Kurec v. CSX Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | 5:18-CV-0670 (LEK/TWD) |
| Parties | ALEX KUREC Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Plaintiff Alex Kurec brings this action against Defendant CSX Transportation, Inc. under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (the "FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., and New York Labor Law ("NYLL") § 201-d. Dkt. No. 1 ("Complaint"). In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FRSA and NYLL § 201-d by firing him after he: refused to drive to work during a snowstorm; refused to drive while fatigued; and refused to report to work while intoxicated. See Compl. ¶ 1.
Now before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment, which seeks dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety. Dkt. No. 35 ("Motion"); Dkt. No. 35-15 ("Defendant's Statement of Material Facts" or "Defendant's SMF"); Dkt. No. 35-16 ("Defendant's Memorandum"). Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Dkt. No. 38 ("Opposition"); Dkt. No. 38-1 ("Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts" or "Plaintiff's SMF"). Defendant filed a reply in support of its Motion. Dkt. No. 41 ("Reply"); Dkt. No. 41-4 ("Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's SMF").
For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Defendant's Motion but dismisses Plaintiff's NYLL claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The following facts are undisputed, except where otherwise noted.
Plaintiff, an engineer, was employed by Defendant from 2007 until July 18, 2017. Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 1, 93; Pl.'s SMF at 1, 26. Defendant is CSX Transportation, Inc., a provider of freight rail transportation services. Compl. ¶ 3; Dkt. No. 17 ("Answer") ¶ 3.
Defendant initially hired Plaintiff as a managerial-level trainee but promoted him a number of times: first to assistant roadmaster, then to roadmaster, and finally, to assistant division engineer in October 2015. See Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 1, 3, 5; Pl.'s SMF at 1. As an assistant division engineer, Plaintiff oversaw track maintenance for the areas between Selkirk and Syracuse, New York and between Syracuse and Montréal, Quebec. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 7. In that role, Plaintiff reported to Albany Division Engineer Joshua Brass, who reported to Greg Mellish, Defendant's Chief Engineer for the North. See Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 16, 18; Pl.'s SMF at 2.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff "understood that as an Assistant Division Engineer . . . he was expected to be available for railroad operations all day, every day, including in particular, emergencies that arose in his territory." Id. ¶ 12; see also Def.'s Mem. at 5, 7. Plaintiff has at times agreed and at times disagreed that he was constantly on call. CompareDkt. No. 35-2 ("Plaintiff's Deposition") at 91 () with Pl.'s SMF at 2 ().
Defendant alleges that it fired Plaintiff due to "a pattern of neglect, lack of engagement, and insubordination that gave rise to serious safety concerns that posed a risk of derailments and grade crossing accidents, and slowed rail operations in Kurec's territory." Def.'s Mem. at 5. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that he was retaliated against for engaging in FRSA-protected activity. See Opp'n at 7. Accordingly, the Court next examines Plaintiff's record while working for Defendant.
In March 2017, Defendant's track geometry car discovered a three-and-a-half inch warp on rail within Plaintiff's territory. See Def.'s Mem. at 8; Def.'s SMF ¶ 20; Pl.'s Dep. at 9. The warp, which was large enough to derail a train, was discovered on track that Plaintiff was tasked with inspecting every sixty days. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 38-2 ("Plaintiff's Declaration") ¶ 3. Though Brass spoke to Plaintiff about the track condition, see Pl.'s Dep. at 9, no disciplinary record regarding the warp discovery exists. See Dkt. No. 35-5 ("Brass Deposition") at 7.
