Kutcher v. Post Printing Co.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
Citation23 Wyo. 178,147 P. 517
Docket Number796
PartiesKUTCHER v. POST PRINTING CO., ET AL
Decision Date12 April 1915

Rehearing Denied June 29th, 1915, Reported at: 23 Wyo. 178 at 199.

ERROR to the District Court of Sheridan County; HON. CARROLL H PARMELEE, Judge.

Action for libel. From an order sustaining a demurrer to the petition and a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff brings error.

Reversed.

Enterline & La Fleiche and J. H. Burgess, for plaintiff in error.

The published matter was libelous within the definition of that term. (25 Cyc. 361; Spencer v. Minnick, 139 P. 130; 25 Cyc. 346.) A false imputation to a public officer of malfeasance or misconduct in office is libelous per se. (25 Cyc. 403.) The allegations of the petition and the correctness of the innuendoes are admitted by the demurrer. (25 Cyc. 469; Belknap v. Ball, 47 N.W. 674.) Hence a malicious publication of false statements accusing plaintiff of misconduct and corruption in office, as alleged in the petition, being admitted, a cause of action is stated. (In re McDonald, 4 Wyo. 150.) The State Constitution, while according every freedom to the press consistent with public welfare, restricts that freedom to the publication of the truth with good intentions and for justifiable ends. (Constitution, Sec. 20, Art. 1.) See also Wertz v. Sprecher, 118 N.W. 1071, a Nebraska case where a similar constitutional provision was invoked on the ground that the publication was true, and wherein it was held that the truth alone is not a complete defense, but that the defendant must further allege and prove, that he published the alleged defamatory matter with good motives and for justifiable ends. The rule is supported by the following authorities: 25 Cyc. 414; Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 100 N.W. 867, 80 A. 583. Where capable of different meanings, the meaning intended is a question of fact for the jury. (25 Cyc. 542; In re McDonald, 4 Wyo. 150; Spencer v. Minnick, supra, 129 P. 716; Morse v. Times-Rep. Printing Co., 100 N.W. 867.) The matter published was libelous within the rule announced by the following authorities: Heller v. Duff, 40 A. 691 (N. J.); Scougale v. Sweet, 82 N.W. 1061 (Mich.); Royce v. Maloney, 5 A. 395 (Ver.); Tanner v. Embree, 99 P. 547 (Calif.); Mattice v. Wilcox, 42 N.E. 270 (N. Y.); Weston v. Grand Rapids Pub. Co., 87 N.W. 258 (Mich.); Bee Pub. Co. v. Shields, 94 N.W. 1029 (Neb.), affirmed on rehearing, 99 N.W. 822. Nearly every question propounded to plaintiff charges him either directly or by insinuations with a dereliction of duty or malfeasance in office. The term "dive" used in the publication clearly referred to a disorderly place. The questions propounded with reference to "Order No. 4" directly charge that plaintiff, as Mayor of Sheridan, deliberately set aside the law and ordinances of the city and wrongfully permitted the sale of liquor on Sunday and in the restricted district in violation of law. A mere glance at the published matter will satisfy anyone that it constitutes a libel of the most venomous kind. What blacker charge must be made against a public official before he is entitled to redress?

Fred H. Blume and H. N. Gottlieb, for defendants in error.

