Kveragas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 83-5197

• Citation: 733 F.2d 409
• Decision Date: 02 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-5197,83-5197
• Parties: Charles KVERAGAS, et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCOTTISH INNS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 409

733 F.2d 409

Charles KVERAGAS, et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCOTTISH INNS, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 83-5197.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 15, 1984.

Decided May 2, 1984.

W. Zane Daniel, Steven Oberman, Knoxville, Tenn., Laurence M. Kelly, argued, Montrose, Pa., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Robert A. Crawford, argued, Knoxville, Tenn., for defendants-appellees.

Before MERRITT and JONES, Circuit Judges, and TAYLOR, District Judge. ^*

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

On February 16, 1982, three intruders kicked open the door to a guest room in a Scottish Inns motel in Knoxville, Tennessee, occupied by Charles and Esther Kveragas, plaintiffs below. Charles Kveragas was shot, Esther Kveragas was injured, and both were robbed of approximately three thousand dollars. The couple subsequently filed a diversity action against the actual and apparent owners and operators of the motel, alleging that their injuries were proximately caused by the failure of the owners and operators of the motel to make adequate provisions for the safety of motel guests. At the close of plaintiffs' case, the District Court directed a verdict for the defendants on the grounds that the defendants had no duty to protect the guests and that the sudden criminal acts of the assailants were the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Kveragas v. Scottish Inns, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 258 (E.D.Tenn.1983). We reverse and remand for a new trial.

I.

The evidence presented at trial showed that the plaintiffs registered as guests at a Scottish Inns motel located in Knoxville on February 16, 1982. Their room was equipped with a hollow core door that fit poorly into the door frame. The only door lock was that incorporated into the handle, described as a grade three lock, although a security chain was provided. After the plaintiffs entered the room, they dutifully locked the door and secured the chain.

At approximately 10:10 P.M., three intruders broke down the door and burst into the room. The evidence showed a single footprint on the door, strongly suggesting that a single kick was the only force applied to the door. One intruder accosted Mrs. Kveragas, who was taking a bath, while another shot Mr. Kveragas, gravely wounding him. The attackers took three thousand dollars in cash and escaped.

The evidence further showed that deadbolt locks and other security devices were easily available and in use throughout the motel industry. Deadbolt locks are considerably stronger than the type of lock employed at this motel, and the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that a deadbolt lock could withstand the force which was applied to the plaintiffs' door.

II.

The District Court directed a verdict for the defendants based on its application of the standard announced by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.1975). Cornpropst involved an action against the owners and operators of a shopping center by a female shopper who was assaulted in the shopping center's parking lot. Affirming the defendants' motion to dismiss in that case, the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that

[t]here is no duty upon the owners or operators of a shopping center, individually or collectively, or upon merchants and shopkeepers generally, whose mode of operation of their premises does not attract or provide a climate for crime, to guard against the criminal acts of a third party, unless they know or have reason to know that acts are occurring or about to occur on the premises that pose imminent probability of harm to an invitee; whereupon a duty of reasonable care to protect against such act arises.

528 S.W.2d at 198.

Applying this standard to the facts of this case, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs "as a matter of law, failed to show that defendants had knowledge of or reason to know that acts were occurring or about to occur at the motel that posed an imminent probability of harm to motel guests." Memorandum Opinion at 259. Alternatively, the District Court held that "the sudden criminal acts of the assailants were the sole proximate legal cause of plaintiffs' injuries." Id.

We believe the District Court erred in applying the Cornpropst standard to this case. Although the majority opinion in Cornpropst is wide-ranging, the holding is expressly limited by the following language:

We are not called upon, in this case, to draft a rule applicable to all of the many types of business and entertainment and service establishments or of every premises liability, or special relationship situation wherein a duty of protection of invitees might be asserted, and we do not propose to do so.

528 S.W.2d at 198. Cornpropst, by its own terms, addresses only the liability of shopping center owners and operators and other shopkeepers; the innkeeper-registered guest relationship is the type of "special relationship situation" which the Cornpropst court expressly refused to address. ¹ Thus, our responsibility is to survey other indicia of state law to determine what rule the Tennessee Supreme Court would apply to this case.

