Kurokawa v. Blum

Decision Date24 March 1988
Docket NumberNo. B022884,B022884
Citation199 Cal.App.3d 976,245 Cal.Rptr. 463
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesKoko KUROKAWA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Melvin C. BLUM, Gerald S. Block & David Zaid, co-executors of The Estate of Robert Beaumont, Defendants and Respondents.
Law Offices of Marvin M. Mitchelson, Marvin M. Mitchelson, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant

Goldberg and Andrus, a Professional Law Corp., Jerome L. Goldberg, Lesley A. Andrus, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

ROTH, Presiding Justice.

I STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Koko Kurokawa (Kurokawa) appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant Robert Beaumont (Beaumont) following a hearing on Beaumont's motion for summary judgment.

Kurokawa sought in excess of $10 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages based upon Beaumont's alleged breach of an oral agreement made in 1965 between the two to cohabit, to help each other in business ventures, and to jointly accumulate, share and account for property and income. Alleging Beaumont had failed to honor his promises upon termination of their relationship in 1981, Kurokawa filed her verified complaint on May 13, 1983, asserting causes of Beaumont filed an answer asserting multiple affirmative defenses. After discovery was conducted, Beaumont moved for summary judgment. The hearing was conducted on June 10, 1986; the proceedings were not transcribed. The trial court granted his motion and finding a relationship between the parties had ended in 1971, all of Kurokawa's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court granted judgment on Beaumont's behalf. It was entered on June 30, 1986.

action for breach of contract, breach of an implied in law contract, and fraud.

On August 29, 1986, Kurokawa filed a timely notice of appeal from the adverse judgment.

On February 21, 1987, Beaumont died in Nevada.

In June 1987, Kurokawa filed a sworn claim (claim) in Beaumont's estate for $20 million. The legal theories generated by the claim are basically at variance with the three or more legal theories pleaded in Kurokawa's complaint and implemented during the summary judgment proceeding. A cursory reading of each document demonstrates an inherent improbability which impeaches Kurokawa's credibility. Each of the documents shatters the truth of the other.

The Claim however, was not part of the record before the trial court when it rendered judgment. It became a part of the record during the pendency of this appeal in the following manner.

As previously noted, following the trial court's entry of summary judgment in Beaumont's behalf, Beaumont died in February 1987. While Kurokawa's appeal from that decision was pending in this court, she filed in June 1987 a sworn document, entitled "General Claim" in the Nevada probate court which had jurisdiction of Beaumont's estate. This claim was first brought to our attention by respondent in August 1987 in conjunction with the request for sanctions for a frivolous appeal. Since then, Kurokawa has neither questioned the authenticity of this document nor objected to this court's use of it. In fact, in her opposition to the sanctions request, she defended her filing of said claim urging, "... having good faith belief in the justice of her [present] appeal, [Kurokawa] and her counsel were bound to file the claim [in Beaumont's estate], or had she gained reversal on appeal, it would perhaps have been a hollow victory without true recourse due to procedural omission to file a claim." We therefore consider it proper to comment on the claim, its contents, and its implications. The claim is attached to this opinion as Appendix I.

In July and August 1987, the parties submitted their respective briefs to this court. Beaumont requested sanctions be imposed upon Kurokawa for prosecuting a frivolous appeal. At oral argument in October 1987, we informed Kurokawa and her attorney we were of the opinion her appeal lacked merit and was frivolous. The matter was continued, additional briefing was submitted on that point, and at the November 1987 hearing testimony was taken.

II PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Although not expressly referenced in her complaint, Kurokawa's action is essentially based upon our Supreme Court's holding in Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106. Marvin held the provisions of the Family Law Act were inapplicable to the distribution of property acquired by a couple in a nonmatrimonial relationship. Instead, an individual's rights in that situation would be based upon enforcement of an express or implied agreement between the nonmarital partners concerning distribution of property as well as theories of partnership or joint venture. ( Id., at p. 674, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106.)

The specifics of Kurokawa's breach of contract claim are set forth in the following paragraphs of her complaint:

"5. ... [i]n or about August of 1965, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an oral agreement whereby it was expressly agreed and understood that Plaintiff would devote her full time and attention "During the period ... Plaintiff and Defendant BEAUMONT agreed that in consideration for the services which Plaintiff provided to Defendant BEAUMONT, Plaintiff and Defendant BEAUMONT would combine their efforts and earnings and share equally ... in any and all property acquired as a result of the individual or combined efforts including all additions thereto, or improvements thereof, and the rents, issues and profits therefrom, and that Defendant BEAUMONT would contribute to the support and maintenance of Plaintiff to assure Plaintiff that she would be able to maintain her life in the same style and manner that was and would be established during the time that the parties lived together.

to caring for Defendant BEAUMONT's needs as his business partner, social hostess, companion, homemaker, decorator, confidant, but not limited to such functions, during the period of time that she lived with Defendant BEAUMONT and/or at all times that Plaintiff continued to provide the services hereinabove alleged at the request of Defendant BEAUMONT....

"6. As further consideration, Defendant BEAUMONT requested Plaintiff to protect BEAUMONT from various matters which would generate adverse publicity, on a case by case basis in return for which, Defendant BEAUMONT would continue to finance as may be necessary, the fashion business of Plaintiff to assure that [her] fashion business would always be solvent and that Plaintiff would not be in need of any funds for her personal lifestyle or business until at least a period of five years from April of 1981."

"7. [I]n reliance upon said agreements, Plaintiff and Defendant BEAUMONT did live together and Plaintiff did perform the services requested by Defendant BEAUMONT from and including August of 1965 to and including April of 1981." (Emphasis added.)

The complaint recites three different dates of the parties' separation: April 1981, December 1981, and July 1982. In any event, Kurokawa further alleged the parties accumulated $10 million in assets during their relationship and that commencing in July 1982, Beaumont had refused to perform his promises of sharing the accumulated property, contributing to her support, and funding her fashion business.

Additionally, the complaint asserted a theory of "Implied in Law Contract." In support thereof, it incorporated the factual allegations found in paragraphs 5 through 7 and added thereto the following assertions:

"16. That between August of 1965 and July of 1982, Plaintiff and Defendant BEAUMONT lived together and maintained business relationship and a personal relationship to the same force and effect as would a couple who would have been legally married.

"17. During the course of the said period of that time the parties lived together:

a. They purchased real and personal property.

b. They travelled together on vacations and business trips.

c. Plaintiff at all times acted as homemaker, cook, companion and confidant to Defendant BEAUMONT.

d. Plaintiff and Defendant BEAUMONT mutually planned their financial future together for the rest of their lives and accordingly, Plaintiff did mutually share in the benefits of their work activities.

e. Plaintiff, at the express request of Defendant BEAUMONT, protected Defendant from all adverse publicity and potential responsibility for actions taken by Defendant BEAUMONT involving third parties.

f. Plaintiff devoted all aspects of her life to Defendant BEAUMONT's interest and well-being to the exclusion of her own.

g. Throughout this period of time hereinabove referred, Defendant BEAUMONT repeatedly assured Plaintiff that all of the said efforts were for both of h. Defendant BEAUMONT impliedly promised to give Plaintiff the same financial security and property rights as she would have had were the parties legally married in August of 1965 and in that connection further implied the promise to Plaintiff to give her one-half of each and all assets owned or acquired by them during the period from the time that they began living together until and including July of 1982.

their benefits, and that she would be secure as hereinabove alleged in paragraph 5 and that it would make no difference that Plaintiff and Defendant BEAUMONT were not legally married.

"18. That as a result of the foregoing and the mutual promises that Plaintiff and Defendant BEAUMONT made to each other during the course of their relationship, Plaintiff at all times had a reasonable expectation that in case the parties were to separate, there would be an equal division of all assets owned or acquired by either Plaintiff or Defendant BEAUMONT during the course of their relationship and that Defendant BEAUMONT would pay to Plaintiff a sum for reasonable support and compensation.

"19. Defendant BEAUMONT has failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to...

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