. Wilson, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Acting Corp. Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondent.

Before FERREN, BELSON and TERRY, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

Abraham Kuflom, a taxi driver in the District of Columbia, appeals from a decision by the Bureau of Motor Vehicle Services (BMVS) to revoke his driver's permit because of twelve points on his driver's record. We reverse and remand.

I.

From January 31 to September 15, 1986, Kuflom received six tickets for moving violations. Initially, he did not respond to these tickets. When, however, BMVS suspended his driver's permit for failure to respond, D.C.Code § 40-615(d)(1) (1981); 18 DCMR § 304.1 (1987), he paid the fines in full in order to lift the suspension. Construing payment of the fines as Kuflom's admission of liability on the tickets, however, BMVS assessed twelve points for the six violations, 18 DCMR § 303.1, and notified him that, for this reason, his driver's permit was subject to revocation. Id. § 303.3(b). Upon receipt of the notice, Kuflom retained counsel, denied the charges represented by the tickets, and requested hearings to challenge them at the D.C. Bureau of Traffic Adjudication (BTA), an administrative tribunal in charge of holding hearings on, determining dispositions for, and assessing penalties for, certain traffic infractions. D.C.Code § 40-603 (1981); 18 DCMR § 9001 (1987). Despite Kuflom's earlier admission of liability by paying the tickets, BTA granted these so called infraction hearings and scheduled them for March 3 to 23, 1987.

On December 4, 1986, three months before the first infraction hearing, BMVS hearing examiner Donovan L. Gay conducted a hearing on the proposed revocation of Kuflom's driver's permit based on the twelve points. At this revocation hearing, Kuflom's counsel asked to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the infraction hearings. He argued that Kuflom had paid the tickets not as an admission of liability but merely to prevent suspension of his license for failure to respond. Counsel also pointed out that one of the six tickets listed a nonexistent police badge number. This ticket would be dismissed at the infraction hearing, he said, because no officer could be located to prosecute. The implication was that, without this ticket accounting for two of the twelve points, 18 DCMR § 303.3 would authorize a suspension, but not the proposed revocation, of Kuflom's license.

The hearing examiner denied Kuflom's request for a stay and proceeded with the revocation hearing. The examiner noted that Kuflom had accumulated two other tickets for moving violations after the six violations that would be the subjects of the infraction hearings. Kuflom had denied one of these, however, and a hearing was pending. The other ticket, issued on September 16, 1987, was for operating after suspension. The hearing examiner believed this matter was pending in Superior Court. Kuflom asserted that the charge had been dropped but produced no documentary evidence to support his assertion. In any event, because Kuflom had not paid the fines for these tickets or otherwise been found liable for these alleged infractions, they did not add to his "points" total.

After the hearing, the examiner revoked Kuflom's permit for six months because of "12 points." The hearing examiner stated that he would consider granting Kuflom an occupational permit if Kuflom obtained a favorable disposition on the ticket for operating after suspension. On the following day, after Kuflom had made such a showing, the hearing examiner granted the occupational permit allowing Kuflom to drive a cab Sunday through Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Kuflom appealed the revocation to the Director of BMVS, who affirmed it on February 19, 1987. Kuflom then petitioned this court for review.

After the infraction hearings in March 1987, all six tickets were dismissed. Two (including the one with the mistaken badge number) were dismissed because the issuing police officer failed to appear at the hearing. Three were dismissed when the issuing officers failed to recall the circumstances or otherwise failed to present a prima facie case. The last one, alleging liability for an illegal U-turn, was dismissed when Kuflom presented evidence showing there was no traffic sign forbidding a U-turn.

After dismissal of four of the six tickets, Kuflom petitioned BMVS for termination of his revocation, which BMVS granted on April 8, 1987. Effective that date, all reference to the revocation supposedly was deleted from Kuflom's traffic record. His counsel asserted at oral argument on appeal, however, that references to the revocation remain in Kuflom's files. Furthermore, the record is not up to date in other important respects. By May 8, 1987, Kuflom's traffic record showed that only four of the six tickets had been dismissed by March 20, 1987, and that only the corresponding eight points had been removed. The May 8 record continued to show four points representing the other two tickets dismissed on March 23 and May 29.

