Kuhn v. Stansfield

• Decision Date: 12 February 1868
• Citation: 28 Md. 210
• Parties: MICHAEL J. KUHN, Garnishee of J. HENRY SOMERVILLE v. THOMAS STANSFIELD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

28 Md. 210

MICHAEL J. KUHN, Garnishee of J. HENRY SOMERVILLE v. THOMAS STANSFIELD.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 12, 1868

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Howard County.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, BRENT, GRASON MILLER and ROBINSON, J.

James Mackubin and Robert J. Brent, for the appellant:

The Court below gave judgments for the creditors, and this appeal is from the judgment in one of several cases, upon an agreement, that the judgment of this Court in this case shall be entered in all, as though all had been appealed from, and that execution be stayed in all until the judgment of this Court is rendered.There is no charge of fraud, nor are the facts constituting the consideration, as set forth in the bill of sale, controverted.The isolated and only question is, was the consideration set forth valuable, or was it so purely voluntary as to be void against creditors?It is conceded that a husband may contract for a transfer of his property to his wife for a bona fide and valuable consideration, and that a promise to re-pay or secure, is a valuable consideration.Bowie vs. Stonestreet, etal., 6 Md. Rep., 430.

And in the case of Jones' Adm'r vs. Jones & Wife, etal., 18 Md. Rep., 467, '8, the Court lay great stress upon the fact, that in that case, as in this the contract had been executed by an actual conveyance.But the appellee's case and the judgment of the Court below rests upon the assumption, that this fund was a gift from Mrs. Somerville, whose separate property they say it was, to her husband.It is insisted however, that this fund never was Mrs. Somerville's, but passed from her father to Somerville; both sign the receipt; but he says in his bill of sale, that he in fact received the money, and the receipt says, that it was received of Kuhn, the father-in-law, but whether received from the wife or her father, he received it upon his written acknowledgment, that it was received not as a gift to him from his wife or her father, but "as an advancement with a view to a portion or settlement of his(Kuhn's)daughter."Thus he became the trustee for his wife, by the act or appointment of her father.Gover vs. Owings,16 Md Rep., 99.

The wife's signature evidences nothing more than her assent, that so much money has been paid by her father to her husband in trust for her, and that such payment may be regarded as an "advancement" of her to that amount.The promise to re-pay, or hold for her use, is necessarily implied from the husband's written acknowledgment that he had received it for her; and that such was the intention as understood by him is emphatically declared in the bill of sale, both in its recital and in the terms of the trust.The case of Edelen vs. Edelen,11 Md. Rep., 415, and the other cases referred to, are all cases where the wife attempted to recover either against a party who had paid to her husband upon her authority, or against her husband's estate, for allowances or expenditures which she had made voluntarily, of her own motion and without any recognition whatever upon the part of the husband, of any indebtedness from him therefor, and without any claim from the wife for repayment until after her husband's death.Here the debt is actually recognized, and there has been an actual conveyance to secure it, "according to the true intent and meaning" of the instrument under which it was contracted.Mrs. Somerville never had this money to give, it passed from her father; if she consented that her husband should receive it, it was upon his written engagement that it was for her, i. e. in trust for her, which necessarily implies the obligation to repay.

In the case of Mory, Exc'x of Michael, vs. Michael,18 Md. Rep., 239, a wife's executor was allowed to recover interest against her husband, in the non-payment of which she had acquiesced for four years, he being her trustee.It may be true, that by the investment of this fund in his business, Somerville obtained credit, &c.But certainly not more so than did Holliday in the case of Stockett, Adm'r of Locke, etal. vs.Holliday and Wife, etal., 9 Md. Rep., 480.

It is insisted that Somerville's execution of the bill of sale was the fulfilment of a high moral duty, and a recognized obligation which equity would have enforced.It was a fulfilment, too, of the statute law of the state, which requires that the wife's estate shall be preserved to her separate use, and particularly, and above all things, shall be secure against her husband's creditors.Such is not only the present law, but has been the policy of the State for the last twenty years or more.Code, Pub. Gen'l Laws, Art. 45, secs. 1, 2, 3;Act of 1853, ch. 245;Const., 1864, Art. 3, sec. 42.

And the Courts have been quite as watchful for the protection of the rights of married women.Koontz vs. Nabb,16 Md. Rep., 554;Johns vs. Reardon and Wife,11 Md. Rep., 465;Steffey, et al. vs. Steffey,19 Md. Rep., 5.

A post-nuptial settlement will be upheld against creditors in two cases:

1st.Where there has been an express contract of the husband, whether made with the wife for a valuable consideration, or with a third party.

2nd.Where the husband having already received a portion of the wife's separate estate, and having appropriated it even with her consent, voluntarily makes such a settlement as a Court of Equity would force him to make.

The only evidence that connects the wife with the transaction is her signing a receipt jointly with her husband, which receipt specifically declares that the money is for her use.Yet this is the only evidence in the record which shows her intervention.

The presumption, that the husband did not agree to settle this property, is adopted in face of the evidence that he did settle it on his wife, and did declare that he did so settle it "for the purposes mentioned in the settlement," and the settlement or receipt specifies that the money was for a portion or settlement of his wife.

But if the decision can be supported on the first ground, it is then claimed it must be reversed on the second ground; that is, that the Court will uphold the deed, if it be such an one as equity would have required the husband to make; and this particularly in view of our Code, which makes all property coming to the wife after marriage her separate property.Wickes vs. Clarke, 8 Paige, Ch. Rep., 162.

But in order to make this deed void at law, there must be an entire failure of consideration; and even supposing that a Court of Equity would not require a husband in failing circumstances to settle the whole $800 on his wife, yet a Court of Equity would certainly have decreed the wife a part.But if a Court of Equity would have allowed the wife a part of the $800, then there is a valuable consideration which will support the deed at law; and if the creditors claim that the consideration is in excess of the wife's equity, they must assert in equity their claims on the surplus.

Henry E. Wootton and George W. Sands, for the appellee:

Under the law of Maryland, the sum of money advanced by Kuhn to his daughter, became her separate property, and she could dispose of it as she pleased....