The petition does not allege a libel published of and concerning plaintiff, as Mayor. That fact is negatived by an allegation that the publication was of and concerning plaintiff. If the publication complained of applies to a private individual upon whom no public duty devolved, it could not be libelous. (Kilgore v. Newspaper Co., 96 Md. 16, 53 A. 716.) Inducements or innuendoes are necessary to show the defamatory meaning of the words. (13 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 36; Christal v. Craig, 80 Mo. 373), and that they were published of and concerning plaintiff, as Mayor. (Stewart v. Codrington (Fla.), 45 So. 809; Van Epps v Jones, 50 Ga. 238; McCallum v. Lambrie, 145 Mass. 234, 13 N.E. 899; Harkness v. News Co., 102 Ill.App. 162; Hume v. Kusche, 87 N.Y.S. 109; Armstrong v. Sun Pr. P. Ass., 122 N.Y.S. 531, 533.) An innuendo is a conclusion. A demurrer never admits a conclusion. It admits only facts well pleaded. In cases of doubt the question is one for the jury. (Morse v. Times, 100 N.W. 867, 870; 13 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 57; 25 Cyc. 545; Zinserling v. Journal Co., 57 New York Supp. 905; Harris v. Santa Fe T. Co. (Tex.), 125 S.W. 77; Basi v. Herald Co., 68 New York Supp. 1134; Warner v. Baker, 36 App. Dec. 493; Crockett v. McLanahan, 109 Tenn. 517, 72 S.W. 950; Weeks v. New Pub. Co. (Md.), 83 A. 162, 164; Watson v. Detroit Journal Co., 143 Mich. 430, 107 N.W. 81; Brown v. Ind. Pub. Co. (Mont.), 138 P. 258; Weeks v. New Pub. Co. (Md.), 83 A. 162; Verbeck v. Durya, 73 N.Y.S. 346; Penry v. Dozier (Ala.), 49 So. 909, 913; Krone v. Block, 144 Mo.App. 575, 129 S.W. 43; McCauly v. State (Tex.), 141 S.W. 975; Moore v. Johnson (Ky.), 144 S.W. 765.) If the language is not libelous per se no cause is stated, unless special damages are alleged. (Brown v. Ind. Pub. Co. (Mont.), 138 P. 258; McCauly v. State (Tex.), 141 S.W. 975.) The sufficiency of an innuendo charge is a question of law for the court, and if insufficient when considered in connection with the facts alleged, a general demurrer should be sustained. (Galveston Tribune v. Guisti (Tex.), 134 S.W. 239; Harris v. Santa Fe T. Co. (Tex.), 125 S.W. 77; Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 A. 566; Naulty v. Bulletin Co., 206 Pa. St. 128, 55 A. 862; Gordon v. Journal Co., 81 Vt. 297, 69 A. 742; Diener v. Star Co. (Mo. App.), 132 S.W. 1143; Macurda v. Journal Co. (Me.), 82 A. 438; McCauly v. State (Tex.), 141 S.W. 975; Weeks v. News Pub. Co. (Md.), 83 A. 162; Hoffland v. Journal Co., 88 Wis. 369, 60 N.W. 263; 13 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 54; 25 Cyc. 545.) If the publication is not libelous per se, plaintiff is bound by an incorrect meaning ascribed by innuendo. (Patterson v. Frazer (Tex.), 79 S.W. 1077; Patterson v. Evans (Mo.), 134 S.W. 1030; Smith Bros. v. W. C. Agee & Co. (Ala.), 59 So. 647; Johnston v. Morrison, 3 Ariz. 109, 21 P. 405; Rossiter v. Press Co., 128 N.Y.S. 325; Ward v. MacBride, 24 Ont. L. R. 555, 20 Ont. W. R. 93; Mix v. Woodward, 12 Conn. 262; Merrill v. Marshall, 113 Ill.App. 447; Herrick v. Tribune Co., 108 Ill.App. 244; Hamilton v. Lowry, 33 Ind.App. 184, 71 N.E. 54; Callaghan v. Ingram, 122 Mo. 355, 26 S.W. 1020.) City ordinances relating to the Mayor's duties are not pleaded. The meaning of words employed in the publication are not shown by innuendo or by inducement to be defamatory. (Grant v. Dreyfus, 122 Cal. 58, 54 P. 389; DeArmond v. Armstrong, 37 Ind. 35; Windsor v. Ottofy (Mo. App.), 120 S.W. 693; Powell v. Crawford, 107 Mo. 595, 17 S.W. 1007; Moore v. Johnson (Ky.), 144 S.W. 765; Atchly v. State (Tex.), 120 S.W. 1010; Curtis v. Iseman, 137 Ky. 796, 127 S.W. 150; Hamilton v. Lowry, 33 Ind.App. 184, 71 