Kulikowski v. Crow
| Decision Date | 02 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-cv-01946-RM-NYW |
| Parties | JAIMIE LYNN KULIKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. JASON CROW, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
AMENDED RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter comes before the court on Defendant Jason Crow's ("Defendant" or "Mr. Crow") "Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint" ("Motion to Dismiss" or "Motion") [#24, filed August 25, 2020]. The undersigned Magistrate Judge considers the Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Order Referring Case dated July 8, 2020, [#5], and the Memorandum dated August 25, 2020, [#25]. The court concludes that oral argument will not materially assist in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, upon review of the Motion and associated briefing [#26; #27], the entire case file, applicable case law, and being otherwise fully advised, this court respectfully RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.1
The following facts are drawn from the court docket and the factual allegations reflected in the operative Amended Complaint, which are taken as true for the purposes of this instant motion. Plaintiff Jaimie Lynn Kulikowski ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Kulikowski") is a disabled army veteran and candidate for the United States House of Representatives for Colorado's 6th Congressional District. [#20 at 1]. Proceeding pro se,2 Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint in this matter on July 2, 2020, asserting a single claim based on the Stolen Valor Act of 2013. See Ms. Kulikowski alleged that Congressman Crow "has stolen [her] valor," "is sitting in [her] seat in the US House of Representatives," and "needs to get out now." [Id. at 4]; see also [id. at 6 ()]. Plaintiff requested the court (1) order she and Defendant participate in mediation, at which time Defendant be required to provide his complete Official Military Personnel File; (2) "grant eservice"; and (3) order all congressional candidates for the seat representing Colorado's 6th Congressional District participate in two public debates before November 2020. [Id. at 7].
On July 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Resolve through ADR, Introduce the Stolen Valor Act of 2020, Increase Request for Relief" ("Motion to Resolve Through ADR"). [#12]. On July 28, 2020, Defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss ("First Motion to Dismiss") [#14].
Three days later, Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B). [#20, filed July 31, 2020]. In the notice of filing anAmended Complaint, Plaintiff explains [#20-1 at 1]. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts only a claim for "[h]arassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." [#20 at 4]. In support of her claim, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Crow:
(1) is her "subordinate" employee and "is not listening to [Plaintiff] as his boss";
(2) "fearmongers in his communications" because he uses phrases like "mask up" in reference to the COVID-19 pandemic;
(3) "supports control and dominion over others by supporting inhumane bills like the TRACE Act," which Plaintiff characterizes as "an assault on all women" who have suffered before her;
(4) "calls himself a servant leader" which Plaintiff claims "is an assault on [her] ancestors who were indentured servants . . . [and] royalty back in the 1500's";
(5) "is a stonewaller," which constitutes "an assault" on Plaintiff's mental health;
(6) "is a war supremacist" because his campaign website includes the statement "'I've just always been someone who goes where the fight is,'" which Plaintiff contends is "an assault on [her] soul";
(7) "is playing God" by stating in a newsletter his decision to wear a mask to protect his community, which Plaintiff claims is "an assault on her right to religion";
(8) "is a helicopter parent gone wild," which Plaintiff alleges is "an assault on [her] American freedom"; and
(9) "is unoriginal and uninspired," which Plaintiff contends is "an assault on her American dream."[Id. at 4-5]. Plaintiff requests $2,000,000 in damages and declares that she is "firing Jason Crow as congressman" because she is his "boss" and has "the right to fire him." [Id. at 5]. Finally, Plaintiff concludes her Amended Complaint with a section titled "Closing Remarks," wherein she decries Mr. Crow's political rhetoric and the Democratic Party generally, and describes a "collective movement towards the American Dream." [Id. at 5-6].
That same day, Judge Moore denied Mr. Crow's First Motion to Dismiss as moot, in light of the Amended Complaint. [#21]. Shortly thereafter, construing Plaintiff's Motion to Resolve Through ADR as a motion for settlement and a motion to amend the complaint, Judge Moore denied Plaintiff's request for a settlement conference and denied Plaintiff's motion to amend as moot. See [#22, filed August 3, 2020]. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on August 25, 2020. See [#24]. The following day, Plaintiff filed a Response [#26] and Defendant a Reply [#27]. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for consideration and recommendation.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) a court may dismiss a complaint "'either because it asserts a legal theory not cognizable as a matter of law or because the claim fails to support a cognizable legal claim.'" Scarbrough v. Coleman Co., Inc., No. 13-cv-00260-LTB-MEH, 2013 WL 3825248, at *1 (D. Colo. July 24, 2013) (quoting Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (D. Colo. 2004)). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations . . . and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009)). A plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, "and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (2007). Rather, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (). To state a claim that is plausible on its face, a complaint must "sufficiently allege[] facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
Federal courts have the inherent authority to sanction conduct that abuses the judicial process. See Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2015); Martin v. Greisman, 754 Fed. Appx. 708, 712-13 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished). This inherent authority authorizes a court to depart from the "American Rule"—whereby litigants pay their own attorney's fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise—to assess fees against an attorney or pro se litigant who acts in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. See Sun River Energy, 800 F.3d at 1227 (); Collins v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., No. 15-cv-02115-RBJ-NYW, 2018 WL 10878005, at *7 (Feb. 7, 2018) (). "For th[is] exceedingly narrow bad faith exception to the American Rule to apply, there must be clear evidence that the challenged claim is entirely without color and has been asserted wantonly, for purposes of harassment or delay, or for other improper reasons." Kornfeld v. Kornfeld, 393 Fed. Appx. 575, 579-80 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). To warrant an award of fees in exception to the American Rule,the Tenth Circuit requires that the trial court make "a finding of bad intent or improper motive." Greisman, 754 Fed. Appx. at 713 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
I first consider whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for harassment under Title VII. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Mr. Crow. Accordingly, I then consider whether—in light of Plaintiff's failure to state a claim and pattern of conduct in federal court—a sanction against Plaintiff in the form of an award of reasonable attorney's fees is warranted. I conclude that Plaintiff's conduct is sanctionable but recommend denial without prejudice of Defendant's request for attorney's fees for failure to comply with D.C.COLO.LCivR 54.3.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff does not have an employee-employer relationship with Defendant for purposes of a Title VII cause of action. [#24 at 4].3 In her Response, Plaintiff argues that "[s]ince Crow employed [her] as his employer in Dec [sic] 2019," Plaintiff is "both protected under Title VII AND [has] the right to fire him in an at-will employment state." [#26 at 3 (emphasis in original)]. Rather than raise the arguments herself in her Response, Plaintiff directs the court to an email thread, attached to her Response as Exhibits A and B, that "reveals [her] argument for Crow and [Plaintiff]...
To continue reading
Request your trial