II.

Kuflom appeals the revocation of his license. BMVS concedes that this issue is not moot, despite termination of the revocation, because of possible collateral consequences. Kuflom argues, first, that payment of a fine does not amount to a "conviction" for purposes of the point system; thus, he says, BMVS was not justified in revoking his license based on points assessed for tickets he had paid. Second, Kuflom argues that the hearing examiner abused his discretion in denying a stay of the revocation hearing when infraction hearings had been scheduled to hear Kuflom's challenges to the tickets upon which the notice of proposed revocation was premised. While we disagree with the first argument, we find merit, on this record, in the second. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

A.

The District of Columbia Municipal Regulations establish a point system under which liability for certain traffic offenses results in the assessment of points that, collectively, can result in suspension or revocation of the offender's license. Upon receipt of an infraction notice ("ticket"), one must respond in one of several ways, as advised on the back of the ticket itself. D.C.Code § 40-614(b) & (c) (1981); 18 DCMR § 3000.3 (1987) (ticket to state how and when to answer and consequences for failure to answer). One may admit the infraction alleged in the ticket, admit it with an explanation, or deny it altogether. D.C.Code § 40-615(a) (1981); 18 DCMR § 3006. If one admits to, is formally convicted of, or is otherwise found liable for certain infractions, points are entered on his or her traffic record. Id. § 303.1. An accumulation of eight points justifies suspension of one's license; twelve points justify revocation. Id. § 303.3. More generally, the regulations also authorize license suspension or revocation when a driver has been convicted of, or found civilly liable for, a pattern of traffic offenses that indicates disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons or property. Id. §§ 302.6, 302.8. The payment of a fine is "equivalent to a conviction." 18 DCMR § 9901 (1987).

Kuflom paid the fines for his six tickets without explanation or protest, resulting in "convictions," id., giving rise to twelve points on his record. These twelve points were enough for revocation. Id. § 303.3. Kuflom contends that payment of a ticket does not constitute a "conviction," but he offers no persuasive argument to counter the plain language of the regulation that "the payment of a fine . . . shall be equivalent to a conviction." Id. § 9901.1 He argues that he paid the fines, not as an admission of liability, but in order to lift the suspension of his license for failure to answer the tickets. That argument is unavailing. Under the relevant statute and regulations, Kuflom was required to answer each ticket within fifteen days to prevent suspension of his license. D.C.Code § 40-615(d); 18 DCMR § 304.1. He failed to do so and thus paid the tickets to resume driving privileges. Kuflom, however, could have answered on time without paying a fine or otherwise admitting liability. Timely denial of liability, or admission with explanation, would have prevented suspension just as effectively as paying the tickets later cured it. Kuflom was only required to answer. Id.

Kuflom apparently knew he could deny an infraction charged in a ticket and obtain a walk-in hearing at BTA, for he did just that with respect to a ticket he received on September 30, 1986, for running a red light—two months before he received the notice of proposed revocation based on the six earlier tickets and retained counsel. Thus, it is likely that, when Kuflom paid the six tickets, he also knew he could have denied the tickets at a walk-in hearing.

In any event, even if we assume Kuflom did not actually know he simply could have denied the six tickets to prevent suspension of his license for failure to answer, he should have known. The tickets themselves told him that a timely answer was required to prevent suspension.2 Kuflom argues, nonetheless, that he did not know his payments would trigger the point system and thus supply the basis for revoking his license. His subjective state of mind when he paid the fines, however, cannot determine the legal effect of payment when that effect has been prescribed by statute and regulations and has been well publicized.3 Information about the point system appears not only in DCMR but also, of particular significance here, in at least two leaflets distributed...

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