On March 14, 2017, a snowstorm dumped 15-to-24 inches of snow throughoutDefendant's Albany Division. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 34; see also Pl.'s Dep. at 13. The winter storm did not come as a surprise; in the days leading up to it, Brass sent forecasts and instructions to Plaintiff and others in the same role. See Dkt. No. 35-6 (). On the day the storm hit, Brass called Plaintiff, see Def.'s SMF ¶ 36; Pl.'s SMF at 7, but the parties' retellings of their conversation diverge. In Defendant's version, Brass told Plaintiff he was needed in Selkirk that night to oversee operations at the switching yard there. See Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 35-36. According to Defendant, Plaintiff refused, saying he would go the following day because he preferred to be with his family in Syracuse overnight. See id. at 36-37. In Plaintiff's version, Brass simply asked Plaintiff for his plans. According to Plaintiff, he told Brass that he wished to spend the night in Syracuse and drive to Selkirk the next morning once the roads had been plowed and there was less chance of an accident. See Pl.'s SMF at 7-8; Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 5.2 Regardless of whether Plaintiff defied Brass' order or merely expressed a preference without opposing Brass' instructions, the parties agreethat Brass was unhappy with Plaintiff's choice not to travel to Selkirk on March 14, 2017. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 38; Pl.'s Dep. at 16.
At some point during 2017, an employee under Plaintiff's supervision used a blowtorch to cut a bolt hole in rail on track within Plaintiff's territory. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 42; Pl.'s Dep. at 10. Use of a blowtorch to cut holes in rails violates Defendant's policies and federal regulations and shortcuts the recommended practice of using a drill. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 43, 45. Blowtorch use could lead to a derailment. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 44; Pl.'s Dep. at 10. Defendant states that Plaintiff was "held responsible" and "coached" for the employee's blowtorch use. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 46. Plaintiff maintains that he was not disciplined for the blowtorch incident. See Pl.'s SMF at 10.
In June 2017, Transport Canada, Canada's transportation department, identified a number of defects on sections of Defendant's track over which Plaintiff had oversight authority. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 47. Specifically, on June 21, 2017, Transport Canada issued Defendant a notice imposing a temporary speed restriction due to vegetation conditions that created reduced sightlines at private crossings. Dkt. No. 35-7. On June 23, 2017, Transport Canada issued Defendant another notice, this time regarding gaps between the road surface and the tops of the rail. Dkt. No. 35-8.
Then, on July 13, 2017, Transport Canada issued Defendant a Notice and Order due to a number of issues discovered during an inspection the day before. Dkt. No. 35-9. Brass asked Plaintiff to travel to Canada that night to "personally assess the defects and start puttingtogether a remediation plan[.]" Def.'s SMF ¶ 54. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff told Brass that his request "was bullshit," that he was driving from Philadelphia back to New York after participating in training, and that he wanted to stay home and put his kids to bed. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 55. Plaintiff alleges that he had just finished working 16 consecutive hours and therefore declined because he felt he needed to rest. Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 7.3 The parties agree that Plaintiff did not travel to Canada until early on the morning of July 14, 2017. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 58; Pl.'s Dep. at 21.
On the night of July 15, 2017, a train derailed in Selkirk Yard, within Plaintiff's territory. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 64; Pl.'s Dep. at 7, 21. At 11:46 p.m., Brass called Plaintiff and told him to report to the derailment site. Def.'s SMF ¶ 66; Pl.'s SMF at 16. Plaintiff told Brass that he had been drinking and did not feel safe driving. Def.'s SMF ¶ 67; Pl.'s SMF at 17. Plaintiff then called a roadmaster he supervised, who agreed to respond to the derailment. Def.'s SMF ¶ 71; Pl.'s SMF at 20.
Plaintiff testified that he began driving to the derailment the next morning when he received a call from Brass, who told him not to go to Selkirk Yard and that his employment was under review. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 75; Pl.'s SMF at 22; Pl.'s Dep. at 24. On July 18, 2017, Plaintiff was informed by Greg Mellish, then Defendant's Chief Engineer for the North, that he was terminated. See Pl.'s Dep. at 25; Def.'s SMF ¶ 93; Pl.'s SMF at 26. Mellish made the decision to terminate Plaintiff with input from Brass. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 84; Pl.'s SMF at 23; seealso Dkt. No. 35-3 ("Mellish Deposition") at 4.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs courts to grant summary judgment if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute is "'genuine' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, while "[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary" will not preclude summary judgment, "summary judgment will not lie if . . . the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also ...
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