KVHP TV PARTNERS, LTD. v. Channel 12 of Beaumont, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1:94-CV 0484.,1:94-CV 0484.
• Citation: 874 F. Supp. 756
• Parties: KVHP TV PARTNERS, LTD. d/b/a Fox 29 and Calcasieu Communications, Inc. v. CHANNEL 12 OF BEAUMONT, INC., Texas Television Inc., Viacom International, Inc., and Multimedia Entertainment, Inc.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

874 F. Supp. 756

KVHP TV PARTNERS, LTD. d/b/a Fox 29 and Calcasieu Communications, Inc. v. CHANNEL 12 OF BEAUMONT, INC., Texas Television Inc., Viacom International, Inc., and Multimedia Entertainment, Inc.

No. 1:94-CV 0484.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

January 4, 1995.

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Paul Franklin Ferguson, Jr. and Michael A. Havard, Provost & Umphrey, Beaumont, TX, for plaintiff.

Bruce L. James, Kleberg & Head, P.C., San Antonio, TX, Harold Henson Walker, Nona B. Thomason, Gardere & Wynne, Houston, TX, Darryl Snider, Janet M. Grady, Paul A. Blechner, John Gueli, Shearman & Sterling, Los Angeles, CA, J. Hoke Peacock, II, Orgain Bell & Tucker, Beaumont, TX, and Amy Catherine Wright, and R. James George, Jr., George Donaldson & Ford, Austin, TX, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COBB, District Judge.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand this case to the Judicial District Court in Jefferson County on the basis that this court lacks jurisdiction. After considering the respective positions of the parties concerning the motion to remand, this court GRANTS plaintiffs' motion.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Calcasieu Communications, Inc., a Louisiana Corporation, is the general partner of KVHP TV Partners, Ltd. KVHP TV Partners operates under the name "Fox 29" and manages the station in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Fox 29 programming competes with defendant, Channel 12 of Beaumont, for viewers in Jefferson County, Texas. Defendants Multimedia Entertainment, Inc. ("Multimedia"), Viacom International, Inc. ("Viacom") sell syndicated programming to various stations. Plaintiffs contend that defendants agreed to restrict, constrain, or prevent Fox 29 from airing the same shows as Channel 12 of Beaumont. Plaintiffs further contend that Channel 12 maliciously prevented Fox 29 from obtaining this programming in order to insure Channel 12's market dominance.

Plaintiffs' original petition alleges that the defendants engaged in tortious interference with business relations and attempted to gain prospective economic advantage; committed civil conspiracy; violated the Texas Free Enterprise and Anti-Trust Act; and violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by restricting the plaintiffs' ability to obtain the same competitive shows as Channel 12. The pleading alleges that defendants used their larger market presence to persuade syndicators not to offer Fox 29 the same shows as Channel 12.

As is their right, plaintiffs alleged no violations of federal statutes and plead no federal causes of action. Accordingly, plaintiffs originally filed this complaint in the 58th Judicial District Court, Jefferson County, Texas. In an effort to escape state jurisdiction in Jefferson County, Multimedia and Viacom filed this removal action. Defendants contend that removal is properly based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a).¹ This court disagrees.

ANALYSIS

28 U.S.C. section 1441(a) states that "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." Since diversity of citizenship is not alleged, the sole issue before this court is whether plaintiffs' well pleaded complaint raises issues "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" that entitle the defendants to remove the case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). Section 1331 provides that: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The party seeking to remove a case to federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S.Ct. 35, 37, 66 L.Ed. 144 (1921); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992). Significant federalism concerns require this court to strictly construe removal jurisdiction. Willy, 855 F.2d at 1164.

1. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

The well-pleaded complaint rule governs removal of cases from state court to federal court. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Generally, the plaintiff is the master of his complaint. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 411-12, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913); Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir.1993). This time honored mastery permits plaintiffs to plead State causes of action and bypass federal causes of action in an effort to avoid federal jurisdiction. Williams, 482 U.S. at 392, 107 S.Ct. at 2429; Anderson, 2 F.3d at 593. Absent diversity of citizenship, defendants may successfully remove a case from state court to federal court only if a federal cause of action appears on the face of the plaintiffs' complaint. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2846-47, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983); Aaron v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 876 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1121, 107 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1990). "Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced." Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3233 n. 6, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). Furthermore, it is well settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption, "even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue." Williams, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430; Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2848; Willy, 855 F.2d at 1165. Generally, removal based on a federal question is proper only when the plaintiffs plead a federal cause of action on the face of the complaint.

2. The Artful Pleading Doctrine

One exception to the well pleaded complaint rule is the artful pleading doctrine. A plaintiff may not avoid federal jurisdiction by artfully disguising a federal claim as a state cause of action. Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2427 n. 2, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); Aaron, 876 F.2d at 1161. In these cases, removal is proper if a court determines that a plaintiff's failure to plead a federal clause of action was simply a bad faith attempt to dress a federal claim in State claim clothing. Yawn v. Southern Railway, 591 F.2d 312, 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 2869, 61 L.Ed.2d 304 (1979).

However, if a court finds that plaintiff filed his State action in good faith, the artful pleading doctrine plays no role in the court's determination of whether the defendant properly removed the case to federal court. See Aaron, 876 F.2d at 1161 n. 7; Beers v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir.1988). Instead, a court must limit its analysis to a reading of plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. No federal question jurisdiction exists if the complaint contains no issues of federal law. Williams, 482 U.S. at 391-92, 107 S.Ct. at 2429; Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 10, 103 S.Ct. at 2846; Aaron, 876 F.2d at 1161.

In the instant case, this court finds no evidence to support federal jurisdiction as imposed by the artful pleading doctrine. Plaintiffs' claims are not uniquely federal and defendants offer no evidence to suggest that bad faith played a role in plaintiffs' choice of causes. In this case, plaintiffs' claims of tortious interference, civil conspiracy, Texas anti-trust laws, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act do not arise under federal law. Instead, these claims simply relate to the possibility that the defendants interfered with the business practices of the plaintiffs. As such, no federal question exists on the face of plaintiffs' complaint and the artful pleading exception does not apply.

3. The Complete Preemption Doctrine

Another exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule developed into the "complete preemption doctrine." See Williams, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. at 2430. Ordinarily, federal preemption is raised as a defense to plaintiff's state law claims and may not serve as a basis for federal court jurisdiction. See Metropolitan Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 63, 107 S.Ct. at 1546; Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). In certain instances, however, the Supreme Court determined that "Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64, 107 S.Ct. at 1546.

The Court first recognized this doctrine in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968). In Avco, an employer sought an injunction in state court to bar the defendant labor union from striking. The union removed the suit to federal court and the Supreme Court upheld the removal holding that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") so completely preempts state law that the employer's complaint should be considered as arising under section 301. Avco, 390 U.S. at 560, 88 S.Ct. at 1237. Thereafter, state claims relating to collective bargaining agreements were completely preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.

The Supreme Court refined the complete preemption doctrine in future cases. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542; Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425. The Fifth Circuit explained each of these decisions...