Kurzawski v. Malaga
Decision Date | 19 January 1949 |
Docket Number | No. 30768.,30768. |
Citation | 83 N.E.2d 557,402 Ill. 207 |
Parties | KURZAWSKI et al. v. MALAGA et al. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Donald S. McKinlay, judge.
Suit by Anthony Kurzawski and another against Adela Malaga and others for partition of realty. From a decree for the defendants, plaintiffs appeal.
Cause transferred to Appellate Court.
Cloyes & Cavender, of Chicago, for appellants.
John J. Maciejewiski, of Chicago, for appellees.
Anthony Kurzawski and Helen Boldega, appellants herein, filed a complaint on January 29, 1948, in the superior court of Cook County naming their seven brothers and sisters, together with their various spouses, parties defendant. The complaint alleged that their father Ignac Kurzawski, then deceased, had been the owner of two lots in the city of Chicago, upon each of which was a residence; that on July 4, 1945, the father conveyed said lots to Adela Malaga and Florence Wlodarski, two of the defendants, as trustees under a trust agreement, the terms of which were unknown to plaintiffs at the time of filing the complaint, except they believed that it provided for a sale of said property after the father's death, and for a division of the proceeds of the sale among his nine children; that on July 27, 1947, two deeds were recorded in the recorder's office of Cook County, wherein one lot was conveyed by the two trustees to Adela and her husband and the other lot to Florence and her husband; that the plaintiffs had received no consideration from the sales; that the consideration actually received by the trustees was inadequate in amount, and that the grantees were not innocent purchasers of the property. Plaintiffs further alleged in their complaint that they are entitled to a partition of the property and each entitled to one-ninth thereof, or, in the event of a sale, to an equal division of the proceeds; and that, in the event that the two trustees were or are authorized to sell and divide the proceeds of the sale, the latter be required to comply with the trust agreement and sell the property for its fair market value and pay to plaintiffs what is equitably due and owing to them.
The defendants filed their answers to the complaint and the cause was heard by the chancellor, who, at the conclusion of the evidence, found the issues for the defendants and dismissed the complaint for want of equity. This appeal is from the decree entered in accordance with his findings.
The deed from the father to his two daughters as trustees is not attacked in any way. The trust agreement, executed at the same time as the deed, provided ‘that the trustees are the sole owners of the said real estate so far as the public is concerned; that the trustees will deal with it only when authorized so to do on the written request and direction of Ignac Kurzawski during his natural life and after his death upon the written direction of five of the said children above named.’ The deeds by the trustees to themselves and their husband were made after what the trustees claim were written consents thereto executed by five of the children; the five being the two named trustees and three others. The grantees named in the deeds were the occupants of the respective properties deeded to them both before and after the death of the father. Appellants concede that the consideration paid by Adela for her lot was near its real value, but they contend that the lot sold to Florence for $9000 was in fact worth $11,000, and that appellant Anthony had offered that amount for it at a family conference held before it was conveyed to Florence. In his testimony before the court Anthony said that if Florence had paid the amount of his offer, he would have let her have it. This inadequacy of the purchase price in the sale of the one lot seems to us to have been the principal subject of controversy in the trial court. The legal questions in the record, as to proper proof of the existence of a missing written consent signed by five of the children, the right of the two trustees to be two of the five signers of the consent and to be purchasers from themselves as trustees, are all advanced by appellants to give support to their claim for the additional monetary relief.
There was also presented to the trial court a question relative to a transaction occurring subsequent to the delivery of the two deeds. When the money was paid by the two daughters as grantees it was delivered by them to a woman real-estate agent who had an office in the neighborhood of the property. This agent was delegated to figure the taxes and costs of the transfers, and, after deducting those items, pay to each beneficiary, his or her one-ninth share of the proceeds. The seven children named as defendants accepted their several checks from the real-estate agent under such arrangement, but the two appellants never took their shares. There is a serious question whether the trustees notified appellants that the money was there waiting for them. Anthony says he did not know of it, but one of his brothers testified that he told Anthony to go to the office and get his check. The proof shows that appellant Helen did know that the money was at the real-estate office, for it appears that she tried to get one of her other brothers to refuse to accept his check. Both of appellants contended then, and do contend now, that the amount coming to each from such sales was insufficient, as heretofore set forth. Some time after the seven had received their money, the real estate agent absconded and was not heard from thereafter and no trace of the funds held for the two appellants was found in her office or effects. This loss of the money presented an additional issue for the trial court to decide as to what persons should bear the loss. The chancellor found that the distributive shares of the appellants were duly tendered to them, and the result of his dismissal of the bill for want of equity is that appellants receive nothing.
Before considering the rights of the appellants herein and the legality and effect of the acts of the trustees under their father's deed and the trust agreement, we must first determine whether this court has jurisdiction of this direct appeal. None of the parties have raised this question, but it is our duty to decline to proceed in a cause where jurisdiction to determine is wanting. Bennett v....
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