Kupperion, In Interest of, 10391
| Decision Date | 03 March 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 10391,10391 |
| Citation | 331 N.W.2d 22 |
| Parties | In the Interest of David KUPPERION. F. DAYAP, M.D., Petitioner and Appellee, v. David KUPPERION, Respondent and Appellant. Civ. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Mackenzie, Jungroth, Mackenzie & Reisnour, Jamestown, for respondent and appellant; argued by William A. Mackenzie, Jamestown.
Wendy P. Schulz, Asst. State's Atty., Jamestown, for petitioner and appellee.
David Kupperion appeals from an "Order for Hospitalization and Treatment Following Treatment Hearing" entered on January 12, 1983, by the Stutsman County Court. We affirm.
The evidence reveals that on October 7, 1982, Kupperion was admitted to the North Dakota State Hospital under the emergency commitment procedures outlined in Sec. 25-03.1-25 of the North Dakota Century Code. This action was precipitated by a telephone call Kupperion made to law enforcement authorities in Cass County informing them that he was contemplating suicide. Kupperion was taken to St. Luke's Hospital in Fargo where he was examined by a physician. The physician discovered a scratch on Kupperion's wrist. Kupperion later admitted that the scratch was self-inflicted with a knife. The scratch, however, was superficial and did not require treatment. Kupperion was then taken to the State Hospital.
On October 8, 1982, Kupperion signed voluntary commitment papers. Kupperion remained under treatment at the State Hospital, but on January 6, 1983, he executed a written request for release. Dr. F. Dayap of the State Hospital subsequently proceeded to file in Stutsman County Court a petition for involuntary commitment on January 7, 1983. An involuntary commitment hearing was held in the Stutsman County Court on January 12, 1983. Dr. Dayap was the only person who testified during the hearing, at which Kupperion was represented by counsel.
At the close of the testimony, the court concluded that Kupperion was a mentally ill person requiring treatment and the court ordered that he be committed to the State Hospital for a period of not to exceed 90 days. Kupperion appeals from this order.
Kupperion raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether or not Kupperion is entitled to immediate discharge from the State Hospital because of noncompliance with Sec. 25-03.1-29, N.D.C.C., which provides that a hearing on appeal shall be commenced within 14 days of filing of the notice of appeal; and (2) whether or not the court's finding that Kupperion is a mentally ill person in need of treatment is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
This appeal is the first of its kind for our Court. Prior to January 1, 1983, expedited appeals from orders of involuntary commitment were statutorily allowed under Chapter 25-03.1, N.D.C.C., to the district courts rather than to the Supreme Court. See Sec. 25-03.1-29, N.D.C.C.; Sec. 113, Ch. 320, 1981 S.L. Section 25-03.1-29, N.D.C.C., currently provides:
In the present case, Kupperion filed his notice of appeal with the clerk of the Stutsman County Court on February 4, 1983. The notice of appeal was received by the clerk of the Supreme Court on February 8, 1983, and was subsequently filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court on February 9, 1983. Oral arguments on this case took place before this Court on February 23, 1983. Kupperion contends that because oral arguments were heard more than 14 days after he filed his notice of appeal with the clerk of county court, he should be entitled to immediate discharge from the State Hospital. We do not agree.
Section 25-03.1-29, N.D.C.C., is silent in regard to whether or not the 14-day period in which a hearing shall be commenced begins to run when the notice of appeal is initially filed in the county court or when it is subsequently forwarded and filed in the Supreme Court. We conclude that the 14-day period under Sec. 25-03.1-29, N.D.C.C., begins to run only after the notice of appeal has been filed in our Court which will hear the appeal.
