Kyle v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 July 1911
• Citation: 81 N.J.L. 186,80 A. 934
• Parties: KYLE v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

80 A. 934

81 N.J.L. 186

KYLE

v. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 5, 1911

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Action by Josephine Kyle against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. Heard on rule to show cause to review a verdict for plaintiff. Rule made absolute.

This rule reviews a verdict rendered at the Somerset circuit in which there was a finding by the jury in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $35,000 as damages alleged to have been sustained by the widow and next of kin of Robert H. Kyle. The deceased was killed in a crossing accident that occurred early in the evening of April 9, 1910, near a station known as Hillsboro, in Somerset county, where a highway crosses the main line of the defendant's railroad. West of this highway and on the northerly side of the railroad, the defendant's property extended about 80 feet northerly from the most northerly rail of a fence, and the defendant had erected and maintained on the property (and between the highway and the direction from which the train which struck Mr. Kyle approached) a passenger station, water-closet, toolhouse, and cattle pens, and had permitted to grow certain trees and shrubs. There were gates at the crossing, but at the time of the accident they were not being operated.

Two grounds of recovery were alleged by the plaintiff: First, that the employés of the defendant neglected to give the statutory crossing signals; and, second, that the defendant by its method of constructing and maintaining the tracks created a condition of extraordinary danger, which required some warning of the approach of trains in addition to that prescribed by the statute. The case was submitted by the trial judge to the jury on both of these grounds, and there was a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

On behalf of the defendant on this rule the following points are submitted:

(1) The clear weight of the evidence shows that the statutory signals were given.

(2) Contributory negligence on the part of the deceased was conclusively shown.

(3) The situation was not one of extraordinary danger requiring extra care on the part of the railroad.

(4) There was material error in the charge.

(5) The damages were excessive.

Argued February term, 1911, before GARRISON, PARKER, and VOORHEES, JJ.

Theodore Rurode and William D. Edwards, for plaintiff.

Gilbert Collins, for defendant.

GARRISON, J. (after stating the facts as above). Without regard to the weight of evidence as to the giving of the statutory-signals or the propriety of submitting to the jury the question of contributory negligence, this rule to show cause must be made absolute. The negligence of the defendant was submitted under an erroneous instruction as to its duty to use precautions other than those required by the statute. Upon this point the charge was as follows:

"The law has established the rights of the railroad company as to these crossings in certain respects. Many years ago a statute was passed providing that where a railroad crosses a public road at grade, and it is nothing but an ordinary grade crossing, if the engineer blows a whistle or rings a bell commencing nine hundred feet from the crossing and continues either one or the other until the crossing is passed, then the railroad company has performed its duty, and, although an accident might occur, yet no liability is imposed upon the railroad company if that duty has been discharged.

"But there is another rule which our courts have also established, and that is this, that where there are dangers created at a railroad crossing by the railroad itself, either by the erection of buildings or by allowing cars to remain at the crossing so as to obstruct the view—if any extraordinary dangers are created, then they are bound to use extraordinary precautions to protect the public against the necessary dangers of that crossing.

"So the first question, it seems to me, that you will have to decide in this case will be whether or not this was merely an ordinary railroad crossing. If it was, if it was not surrounded with any extraordinary dangers created by the railroad company itself, then, of course, they are only bound to comply with the law, to ring a bell or blow a whistle."

If the statutory signals were given, the jury were instructed that a further question was whether or not "there were extraordinary dangers created at the crossing by the railroad company. It appears that there was a line of trees maintained there upon the railroad property, and also the station house which obstructed in some degree the view down the track on which the train came which caused this accident."

"It also appears that the railroad company had recognized the necessity of having extraordinary precautions there, because they had erected gates. Those gates were not in use at night; but they were in use, under the evidence, from half past 6 in the morning until half past 6 at night. That is a circumstance that you also have a right to take into consideration in saying whether or not they were discharging their duty to the public in maintaining the gates in the daytime and not maintaining them in the night.

"Now, if the circumstances surrounding that crossing, the obstructions which were put there by the railroad company, rendered it necessary for them to use extra precautions in the daytime, then it is for you to say whether those precautions should not be extended into the night. It would seem under general principles...