Kuziw v. LAKE ENGINEERING COMPANY
| Decision Date | 06 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 71 C 253.,71 C 253. |
| Citation | 398 F. Supp. 961 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | William KUZIW, Plaintiff, v. LAKE ENGINEERING COMPANY, a Division of Arlo Manufacturing Corporation, a corporation, et al., Defendants. LAKE ENGINEERING COMPANY, a Division of Arlo Manufacturing Corporation, a corporation, and Economy Baler Corporation, a corporation, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. BELL & HEFTNER, INC., et al., Third-Party Defendants. |
Alan E. Morrill, Morrill, Koutsky, Klomann & Chuhok, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
George E. Sweeney, Kralovec, Sweeney, Marquard & Scoby, John F. Laughlin, Price, Schlager, Burgeson & Laughlin, Jerome M. Brooks, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
This cause comes before the Court on the motion of third party defendants to reconsider its earlier motion to dismiss the third party complaint. The Court, in a previous opinion by another judge, denied third party defendants' motion to dismiss, thereby permitting the third party complaint to stand on an indemnity theory of active-passive negligence. In denying that motion, the Court failed to recognize differences between actions in strict liability and actions in negligence. Consequently, the motion to reconsider dismissal of the third party complaint is granted.
Plaintiff in his complaint seeks redress for personal injuries sustained by him while operating a certain baling machine manufactured by defendant Lake, containing a component part manufactured by defendant Fluid Power, and sold by defendant Economy Baler.
The complaint sounds in strict liability, alleging that: the machine was "not reasonably safe"; the condition existed at the time the machine left defendant manufacturer's control; and the condition was due to a defect in design or manufacture of a certain valve, which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Defendants Lake Engineering Company and Economy Baler Corporation have filed a third party complaint against Bell & Heftner, Inc., and Harriet Schwartz and Jack Davidson, as Trustees of the Garland Building Trust, plaintiff's employer. Gist of the complaint is that through various acts of negligence, lack of maintenance or misuse, third party defendants rendered the baler unsafe, and that therefore third party defendants were actively negligent and should indemnify the primary defendants should they be found liable.
Jurisdiction is invoked under diversity of citizenship and Illinois law is applicable. The question is whether a third party complaint seeking indemnity from a user, and predicated upon an active-passive negligence theory, may properly be filed in an action based on strict liability.
Under Illinois law one negligent tortfeasor may seek indemnification from another negligent tortfeasor on grounds that the latter's negligence was primary and active and the former's negligence only secondary and passive. Illinois does not permit contribution among joint tortfeasors, and indemnification enables shifting the burden of liability to the party primarily responsible for the acts complained of. The indemnity concept involves qualitative determinations of relative fault.
Strict liability in tort, however, is not predicated upon a finding of negligence of any defendant; but rather a determination that plaintiff's injury occurred as a result of an unsafe condition of the product that existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control. The fact that another party may have acted to make the product more unsafe, or that plaintiff himself in some way negligently contributed to his own injury, is no defense so long as the unsafe condition attributed to the manufacturer is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
Defendant manufacturer may allege that the intervening act of another party or plaintiff himself was the proximate cause of the injury complained of. Proof of same would be a complete defense to the action. It is not, however, a basis upon which a third party user may be brought into the action. Indemnity is not obtainable in strict liability cases as against the user. In Illinois proximate causation may be asserted only as a defense and cannot be the basis, in strict liability actions, for a third party complaint seeking to shift liability. Burke v. Sky Climber, 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974); Kossifos v. Louden, 22 Ill.App.3d 587, 317 N. E.2d 749 (1974); Stanfield v. Medalist Industries, 17 Ill.App.3d 996, 309 N.E.2d 104 (1974); Wells v. Web Machinery, 20 Ill.App.3d 545, 315 N.E.2d 301 (1974).
Defendants rely upon dicta in Kossifos, supra. wherein the court stated:
In view of the availability of the "misuse by plaintiff" defense to strict product liability, one held strictly liable might conceivably...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Guidry v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., Inc., Civ. A. No. 72-1220
... ... the Intracoastal Waterway between a point where, on the west, the Wax Lake Outlet intersects the waterway and where, on the east, the waterway meets ... as an expert in the field of naval architecture and marine engineering. In response to a hypothetical question which took into account the ... ...
-
Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co.
...by the employee and accordingly cannot serve as the basis for a suit for indemnification against the user. Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co. (N.D.Ill.1975), 398 F.Supp. 961; Burke v. Sky Climber (1974), 57 Ill.2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516; Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division (1976), First District, 40 ......
-
Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co.
...based on that evidence could ever stand. II The case proceeded upon the theory of strict liability in tort. Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 398 F.Supp. 961 (N.D.Ill.1975). In order to recover under that theory, plaintiff was required to prove that his injury " resulted from a condition of th......
-
Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 75 C 4398.
...41, 341 N.E.2d 54 (1975); Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 13 Ill.App.3d 498, 301 N.E.2d 41, 45 (1973).1 See also Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 398 F.Supp. 961 (N.D.Ill.1975). Defendant argues, however, that the proper law to be applied is a federal common law of indemnity and contribution, as ......