Kuhar v. Thompson Mfg.
Jurisdiction | United States,Federal,New Jersey,Utah |
Parties | Nicholas Kuhar and Julie Kuhar, Respondents, v. Thompson Manufacturing, Inc., Petitioner. |
Citation | 2024 UT 12 |
Decision Date | 25 April 2024 |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Docket Number | 20220282 |
Heard January 9, 2023.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals Third District, Salt Lake The Honorable Kristine E. Johnson No. 190900751
Colin P. King, Paul M. Simmons, Salt Lake City, Matthew Weng Bridgeton, N.J., for respondents
Robert L. Janicki, Michael L. Ford, Sandy, for petitioner.
OPINION
Petersen Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 This case involves the doctrine of issue preclusion. Under this doctrine, a party can preclude another party from litigating an issue if the same issue was litigated and determined in a previous case; the previous case resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and the party to be precluded was a party, or in privity with a party, in the previous case. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 842.
¶2 In the instant case, Nicholas Kuhar and his wife Julie have asserted a product liability claim against a Utah company, Thompson Manufacturing. They seek compensation for injuries Kuhar sustained in New Jersey, when his safety harness failed as he was cleaning rain gutters and he fell thirty-seven feet to the ground.
¶3 But this is not the first lawsuit the Kuhars have brought involving this incident. They previously sued Thompson and other defendants in New Jersey federal court, alleging that the harness was defective. That suit was unsuccessful. Thompson was dismissed from the case based on a lack of personal jurisdiction- and the Kuhars refiled their claims against Thompson here. Meanwhile, the other New Jersey defendants prevailed on a summary judgment motion after the federal court excluded the Kuhars' expert witness. Once the New Jersey case was dismissed, Thompson moved in the instant case to preclude the Kuhars from litigating the issue of whether the harness was defective.
¶4 The district court concluded that Thompson had shown the elements of issue preclusion were met. And this resulted in the dismissal of the Kuhars' claims. But the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the issue litigated and decided in New Jersey was not identical to the issue Thompson seeks to preclude here. Kuhar v. Thompson Mfg. Inc., 2022 UT App 22, ¶¶ 9-10, 16, 506 P.3d 1200. Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that the New Jersey court had not resolved on the merits whether the harness was actually defective, but had determined only that (1) the expert report disclosed by the Kuhars was inadmissible, and (2) the Kuhars needed expert testimony in order to proceed on their claims. Id. ¶ 10. The court of appeals' decision is now before us.
¶5 On certiorari, we conclude that the elements of issue preclusion are satisfied here. As a threshold matter, we clarify that to determine the issue-preclusive effect of the New Jersey federal court's judgment in this case, the substantive law of New Jersey applies. Under that law, we conclude that the issue Thompson seeks to preclude the Kuhars from litigating-whether the harness was defective-was actually litigated and decided on the merits in the New Jersey court's summary judgment order. This is because, in general, a ruling that plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof functions as a determination on the merits. Accordingly, we reverse.
¶6 Nicholas Kuhar was cleaning rain gutters in New Jersey when his safety harness failed, causing him to fall thirty-seven feet onto crushed concrete. He suffered serious injuries. Kuhar and his wife, Julie, sued the companies involved in the harness's design, manufacture, production, and distribution in New Jersey state court. But the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
¶7 Relevant here, the Kuhars asserted claims of design defect under the New Jersey Products Liability Act. The harness consisted of three component parts: "a 'micrograb,' a bolt, and a rope." The Kuhars alleged that the "bolt attached to the carabiner of the safety harness snapped," causing Kuhar's fall.
¶8 In the federal court, the Kuhars amended their complaint to add Thompson Manufacturing as a defendant, asserting that Thompson "advertised, promoted, sold, distributed, and otherwise introduced into the stream of commerce the safety harness." Thompson, whose principal place of business is in Utah, moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. After about a year of jurisdictional discovery, the court granted Thompson's motion and dismissed it from the case. The Kuhars then initiated the present action in Utah, asserting claims of design defect, breach of warranties, negligence, and loss of consortium.
¶9 Meanwhile, in the New Jersey case, the Kuhars disclosed the report of their liability expert, Dr. Richard Lynch. Dr. Lynch opined that "the bolt would not have failed if not for the presence of two design defects and one manufacturing defect." Two of the remaining defendants filed motions to preclude Dr. Lynch's report and testimony. The court granted the motion, concluding that Dr. Lynch's report was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The court determined that the report was unreliable, consisted of Dr. Lynch's "subjective belief or unsupported speculation," did not rely on scientific methods and procedures, was based on improper net opinions[1] and bald assertions, did not lay the proper foundation, "merely [told] the jury what result to reach," and did not contain sufficient quantitative data.
¶10 After successfully excluding the expert's testimony, the remaining defendants in the New Jersey case moved for summary judgment. The court granted the defendants' motions, concluding that expert testimony was required for the Kuhars to establish their design defect claim and "[they] ha[d] none." Specifically, the court determined that the micrograb and bolt were "complex instrumentalities" under New Jersey law, meaning that "without the assistance of an expert[,] a jury is not able to adequately understand the relevant design considerations involved with [the] bolt and micrograb." The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.
¶11 After learning of the summary judgment ruling in New Jersey, Thompson moved for summary judgment in the instant case. It argued that because the New Jersey federal court had determined that the harness was not defective, the Kuhars should be precluded from relitigating that issue here. The district court ultimately agreed with Thompson and granted summary judgment in its favor. The Kuhars appealed.
¶12 The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. Kuhar v. Thompson Mfg. Inc., 2022 UT App 22, ¶ 1, 506 P.3d 1200. Applying Utah law, the court of appeals used the issue preclusion standard set out in Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 99 P.3d 842. See Kuhar, 2022 UT App 22, ¶ 9. Buckner states that to invoke issue preclusion, a party must prove that:
(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the instant action; (2) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; (3) the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
2004 UT 78, ¶ 13. The court of appeals concluded that Thompson could not establish the first and third elements. See Kuhar, 2022 UT App 22, ¶ 9. Specifically, the court reasoned that the issue Thompson seeks to preclude here-whether the harness was defective-is not identical to the issue that was actually decided in New Jersey. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. The court concluded that the New Jersey court had decided only that the Kuhars' expert evidence was inadmissible, and they needed an expert to prove their claims. Id. ¶ 10. Consequently, the court of appeals held that the question of whether the harness was defective had not been decided or fully litigated in the New Jersey case. Id. ¶ 13.
¶13 Thompson petitioned for certiorari, and we granted its petition. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code subsection 78A-3-102(3)(a).
¶14 "On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. Rushton, 2017 UT 21, ¶ 9, 395 P.3d 92 (cleaned up). Whether issue preclusion bars litigation in a subsequent action is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness on appeal. Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 17, 16 P.3d 1214.
¶15 The question before us is whether the doctrine of issue preclusion bars the Kuhars from litigating the defectiveness of the harness in the instant case. Before addressing this question, however, we must first ascertain which forum's law is controlling. Because the previous case was litigated in New Jersey federal court, federal law governs the preclusive effect of that judgment. And where, as here, a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction, federal law dictates that the law of the state in which the federal court sits controls. Accordingly, we conclude that New Jersey law governs the question before us.
¶16 Applying New Jersey law, we conclude that the elements of issue preclusion are satisfied here. We therefore reverse.
¶17 The parties dispute which...
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