Kuhn v. Kjose

• Decision Date: 02 May 1933
• Docket Number: No. 41372.,41372.
• Citation: 248 N.W. 230,216 Iowa 36
• Parties: KUHN v. KJOSE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

216 Iowa 36

248 N.W. 230

KUHN

v.KJOSE.

No. 41372.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 2, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Winneshiek County; H. E. Taylor, Judge.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in automobile accident. The verdict and judgment were for defendant. Plaintiff appeals. The opinion states the facts.

Affirmed.E. R. Acres, of Decorah, and T. H. Goheen, of Calmar, for appellant.

C. N. Houck, of Decorah, and McCook & Lyons, of Cresco, for appellee.

CLAUSSEN, Justice.

In the evening of December 14, 1930, plaintiff and defendant were proceeding in the same direction in automobiles on a paved highway near Decorah, Iowa. Plaintiff was riding in a car driven by her husband. The defendant passed the car in which plaintiff was riding, and, as he returned, or immediately after he had returned, to the right side of the paving, the incidents occurred which resulted in the injuries complained of. Just what such incidents were constitute the fact questions in the case. It was claimed by plaintiff that the defendant hooked onto the front part of the car in which she was riding as he returned to the right side of the highway. It was contended by the defendant that the car in which plaintiff was riding was driven into the rear of his car as, or after, he returned to the right side. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. A motion for a new trial was made by plaintiff, and, upon such motion being overruled, judgment was rendered against plaintiff for the costs of action. From such judgment the plaintiff appeals.

[1][2] I. The first error relied upon for reversal is in relation to the rejection of certain testimony offered by plaintiff. Soon after the accident plaintiff was taken to a hospital in Decorah. A conversation took place between plaintiff's husband and the defendant in the corridor of the hospital. Upon the trial of the case, plaintiff's husband was examined as a witness in her behalf. After he had been examined in relation to the circumstances under which the accident took place, the jurors were excused, and in their absence the witness stated the substance of the conversation as follows: “He (defendant) said, ‘My name is Kjose, Lloyd Kjose. My address is Ridgeway, Iowa. * * * I have insurance to cover the damage I did you. * * * I will call Gilbert Hopperstad to find out. * * * I paid $18.50 premium on my car, I must have enough insurance. * * * You write down what I am telling you.’ I (witness) sat down at a desk and wrote down his name, address, car license and number and when I got up I said ‘Kjose, why did you hook me?’ He said, ‘Doctor, I misjudged the speed when I cut in on you.’ He said, ‘I will notify Gilbert Hopperstad and will meet you at the office in the morning.”

The proceedings in the absence of the jury were treated by the parties and the court as an offer of the testimony, and objection was made by the defendant to so much of said testimony as referred to insurance carried by the defendant. The court ruled that, when the jurors returned, the witness might be examined concerning that part of the conversation in which the witness asked the defendant why he cut in on witness and the answer given by the defendant, but that the witness might not be examined concerning what was said about insurance.

Thereupon the jurors were recalled, and the following questions asked and answers given:

“Q. Doctor, when you went out into the hall at the hospital that night when your wife was in the operating room, did you have a talk with the defendant, Kjose? A. I did.”

Q. What did you say to him about hooking you, if anything? A. I said, ‘Kjose, why did you hook me?’ He said, ‘I misjudged your speed and I cut in on you.”DD’

Appellant urges that the excluded part of the conversation was necessary to a full understanding of the part admitted in evidence, and that, if any part of the conversation was admissible, she was entitled to prove all of it. There is no merit in these contentions. Only relevant parts of a conversation are admissible. The cases which discuss this principle are not numerous, but it has been applied frequently in the exclusion of irrelevant parts of conversations. Sims v. Moore, 61 Iowa, 128, 16 N. W. 58;Alsup v. Ray, 175 Ill. App. 621;Rollins v. Duffy, 18 Ill. App. 398. This court has held that only relevant parts of a writing may be introduced by the party first offering the instrument. Parnham v. Weeks, 180 Iowa, 649, 163 N. W. 454. The principle involved is the same in written admissions as in oral declarations. All that is said in a conversation, in relation to relevant subjects, may be shown, and no more.

Brief and hurried conversations, as well as long and deliberate discussions, may relate to more than one subject-matter. The conversation between the witness and defendant was brief, but it related to at least two subjects. One was the manner in which the accident happened. The other was in relation to insurance.

[3] It is a singular fact that one involved in an accident, who has insurance, promptly discloses that he is insured. At the time such disclosure is made, it is seldom taken by the other party as an admission of blame for the accident. The belief is nearly universal that liability insurance obligates the insurance company to pay damages, however inflicted. Statements of the character, “I have insurance to cover the damage I did you,” are not made as an admission of culpability, but are the expression of the belief that the insurance company must pay, regardless of where blame for the accident may rest. Such statements are not relevant to the issue of negligence.

[4][5] Admissions are often satisfactory evidence. As a rule, however, relevant admissions, after being admitted in evidence, are to be considered with caution and scrutinized with care. Allen v. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 658, 47 N. W. 906;Wilmer v. Farris, 40 Iowa, 309;Cooper v. Skeel, 14 Iowa, 578;In re McDonald's Estate, 167 Iowa, 582, 149 N. W. 897;Oberholtzer v. Hazen, 101 Iowa, 340, 70 N. W. 207. In this situation sound legal principle requires the exclusion of declarations of doubtful relevancy, when interwoven with matter universally recognized as prejudicial and baneful.

[6] What has been said is not in derogation of the well-recognized rule that relevant parts of a conversation will not be excluded because they are inextricably mingled with irrelevant and prejudicial matters. Stilson v. Ellis, 208 Iowa, 1157, 225 N. W. 346.

The excluded portions of the conversation were not necessary to a full understanding of the parts admitted in evidence. The part admitted in evidence is complete and self-explanatory.

[7] II. In addition to a general denial, and certain allegations not germane to the objection now under consideration, the answer contains this language: “Further answering this defendant says that at the time and place alleged * * * plaintiff and one L. C. Kuhn * * * were together engaged in a joint enterprise and in operating the motor vehicle in which they were riding and that the negligence of the plaintiff and of the said L. C. Kuhn contributed to and caused the injury...