Kunz v. Young

Decision Date10 April 1896
Citation97 Iowa 597,66 N.W. 879
PartiesKUNZ v. YOUNG.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from district court, Webster county; N. B. Hyatt, Judge.

Action to quiet title. Decree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.C. C. Cole, for appellant.

R. M. Wright, for appellee.

KINNE, J.

1. Plaintiff claims title to the land in controversy in Webster county, Iowa, under the swamp land grant passed by congress on September 28, 1850, and by act of the general assembly passed in 1853, and the subsequent selection of the land as swamp land by the agents of Webster county, the sale of the same to John F. Duncombe, and deed to him by the county; also, under a tax deed of said land, by the treasurer of said county to one A. Jacobs, of date May 28, 1870; also, under a tax deed, by the treasurer of said county, dated April 24, 1888, to F. T. Walker; also, a deed from said Walker and wife to W. G. Watters, and a deed from Duncombe and wife to said Watters; also, a deed from Watters and wife to the plaintiff. Defendant claims title under the railroad land grant of May 15, 1856, and a grant from the state of Iowa to the Dubuque & Pacific Railroad Company, and by subsequent transfer to the Dubuque & Sioux City Railroad Company, and by certification of the land by the department of the interior to the last-named company, and by quitclaim deeds from the railroad company to William Ragan, and from said Ragan to the defendant.

2. In this case the appellant filed an abstract which recites that it contains “all the evidence introduced or offered on the trial of the cause.” Appellee files an additional abstract, containing many corrections of and additions to appellant's abstract, and at the close thereof states: “And appellee demes that appellant's abstract, and this additional abstract, when taken together, are or constitute all the evidence offered or received in the trial of said cause.” To the denial appellant files no further abstract, either in denial of the additional abstract, or by way of reaffirmance of the correctness of his own abstract. Appellant, however, files a transcript. This is an equity cause, triable de novo in this court; and it is essential that it appear that we have all of the evidence before us. It has often been held that when the appellee, in an additional abstract, denies that appellant's abstract is an abstract of all of the evidence in the case, such statement by appellee will be deemed true, in the absence of a denial by the appellant. Kearney v. Ferguson, 50 Iowa, 72;Love v. Donaldson, 63 Iowa, 631, 19 N. W. 804;Acton v. Coffman, 74 Iowa, 17, 36 N. W. 774;Shattuck v. Insurance Co., 78 Iowa, 377, 43 N. W. 228;Carson & Rand Lumber Co. v. Knapp, Stout & Co. Company, 80 Iowa, 619, 45 N. W. 544;Burkhart v. Ball, 59 Iowa, 629, 10 N. W. 260, and 13 N. W. 666;Marsh v. Smith, 73 Iowa, 295, 34 N. W. 866;Foley v. Hefferon, 70 Iowa, 572, 31 N. W. 877;Chapin v. Garretson, 85 Iowa, 377, 52 N. W. 104;Fairbairn v. Haislet, 90 Iowa, 145, 57 N. W. 702;Hopkins v. Railway Co. (Iowa) 64 N. W. 603; Dungan v. Railway Co....

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT