Kurowski v. C.I.R.

Decision Date13 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-3578,89-3578
Citation917 F.2d 1033
Parties-5898, 59 USLW 2341, 90-2 USTC P 50,585, 63 Ed. Law Rep. 754 Audre Lee KUROWSKI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Stephen G. Katz, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant.

Peter K. Scott, I.R.S., Gary R. Allen, Laura Marie Conley O'Hanlon, Bruce R. Ellisen, Dept. of Justice, Tax Div., Appellate Section, Charles S. Casazza, U.S. Tax Court, Washington, D.C., for respondent-appellee.

Before CUMMINGS and MANION, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. *

CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.

Taxpayer Audre Kurowski was a tenured teacher who received $12,862 in settlement of a dismissal proceeding brought against her by her former employer. The Tax Court held that this amount did not constitute damages received on "account of personal injuries or sickness" and consequently was not excludable from her income under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. Sec. 104(a)(2)). The Court held that there was a deficiency in income tax due from taxpayer for 1980 in the amount of $5,999.06, and taxpayer has appealed from this decision. We affirm.

A. Factual Background and Procedural History

In 1970 taxpayer began working as a teacher with the Community Consolidated School District 59 of Cook County, Illinois ("School District") and ultimately obtained tenure. In 1975 she and her husband were divorced. In the spring of 1974 during the divorce proceedings, she began to suffer from psychiatric problems requiring the School District to have her examined by Dr. Rolando de la Torre, a psychiatrist. He determined that she could not properly discharge her duties as a teacher, and in August 1974 she requested and received a leave of absence without pay.

Mrs. Kurowski was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment in January 1975. She was declared incompetent and became a ward of the State of Illinois. Her leave of absence was extended at the request of an attorney for Illinois. In December 1975 she was adjudicated to be competent. Thereafter the School District granted her request for an extension of her leave of absence to obtain a master's degree. After obtaining the degree in August 1976, she asked the School District to return her to active status. However, psychiatrist Dr. Robert Cutler reported that she could only function at a "borderline level," and shortly thereafter she was again hospitalized.

Finally, in April 1977, Dr. de la Torre and another psychiatrist reported that she was competent to return to work, and she was permitted to do so at the start of the school year in September 1977. However, Dr. de la Torre reported in February 1978 that she was not capable of functioning as a teacher in view of her paranoia. The following month the School District advised taxpayer that she could not continue her teaching assignment because of mental illness. As a result, in September 1978 the School District initiated dismissal proceedings to remove taxpayer from her tenured position. The School District served her with a bill of particulars setting forth the reasons why it decided to dismiss her in accordance with a resolution of the Board of Education. The dismissal notice stated that a hearing would be held on November 1, 1978. However, the dismissal proceeding was postponed to early 1979 at the joint request of counsel because of her inability to participate. In March 1979 psychiatrist Dr. Heller reported that taxpayer's condition would permanently impair her teaching abilities. Subsequently the School District's counsel recommended a settlement with taxpayer, and in 1980 the controversy was settled for $12,862.

Although the settlement agreement was not reduced to writing, an October 1, 1979, letter from one of the counsel for the School District described it as follows:

A. That the Board shall pass a resolution accepting Audre Kurowski's resignation and will withdraw the prior Dismissal Resolutions;

B. District 59 and the Board will state to anyone inquiring as to the reason for Audre Kurowski's departure from District 59 that she left because the treatments required for her mental illness conflicted with her scheduled teaching assignment time requirements;

C. That furthermore, assuming Audre's performance was satisfactory before the onset of her mental illness, that anyone inquiring as to her performance would be advised her performance was satisfactory before the onset of her illness;

D. That Audre Kurowski would be paid the total amount of $12,862 constituting payment to her of three-quarters of her last year's annual salary; and

E. That the compensation payment aforesaid be considered by the Board as settlement compensation and not salary so that Audre Kurowski would receive the more favorable tax treatment accorded such settlement compensation as opposed to payment of salary or wages.

At her Tax Court trial, taxpayer testified that she had retained counsel to regain her reinstatement and that she felt that the School District had caused her embarrassment, humiliation and personal suffering. She told her attorney that the damage to her reputation was worth millions, but her attorney advised taxpayer that "she didn't know if she [taxpayer] could take a stance like that."

Taxpayer added that she did not file a lawsuit against the School District regarding these "injuries" and was unaware of any demand by her attorney for compensation in an action against the School District. She added that she believed the School District was dropping its charge against her for insubordination and aberrational behavior and that she tendered her resignation as part of the settlement. She admitted that resignation from her tenured position was a condition of receiving the settlement proceeds and that she did not know if her alleged claim for embarrassment, humiliation and loss of reputation was being settled.

Taxpayer's attorney testified that she never made a tort-type claim against the School District on taxpayer's behalf, did not remember whether she had ever discussed a tort-type claim with the School District's counsel, and admitted that she was not aware of any such claim being made by taxpayer.

The School District's counsel testified that taxpayer's resignation was sought and then dismissal proceedings were commenced because of her performance as a teacher and her mental problems. He also stated that no tort-type claim was made against the School District.

The Tax Court found that the settlement was based on taxpayer's inability to teach and that the dismissal proceedings were brought to remove her from her tenured position because she had become ineffectual as a teacher. Therefore the court rejected taxpayer's assertion that the settlement proceeds represented damages for embarrassment and humiliation or because taxpayer had not been permitted to select her own physician. The court concluded the settlement was similar to an employer's buying out an employee's contract, and that the taxpayer was exchanging her tenure for the settlement proceeds. Consequently decision was entered in favor of the Commissioner.

B. Applicability of Section 104(a)(2)

Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that gross income does not include "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness." The rationale of the exemption is to free a taxpayer from liability for an amount received as compensation for a loss of that nature. "[T]he recovery does not generate a gain or profit but only makes the taxpayer whole by compensating for a loss." Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir.1990), citing 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts para. 13.1.4 (1981). Here it is clear that in return for the $12,862 settlement, taxpayer resigned from her tenured teaching position and the School Board withdrew its pending dismissal charges. Since the settlement agreement did not expressly state that...

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  • Francisco v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • February 5, 2001
    ...presumption status), courts are obliged to measure the veracity of, and support for, that assertion. See Kurowski v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1990). Moreover, our review of the District Court's determination of the payor's intent is particularly deferential because it mus......
  • Rivera v. Baker West, Inc.
    • United States
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    ...language specifying the purpose of the compensation, we will then examine the intent of the payor. See id. at 864; Kurowski v. Comm'r, 917 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir.1990); Knuckles v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir.1965). The payor's intent can be "based on all the facts and circumstanc......
  • Pipitone v. US, 98-3624.
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • June 14, 1999
    ...amount was paid to settle, the most important factor for courts to consider is the intent of the payor. See Kurowski v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir.1990) ("Since the settlement agreement did not expressly state that the payment was made on account of personal injuries, the pa......
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    ...exemption is to free a taxpayer from liability for an amount received as compensation for a loss of that nature." Kurowski v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir.1990); see also Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 590 (4th Cir.1990). Though § 104(a)(2) provides an exclusion from th......
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  • Back pay awarded in employment discrimination dispute is taxable.
    • United States
    • The Tax Adviser Vol. 24 No. 4, April 1993
    • April 1, 1993
    ...290 F2d 283 (2d Cir. 1961)(7 AFTR2d 1423, 61-1 USTC [paragraph] 9457). (14) See, e.g., Byrne, note 5; Madson, note 8; Audre L. Kurowski, 917 F2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1990)(66 AFTR2d 90-5898, 90-2 USTC [paragraph] 50,585), aff'g TC Memo 1989-149. (15) See, e.g., Mason K. Knuckles, TC Memo 1964-33,......

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