Kuperman v. Wrenn

• Decision Date: 14 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 10–2083.,10–2083.
• Citation: 645 F.3d 69
• Parties: Albert KUPERMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.William L. WRENN, Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections; Richard M. Gerry, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison; Michael A. Samson; Steven E. Britton, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

645 F.3d 69

Albert KUPERMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.William L. WRENN, Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections; Richard M. Gerry, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison; Michael A. Samson; Steven E. Britton, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 10–2083.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Submitted April 4, 2011.Decided July 14, 2011.

Nancy S. Tierney, and the Law Office of Nancy S. Tierney, on brief for appellant.Laura E.B. Lombardi, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General, on brief for appellees.Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and THOMPSON, Circuit Judges.THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Albert Kuperman, a former inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, challenges a district court order granting summary judgment to the defendant prison officials. The New Hampshire State Prison system requires all inmates to be clean-shaven, unless they obtain a waiver based on a medical condition or on their religious beliefs.¹ An inmate who obtains a shaving waiver based on his religious beliefs may “maintain a 1/4–inch neatly trimmed beard.”

While incarcerated in state prison, Kuperman, an Orthodox Jew, filed a pro se complaint claiming that he should not have been required to shave at all, because doing so unduly impinged on his sincerely-held religious beliefs. More specifically, he asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the prison shaving regulation (sometimes referred to as “PPD 7.17”) violated his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. He also argued that it violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1 et seq.² The complaint sought injunctive relief, monetary damages, and declaratory judgment.

The defendants are William Wrenn, Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections, and Richard Gerry, Warden of the New Hampshire State Prison (collectively referred to as “Prison Officials”). Kuperman sued them in both their official and personal capacities. During preliminary screening of the complaint, the district court identified which claims could proceed. ³ As part of that screening, it dismissed Kuperman's official capacity claims except to the extent they sought injunctive relief. Kuperman does not challenge that dismissal on appeal.

Prison Officials filed a motion seeking summary judgment on all remaining claims. Kuperman, who by this stage had obtained counsel, opposed the motion, but submitted no new affidavits or other admissible evidence to rebut Prison Officials' arguments.⁴ Ultimately, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Prison Officials on all claims. Kuperman filed a timely notice of appeal.

Because our review of the record reveals no dispute of material fact and shows that Prison Officials are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

MOTION TO DISMISS

Because Kuperman completed his sentence and was released from state custody while his appeal was pending, Prison Officials moved to dismiss his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot. Kuperman agrees that his claims for injunctive relief are moot. But he insists that his claims for declaratory relief and monetary damages survive. We can decide only ongoing cases and controversies, of course. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975). So if an event occurs that makes it impossible for us to provide some form of meaningful relief, there is, generally speaking, no case or controversy, and we must dismiss the appeal as moot. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992). Our first task, then, is to see whether Kuperman's release from prison eliminates any possibility of further judicial relief, which would render his claims moot.

Official Capacity Claims

During preliminary screening of Kuperman's complaint, the district court jettisoned his official capacity claims except to the extent they sought injunctive relief—a ruling Kuperman does not contest here. Kuperman concedes that his release moots his injunctive relief requests. See, e.g., Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir.2009). That leaves us with this: § 1983 and RLUIPA claims against Prison Officials in their personal capacities seeking monetary and declaratory relief.

Personal Capacity Claims

A claim is moot only if no relief is available. See Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12, 113 S.Ct. 447. Prison Officials appear to concede that Kuperman's claims for monetary relief survive, given that their motion to dismiss mentions Kuperman's request for monetary relief but asks us to dismiss only his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Indeed, as a former prisoner alleging a constitutional violation that occurred during his incarceration, Kuperman may obtain nominal and punitive damages under § 1983.⁵ See, e.g., Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir.2004); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir.2002); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 879, 881 (10th Cir.2001). Because some relief is available on Kuperman's claims, they are not moot.⁶ See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969); Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol Puerto Rico Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 36 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 13, 113 S.Ct. 447).

For the same reason, Prison Officials' argument that Kuperman is no longer entitled to declaratory relief is beside the point. Our question is whether Kuperman can obtain some relief, and he can. Therefore, his claims are not moot.

We grant Prison Officials' motion to dismiss Kuperman's claims seeking injunctive relief, and analyze his remaining claims on the merits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo, resolving all evidentiary conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Spratt v. R.I. Dep't of Corr., 482 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir.2007) (citing Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006)). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the undisputed facts show that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

MERITS

As the moving parties, Prison Officials had the initial burden of informing the judge of the basis for their motion and identifying the portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Rivera–Colón v. Mills, 635 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If they did that, then Kuperman had to show, “through submissions of evidentiary quality, that a trialworthy issue persists.” Iverson, 452 F.3d at 98. On issues for which Kuperman would bear the burden of proof at trial, he had to introduce definite, competent evidence to survive summary judgment. See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991).

First Amendment ⁷

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against those who, acting under color of state law, violate federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Rodríguez–Cirilo v. García, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir.1997). Kuperman's § 1983 claim is based in part on his contention that the prison shaving regulation prevented him from practicing his religion, in violation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.⁸

A prison regulation which restricts an inmate's First Amendment rights is permissible if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The factors relevant in deciding the regulation's constitutionality are: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether alternative means to exercise the right exist; (3) the impact that accommodating the right will have on prison resources; and (4) the absence of alternatives to the prison regulation. Id. at 89–90, 107 S.Ct. 2254. We will refer to these as the “ Turner factors.” Of course, courts “must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 156 L.Ed.2d 162 (2003); see also Brown v. Plata, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011). When contesting the reasonableness of a prison's regulation, the inmate bears the burden of persuasion. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 132, 123 S.Ct. 2162.

Applying the first Turner factor, we consider whether the beard-length restriction is reasonably related to the penological interests asserted by Prison Officials to justify it. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Prison Officials submitted an affidavit from Charles Boyajian, Unit Manager of the Special Housing Unit and the Close Custody Unit of the New Hampshire State Prison for Men, stating that the shaving regulation promotes safety and security interests and good hygiene.⁹ Prison Officials insist that the beard-length restriction is reasonably related to prison security because it (1) helps guards identify inmates inside the prison to ensure they do not enter prohibited areas, (2) makes it harder for inmates to hide weapons or contraband, and (3) prevents an inmate from quickly changing his appearance if he escapes.

Kuperman's evidence does not refute these contentions. On appeal, he contends otherwise, pointing to a letter from Rabbi Wiener of the Jewish Council of Greater Coney Island, and an affidavit from another inmate, Wayne Sargent. Rabbi Wiener's letter, which was attached to the complaint and not sworn to under oath,...