Kuzminski v. Waser

• Decision Date: 15 October 1940
• Docket Number: No. 25733.,25733.
• Citation: Kuzminski v. Waser, 374 Ill. 428, 29 N.E.2d 594 (Ill. 1940)
• Parties: KUZMINSKI v. WASER et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

374 Ill. 428

29 N.E.2d 594

KUZMINSKI

v.WASER et al.

No. 25733.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 15, 1940.

Personal injury action by Albin Kuzminski against E. J. Waser and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendants appeal.

Cause transferred to the Appellate Court for the First District.Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; U. S. Schwartz, judge.

Delmar J. Hill and Cyrus L. Garnett, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellants.

Henry Mitgang, of Chicago (Arthur A. Wolfinsohn, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

SHAW, Justice.

The appellee, by his next friend, had judgment in the superior court of Cook county in the sum of $5,000 on the verdict of a jury in an action for personal injury. An appeal was prosecuted directly to this court on the ground, as it is claimed, that although the appellants had the form they did not have the essence of due process of law or a constitutional jury trial. This contention is based upon proof which was received on a motion for a new trial. Sonia Young, who was one of the jurors, had perjured herself on her voir dire examination. It seems clear that this juror testified falsely, before being accepted as a juror, to the effect that neither she nor any member of her family had been interested in a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident, whereas her husband had been the plaintiff in such a suit shortly before the trial resulting in the judgment which we are asked to review.

Inasmuch as we have no jurisdiction of this cause, we will refrain from any comment upon the evidence or instructions. The most that is claimed for the appellants amounts to an argument that a new trial should be granted because of the assumed bias of this juror. It is enough for us to point out that even if the juror was biased and even if serious errors were committed by the trial court in refusing to grant a new trial and if, as argued, the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, none of these things go to the question of due process nor to the right to trial by jury.

Neither the right to trial by jury nor the guaranties of due process of law extend to any guarantee against erroneous or unjust decisions. If the juror Young perjured herself on her voir dire examination it is no different than any other perjury which might occur in the course of a trial. These principles have so frequently been pointed out that we hesitate to repeat them. Thus, in Genslinger v. New Illinois Athletic Club, 332...