After being notified of an expedited appeal such as the one involved in the instant case, this Court must be afforded a sufficient amount of time to effectively process that appeal. Only upon our receipt of the notice of that appeal can the proper procedural steps be taken to ensure a just determination of the issues in compliance with the 14-day hearing requirement. A sufficient amount of time is required not only for the clerk of the Supreme Court to schedule oral arguments for the case and to adequately notify counsel of the briefing schedules; but, also, to help foster just adjudication of the merits of such appeal through more adequate preparation by counsel as well as this Court. An adoption of Kupperion's interpretation of the statute, which would hold this Court to a time limit that could run either partially or entirely before the Court even had notice of the commencement of the appeal, would not only be detrimental to the proper and efficient functioning of this Court, but would also be detrimental to the interests of the parties involved.
We also believe that although it is the function of the clerk of county court to transmit the notice of appeal to this Court, the ultimate responsibility for assuring that the notice of appeal is timely transmitted to the Supreme Court lies with the counsel for an appellant. Cf. J.L.R. v. R.L.G., 311 N.W.2d 191, 193 (N.D.1981); In Interest of R.H., 262 N.W.2d 719, 721 (N.D.1978); State ex rel. Olson v. Nelson, 222 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D.1974); Naaden v. Hagen, 213 N.W.2d 702, 704 (N.D.1973). This allocation of responsibility will assist in guarding against undue delay between the time the notice of appeal is filed in the county court and the time the notice of appeal is received and filed in this Court.
Another consideration in the determination of this issue is that legislation will be construed, if possible, so that it will pass constitutional muster. State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 473 (N.D.1982); Paluck v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, Stark Cty., 307 N.W.2d 852, 856 (N.D.1981); Snortland v. Crawford, 306 N.W.2d 614, 626 (N.D.1981); Grace Lutheran Church v. N.D. Employment, 294 N.W.2d 767, 772 (N.D.1980). In City of Carrington v. Foster County, 166 N.W.2d 377, 382 (N.D.1969), this Court recognized that the creation by our Constitution of the three branches of government operates as an apportionment of the different classes of power and that because all of the branches derive their authority from the same Constitution there is an implied exclusion of each branch from the exercise of the functions of the other. See also Paluck v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, Stark Cty., supra 307 N.W.2d at 856. If we were to construe Sec. 25-03.1-29, N.D.C.C., in such a fashion that would unduly impede or hamper this Court in the discharge of its judicial functions, a serious question concerning the doctrine of separation of powers would arise. See United States v. Brainer, 515 F.Supp. 627, 631-640 (D.Md.1981); United States v. Howard, 440 F.Supp. 1106, 1109-1113 (D.Md.1977); State ex rel. Emerald People's Util. v. Joseph, 292 Or. 357, 640 P.2d 1011, 1013-1014 (1982); State v. Johnson, 224 Ind. 540, 69 N.E.2d 592, 594-596 (1946).
We therefore conclude that because the hearing in the instant case was held within fourteen days from the date in which Kupperion's notice of appeal was filed in this Court, the provisions of Sec. 25-03.1-29, N.D.C.C., were not violated. 1
Kupperion also contends that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish his need for commitment. He does not contest the Court's finding that he was a "mentally ill person" as defined by statute. See Sec. 25-03.1-02(10), N.D.C.C. Nor does he contend that he is not receiving treatment in the State Hospital. See Youngberg v. Romeo, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Rather, he argues that the court's finding that he is a "person requiring treatment" is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
In involuntary commitment proceedings, the evidence must establish that the individual involved is a person requiring treatment. Sec. 25-03.1-07, N.D.C.C. The burden of proof in these proceedings lies with the petitioner, and there is a presumption in favor of the respondent that he or she does not require such treatment. Sec. 25-03.1-19, N.D.C.C. Furthermore, in order for an involuntary commitment petition to be granted, it must be sustained by evidence which is clear and convincing. Sec. 25-03.1-19, N.D.C.C.; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).
A "person requiring treatment" is defined in Sec. 25-03.1-02(11), N.D.C.C., as follows:
"11. 'Person requiring treatment' means either a person:
a. Who is severely mentally ill; or
b. Who is mentally ill, an alcoholic, or drug addict, and there is a reasonable expectation that if the person is not hospitalized...
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