L.B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Clark Cty. Schools

• Decision Date: 20 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 4:05-CV-206-SEB-WGH.,4:05-CV-206-SEB-WGH.
• Citation: 458 F.Supp.2d 845
• Parties: L.B., a minor, By and Through his parents and legal guardians, Lee BENJAMIN and Kelly Benjamin, Plaintiffs, v. GREATER CLARK COUNTY SCHOOLS and Clark County Special Education Cooperative, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

458 F.Supp.2d 845

L.B., a minor, By and Through his parents and legal guardians, Lee BENJAMIN and Kelly Benjamin, Plaintiffs, v. GREATER CLARK COUNTY SCHOOLS and Clark County Special Education Cooperative, Defendants.

No. 4:05-CV-206-SEB-WGH.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, New Albany Division.

June 20, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Kyle A. Jones, Norris Choplin & Schroeder LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Monica J. Conrad, Bose McKinney & Evans LLP, Chesterton, IN, Sarah Steele Riordan, Bose Mckinney & Evans, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

ENTRY and ORDER

on Plaintiffs' Motion for Statutory Injunction (doc. no. 14)

SARAH EVANS BARKER, District Judge.

This cause is an action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq., ("IDEA" or "Act"), that seeks judicial review of a decision of the Indiana Board of Special Education Appeals ("Board") on the proper educational placement for L.B., a minor child. L.B. is a nearly-thirteen-year-old boy diagnosed with cerebral palsy¹ with a left hemisparesis ²

and mild psychomotor delay which affects language formulation, word retrieval, and left-sided motor skills. Dissatisfied with the education that he was receiving from his local Indiana public school district, L.B.'s parents unilaterally withdrew him from public school, placed him in a private school in Kentucky, and initiated the administrative processes under the Act to challenge the state's provision of services to L.B. Before the Court is a request for preliminary relief: L.B. has moved for an injunction ordering the defendants to continue paying for his tuition, transportation, and related expenses at and to the private school in Kentucky, and certain program expenses, during the pendency of this litigation. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the plaintiffs' motion.

The IDEA aims "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living" and that "the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected...." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) and (B). While recognizing that states and localities are responsible for providing education to disabled students, Congress determined that it was in the national interest that the federal government also have a role to play in ensuring the proper education of students with disabilities by assisting states financially in providing this education and providing uniform standards and procedures. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(6) and (d)(1)(c). To that end, the Act makes grants available to state educational agencies to fund special education programs. 20 U.S.C. § 1411. But the grants are not open-ended: to be eligible, a state must demonstrate that it has adopted specific policies and procedures spelled out in the Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412, and funded programs are required to comply with various substantive and procedural criteria (20 U.S.C. §§ 1414 and 1415). Indiana has legislatively accepted the provisions of the IDEA, Ind.Code Ann. ("IC") § 20-19-2-16 (Lexis/Nexis 2005), and has implemented its substantive and procedural requirements through legislation, Ind. Code Ann. § 20-35-1-1 et seq., and administrative rules, 511 Ind. Admin. Code ("IAC") 7-1, et seq. (2003).

To be eligible for grants, a state must comply with several substantive conditions. In part, it must make available a free and appropriate education to all children with disabilities, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1); it must provide that education in the least restrictive environment, meaning in regular classrooms, unless, due to the nature or severity of the child's disability, such placement would be unsatisfactory, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); it must identify and evaluate all children in need of special education, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) and (7), and § 1414(a)—(b); and it must develop, implement, and periodically review and revise an individualized education program for each child with a disability, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4) and 1414(d). Special education services shall be provided to a child with disabilities, at no cost to his parents, who is placed in or referred to a private school by the state or local educational authority as a means to provide the child a free and appropriate education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(B). Educational authorities are not required to pay for a child's education in a private school if the authority made a free and appropriate education available to the child in a public school. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i). If the parents of a child with disability enroll the child in a private school without the responsible public agency's consent, a hearing officer or court may require the authority to reimburse the cost of the enrollment if it finds that the responsible public agency had not made a free and appropriate education available to the child before the private enrollment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).

The Act also requires that recipient states comply with several "procedural safeguards" to ensure parental notice of and involvement in the development and implementation of special educational plans for their children. See generally, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6) and 1415. The Act also provides a formal process for parents or the responsible educational agency to seek administrative and judicial review of "any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child" in a funded special-education program. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). This process consists of, first, the presentation of a complaint, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); second, an impartial due process hearing before an independent hearing officer that is conducted by either the state or the local educational agency as determined by state law or the state agency, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) and (f)(3); third, depending on the nature of the particular state's due-process hearing structure, an appeal to the state education authority, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1); and, finally, a civil action for judicial review and determination, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i). A reviewing court shall receive the administrative record, shall hear additional evidence on request of any party, and, based on a preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as it determines is appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(c).³

Indiana has implemented these procedural safeguards by administrative rule. Any individual, group of individuals, agency, or organization may file a complaint alleging a violation of federal or state laws applying to special education programs. 511 IAC 7-30-2. Indiana additionally requires its division of special education to investigate complaints and order corrective action. 511 IAC 7-30-2(c)-(j). A parent, public agency,⁴ or the state educational agency⁵ may initiate a due process hearing whenever a dispute arises concerning the provision of special education to a student. 511 IAC 7-30-3. Any party to a due-process hearing may appeal the hearing officer's decision to the Board of Special Education Appeals ("BSEA") which applies a deferential standard of review: the BSEA determines only whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law or established procedure. 511 IAC 7-30-4. Dissatisfied parties may file a civil action for judicial review of the BSEA's decision. 511 IAC 7-30-4(n) and (o).

The IDEA requires recipient states to comply with a "stay put" requirement during the pendency of administrative and judicial review processes:

Except as provided in subsection (k)(4) of this section [pertaining to changes in a child's placement for disciplinary reasons], during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.

20 U.S.C. § 14150). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(a) (same provision).⁶ The United States Department of Education has defined, by regulation, one circumstance that constitutes an agreement for an exception to the child's stay-put placement:

If the decision of a hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted by the [state educational authority] or a State review official in an administrative appeal agrees with the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must be treated as an agreement between the State or local agency and the parents for purposes of paragraph [300.514](a) of this section.

34 C.F.R. § 300.514(c). Thus, even if parents unilaterally change their child's operative educational placement after commencing an administrative review, the stay-put requirement will preserve that change for the remainder of the proceedings if state review officials decide in favor of the parents. See also, School Committee of the Town of Burlington, Massachusetts v. Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359, 372, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 2004-05, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). By administrative rule, the Indiana Department of Education has implemented this requirement:

Except as provided in 511 IAC 7-29-3 and 511 IAC 7-29-7 [both relating to disciplinary changes of placement], the student shall remain in the student's current educational placement during a due process hearing, administrative appeal, or judicial proceeding, unless the parties agree otherwise.

511 IAC 7-30-3(j). Similarly, Indiana has also carved out one circumstance constituting an agreed exception to the stay-put...