Kuznar v. Raksha Corp., Docket No. 132203.
| Citation | 481 Mich. 169,750 N.W.2d 121 |
| Decision Date | 11 June 2008 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 132203.,Calendar No. 5. |
| Parties | Judith KUZNAR and Joseph Kuznar, her husband, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RAKSHA CORPORATION, doing business as Crown Pharmacy, and Valerie Randall, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Kanter & Knapp, P.L.L.C. (by Lesley F. Knapp and Robert J. Kanter), Livonia, for the plaintiffs.
Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, P.L.C. (by Karen M. Daley and Jeffrey R. Clark), Livonia, for the defendants.
Mark R. Bendure, Law Offices of Nadia Ragheb, P.C. (by Nadia Ragheb), Charfoos & Christensen, P.C. (by David R. Parker), and Sachs Waldman, P.C. (by Linda Turek), Detroit, Farmington Hills, Detroit, Detroit, for amici curiae the Michigan Justice Association.
Jesse C. Vivian, Lansing, for amici curiae the Michigan Pharmacists Association.
Plaintiffs Judith and Joseph Kuznar sued Raksha Corporation, doing business as Crown Pharmacy (hereafter Crown Pharmacy), and its nonpharmacist employee Valerie Randall for negligence in refilling a prescription that resulted in injury to Judith. The issue is whether the two-year statutory period of limitations for medical malpractice 1 or the three-year period for ordinary negligence2 applies to plaintiffs' claims.
We affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that a pharmacy is not a licensed health facility or agency. In addition, we conclude that a pharmacy is not a licensed health-care professional. We hold, therefore, that a pharmacy cannot be directly liable for medical malpractice. But it can be directly liable for ordinary negligence for operating without having a licensed pharmacist on site and for allowing a nonpharmacist to dispense medications. Hence, plaintiffs' claims of direct negligence on the part of the pharmacy are timely under the three-year period of limitations for ordinary negligence.
Because the pharmacy is not a licensed health facility or agency, the defendant nonpharmacist employee was not an employee of such a facility or agency. Neither was she a licensed health-care professional. As a consequence, plaintiffs' claims alleging negligence by the nonpharmacist employee and vicarious liability for that negligence by the pharmacy may also proceed under the three-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
On November 11, 2000, Joseph Kuznar took a prescription for Mirapex, 0.125 mg, to be refilled at Crown Pharmacy. His wife, Judith, was taking the medication on her physician's orders to control the symptoms of restless leg syndrome. Defendant Valerie Randall refilled the prescription with 1 mg tablets of Mirapex, each tablet thus containing eight times the prescribed dosage. Randall was a Crown Pharmacy employee who was not a licensed pharmacist and was not acting under the supervision of a pharmacist.3
Judith Kuznar took one of the 1 mg Mirapex tablets in the afternoon and two in the early evening of November 13, 2000. She became dizzy, agitated, and nauseated in the evening and lost consciousness during the night. At the Botsford General Hospital emergency room, her symptoms were determined to be an adverse reaction to the excessive dosage of Mirapex.
On October 7, 2003, the Kuznars filed a negligence lawsuit against both Crown Pharmacy and Randall.4 In count 17 of the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Crown Pharmacy owed a duty to exercise reasonable care through its agents and employees when dispensing medications. In count 18, plaintiffs alleged that Crown Pharmacy owed a duty to avoid foreseeable injury when dispensing medications. In count 19, plaintiffs alleged that the pharmacy breached these duties by:
a. Failing to dispense the appropriate medication dosage and refilling a prescription instead with eight times the prescribed dosage.
b. Failing to timely recognize the error made in dispensing medications.
c. Allowing persons other than a licensed pharmacist to refill prescriptions d. Failing to have a licensed pharmacist available on site to oversee, supervise and control the actions of persons not pharmacists who refilled prescription[s].
In counts 22 to 24, plaintiffs alleged that Randall had a duty not to dispense medication if she was not a licensed pharmacist. Alternatively, plaintiffs alleged, she had a duty "to adhere to a standard of care to which she is held to avoid foreseeable injury in dispensing medications." In count 25, plaintiffs alleged that Randall breached these duties by:
a. Dispensing medication which she was not qualified to dispense as she was not a licensed pharmacist.
b. Failing to dispense the appropriate medication dosage and refilling a prescription instead with eight times the prescribed dosage.
c. Failing to timely recognize the error made in dispensing medications d. Failing to consult with a licensed pharmacist before dispensing medications.
On August 9, 2004, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). They contended that, because Randall was employed at a licensed health facility or agency, the complaint sounded in medical malpractice rather than in ordinary negligence. Defendants argued that the complaint failed to state a claim for ordinary negligence and was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice. The circuit court denied the motion without explanation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of defendants' motion for summary disposition.5 It pointed out that, under MCL 600.5838a(1), a medical malpractice claim can be brought against a "licensed health facility or agency" as defined in article 17 of the Public Health Code.6 Because the licensure requirement applicable to pharmacies appears in article 15 of the code,7 and not in article 17, the Court of Appeals concluded that a pharmacy is not a "licensed health facility or agency" subject to medical malpractice claims.
The Court of Appeals noted that pharmacists are licensed health-care professionals subject to medical malpractice claims under MCL 600.5838a(1)(b). However, Randall was not a licensed pharmacist, and neither was Crown Pharmacy. The Court noted that MCL 600.5838a(1) contemplates that the negligent acts of unlicensed agents or employees of licensed health facilities or agencies may be subject to medical malpractice claims. But because a pharmacy is not a "licensed health facility or agency," the Court opined, no medical malpractice had occurred in this case. The Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiffs' complaint was timely under the three-year limitations period for ordinary negligence.8
Defendants sought leave to appeal in this Court. We review decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo.9 Such motions are properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) when a statute of limitations bars a claim. In reviewing whether a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) was properly decided, we consider all documentary evidence and accept the complaint as factually accurate unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict it.10
Summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the nonmoving party "has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted." Such claims must be "`so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.'"11 In reviewing the outcome of a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we consider the pleadings alone.12 We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.13
We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.14 Our main goal in doing so is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. When a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls.15 The meaning accorded to undefined terms is determined in part by their placement in the statute and their purpose in the statutory scheme.16
In Bryant, this Court held that, to be subject to the requirements for asserting medical malpractice, a claim must allege an action that (1) occurred within the a professional relationship and (2) poses questions of medical judgment outside the realm of common knowledge and experience.17
A professional relationship exists if a person or an entity capable of committing medical malpractice was subject to a contractual duty to render professional health-care services to the plaintiff.18 Under the common law, only physicians and surgeons were potentially liable for medical malpractice. But in MCL 600.5838a(1), the Legislature expanded the scope of those who could be liable for medical malpractice.19 It provided for medical malpractice claims to be brought against "a person or entity who is or who holds himself or herself out to be a licensed health care professional, licensed health facility or agency, or an employee or agent of a licensed health facility or agency. . . ."20
The primary issue in this case is whether the pharmacy technician and the pharmacy are covered by MCL 600.5838a(1). We conclude that they are not. Because the professional relationship test is not satisfied, we need not consider whether the complaint poses questions of medical judgment that would require expert testimony.21
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the relevant statutes in determining that licensed health facilities and agencies are those licensed under article 17 of the Public Health Code.22 Article 17, entitled "Facilities and Agencies," provides its own definition of what is a health facility or agency in the form of a list. The list does not include pharmacies.23 All the entities listed do more than just dispense...
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