A.

The common law has long recognized the special legal relationship between innkeepers and registered guests. Historically, innkeepers operated under an extreme standard of liability, approaching that of an insurer against all dangers save acts of God. See, e.g., Dickson v. Waldon, 135 Ind. 507, 34 N.E. 506 (1893); McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56, 46 N.E.2d 573 (1943); Gurren v. Casperson, 147 Wash. 257, 265 P. 472 (1928). The Supreme Court of New York long ago offered an explanation for the emergence of the innkeeper's special responsibility:

This rigorous rule had its origin in the feudal conditions which were the outgrowth of the Middle Ages. In those days there was little safety outside of castles and fortified towns for the wayfaring traveler, who, exposed on his journey to the depredations of bandits and brigands, had little protection when he sought at night temporary refuge at the wayside inns, established and conducted for his entertainment and convenience. Exposed as he was to robbery and violence, he was compelled to repose confidence, when stopping on his pilgrimages over night, in landlords who were not exempt from temptation; and hence there grew up the salutary principles that a host owed to his guest the duty, not only of hospitality, but also of protection.

Crapo v. Rockwell, 48 Misc.Rep. 1, 94 N.Y.Supp. 1122 (1905).

Although castles and fortified towns are no longer part of our landscape, bandits and brigands remain. The common law has responded to these cultural changes by lessening, but not removing, the innkeeper's liability for criminal acts committed by third parties. See Anno., Liability of Innkeeper, Restaurateur, or Tavern Keeper for Injury Occurring on or about Premises to Guest or Patron by Person other than Proprietor or his Servant, 70 A.L.R.2d 628; Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants From Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 Georgetown L.J. 1153 (1971). We predict that the Supreme Court of Tennessee would neither adhere to the ancient rule of virtual strict liability nor entirely abrogate the innkeeper's duty save in cases of imminent harm. Rather, we predict the Tennessee Supreme Court would adopt the rule announced by a panel of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Zang v. Leonard, 643 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn.App.1982). ²

The plaintiff in Zang was shot by a robber in the parking lot of a motel in which the plaintiff was then residing. The theory of plaintiff's suit was that the motel was negligent in failing to make adequate provision for his safety in the parking lot. The Zang court concluded that Cornpropst did not apply, for the same reasons that we do not believe it applies to the case sub judice. See 643 S.W.2d at 662. The Zang court next rejected the rule set out in Restatement, Second, Torts Sec. 344 because that rule can be interpreted to impose liability in the absence of fault on the part of the innkeeper. ³

The Zang court then set out the standard of care which we believe the Tennessee Supreme Court would apply in cases such as the instant one: the duty placed on innkeepers to protect registered guests from the misconduct of third persons is a duty of due care under all the circumstances. 643 S.W.2d at 663. Put differently, the "reasonable person" standard, the cornerstone of common law tort jurisprudence, is the standard that applies to innkeepers in the protection of their guests, just as it governs countless other relationships.

The Zang court did not leave the application of the general due care standard to the unfettered discretion of the jury, and neither do we. The Zang court addressed the factors which a jury should consider in assessing due care:

The measure of the liability of the possessor of land to invitees is due care under all the circumstances including the nature and use of the land, the nature of the invitation, the nature of the relationship with the invitee, the opportunity of the possessor and the invitee to know and avoid existing or probable dangers, and any and all other factors which would challenge the attention of the possessor and/or invitee to the probability of danger to the invitee and produce the precautions which a reasonably prudent person would instigate under the same or similar circumstances.

643 S.W.2d at 663.

Under the Zang rule, the first responsibility of the factfinder is to determine "what, if any, protective measures would have been employed by a reasonably prudent motel operator under the same circumstances" which the factfinder finds existed at the time of the injury. Id. The finding of fact as to the protective measures which a reasonably prudent motel operator would have employed is to be based on a comprehensive study of all relevant conditions. The Zang court listed some of the appropriate considerations: whether the motel...