N.E. 55; Grant v. New York Herald Co., 123 N.Y.S. 449; Stewart v. New York Herald Co., 77 N.Y.S. 216; McNamara v. Goldon, 194 N.Y. 316, 87 N.E. 442; Weeks v. News Pub. Co. (Md.), 83 A. 162; Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 278, 68 A. 566; Peterson v. Seetman, 37 Md. 153, 11 Am. Rep. 534; Clute v. Clute, 101 Wis. 137, 76 N.W. 114; Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kans. 267, 105 P. 509; Krone v. Block, 144 Mo.App. 575, 129 S.W. 43; Craig v. Pyles, 18 Ky. Law. 1043, 39 S.W. 33; Sturdevant v. Duke, 159 S.W. 621; Hansbrough v. Stennett, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 494; McFabin v. David, 78 Ind. 445.) Words having an innocent, as well as a slanderous meaning, must be alleged to have been used in the slanderous sense, otherwise the innocent meaning will be taken. (Cosand v. Lee, 11 Ind.App. 511, 38 N.E. 1099; Smid v. Bernard, 63 N.Y.S. 278; Barnard v. Press Pub. Co., 17 N.Y.S. 573, citing Odgers S. & L. 112, 13 Ency. P. & P. 57, 25 Cyc. 453.) Ordinances or by-laws relating to mayors' duties should be pleaded. (15 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 425; McClean v. Fowle, Fed. Cas. No. 8691; Miller v. Dorsey (Mo. App.), 129 S.W. 66; Seery v. Viall, 16 R. I. 517, 17 A. 552.) The innuendoes relating to the non-performance of duties, as mayor, are insufficient to show malfeasance, which implies some positive act. (Bouviers Dict. 2, p. 91.; Coite v. Lynes, 33 Conn. 115; State v. Lazarus, 39 La. Ann. 178; People v. Auburn, 33 N.Y.S. 165; Mudler v. State, 14 Neb. 183, 15 N.W. 330.) The first two clauses addressed to the Mayor are harmless. The newspaper wanted information and it had a right to ask for it. It is not averred that it was a public duty of the Mayor to confiscate gambling devices and the question propounded was not libelous. (Dawson v. Baxter, 131 N.C. 65, 42 S.E. 456; Westbrook v. Association, 65 N.Y.S. 399.) A charge of false swearing, without a colloquium of a judicial proceeding is not libelous. (Villikange v. Mllichamp (Wash.), 120 P. 876; Casselman v. Winship, 3 Dak. 292, 19 N.W. 412.) No slanderous meaning attaches to the term "restricted district." There are "restricted districts" of various kinds. No slanderous meaning attaches to the word "dive"; in the absence of averments by way of inducement indicating what is meant. (Peterson v. Snetman, 37 Md. 153, 11 Am. Rep. 534.) The meaning of "Order No. 4" is not made clear by innuendo or inducement. The article shows on its face that it was not intended to affect plaintiff adversely. (Wellman v. Sun P. & P. Co., 21 N.Y.S. 577.) Defendant newspaper was justified in seeking information. (Diener v. Star-Chronicle Co. (Mo.), 132 S.W. 1143; Farley v. McBride, 74 Neb. 49, 103 N.W. 1036; Herringer v. Ingberg, 91 Minn. 71, 97 N.W. 460; Diener v. Star-Chronicle Pub. Co. (Mo.), 135 S.W. 6; Coleman v. McLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281; Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 A. 411; Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. 404, 2 A. 513.) A different rule of criticism applies in the case of a public officer from one where only a private individual is concerned. The gravamen of the action is damage to...

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  • Kutcher v. Post Printing Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • June 29, 1915
    ...POST PRINTING CO., ET AL No. 796Supreme Court of WyomingJune 29, 1915 23 Wyo. 178 at 199. Original Opinion of April 12, 1915, Reported at: 23 Wyo. 178. Rehearing Fred H. Blume and H. N. Gottlieb, on petition for rehearing. The publication in the absence of express malice is conditionally pr......

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