L.B. Motors, Inc. v. Prichard

• Decision Date: 25 January 1940
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 9472.
• Citation: 25 N.E.2d 129,303 Ill.App. 318
• Parties: L. B. MOTORS, INC., ET AL. v. PRICHARD.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

303 Ill.App. 318

25 N.E.2d 129

L. B. MOTORS, INC., ET AL.

v.PRICHARD.

Gen. No. 9472.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 25, 1940.

Appeal from DeKalb County Court; Wm. J. Fulton, Judge.

Action of replevin by L. B. Motors, Incorporated, and the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company against R. H. Prichard, doing business as the Local Finance Service, for recovery of an automobile. Upon death of defendant, Arthur P. Prichard, administrator of the estate of R. H. Prichard, deceased, was substituted as defendant. From judgment directing plaintiff to return replevied automobile to defendant, and that defendant recover damages for wrongful detention, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed. James H. Scott, of Geneva, and E. L. Keating, of Chicago, for appellants.

George Spitz, of DeKalb, for appellee.

DOVE, Presiding Justice.

It appears from the stipulation of the parties and the evidence in this record that the plaintiff L. B. Motors, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of buying, selling, exchanging and servicing automobiles having its place of business in Chicago. Charles R. Hunt is a retail dealer in new and used automobiles in Plano, Illinois, and does business under the name of Kendall Motor Sales. On February 2nd, 1937, Hunt purchased from the plaintiff a used 1935 Ford Sedan for $420 and in payment therefor delivered his note to the plaintiff for that sum due March 2nd, 1937, and the parties executed a conditional sales contract. On April 20th, 1937 Emma Weiss entered into an agreement with Hunt at his place of business in Plano, whereby she obtained from Hunt this Ford Sedan and in return therefor delivered to Hunt her used automobile and executed and delivered to him her promissory note for $459, payable in monthly installments of $25.50, beginning May 20th, 1937. These parties also executed a conditional sales contract covering this automobile. On the same day, in consideration of $360, Hunt sold and assigned this note and conditional sales contract to R. H. Prichard, doing business as Local Finance Service. Thereafter, Emma Weiss having defaulted in making her payments, Prichard took possession of the car under the provisions of this sales contract. The conditional sales contract executed by Hunt and held by the plaintiff was in default and thereafter it demanded possession of the car from Prichard. Its demand being refused, this replevin suit was instituted by L. B. Motors, Inc., against Prichard and the automobile was delivered to the plaintiff.

The cause originated before a Justice of the Peace and upon appeal to the Circuit Court a jury was waived and a trial had before the court resulting in a finding for the defendant and judgment directing the plaintiff to return the replevied automobile to the defendant and that the defendant recover of the plaintiff $180 for damages for the wrongful detention of said automobile by the plaintiff. From this judgment an appeal has been perfected to this court.

The Motor Vehicle Law requires every owner of a motor vehicle within twenty-four hours after he becomes the owner thereof to file in the office of the Secretary of State an application for a certificate of registration and upon the payment of the required fee, the Secretary of State is required to assign a number and issue to such owner a certificate of registration. The same Act provides that upon the sale of a motor vehicle by a dealer he shall give the purchaser a bill of sale and another section of the same Act requires the vendor of a registered motor vehicle other than a dealer or manufacturer to send a statement thereof to the Secretary of State, (Ill.Rev.St.1937, Chap. 95 1/2, §§ 8, 18, 21) being Sections 8, 17 and 19 of said Motor Vehicle Law. The Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act provides, among other things, that the Secretary of State shall not register or renew the registration of any motor vehicle unless the owner thereof shall make application for and be granted an official certificate of title for such vehicle and prohibits the owner from operating or permitting the operation of any such motor vehicle upon any highway without first obtaining a certificate of title therefor and prohibits the owner from selling or transferring his title or interest in any motor vehicle unless he has obtained a certificate of title and makes it the duty of the owner who sells or transfers his interest in a motor vehicle to endorse an assignment and warranty of title upon the certificate of title and deliver the certificate so endorsed to the purchaser at the time of delivering the motor vehicle. Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, Chap. 95 1/2, §§ 76 and 80, being Sections 3 and 7 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-Theft Act.

Counsel for appellant contend that Emma Weiss and appellee are charged with knowledge of the requirements of these statutory provisions and that since their enactment purchasers of automobiles need not and can not depend upon or rely upon possession of an automobile as evidence of ownership thereof or upon statements or representations of the title made by the seller, that the purpose of the Legislature in enacting these laws was to prevent the sales of motor vehicles to innocent persons by one having no title thereto and that when Emma Weiss purchased this car from Hunt, appellant had the certificate of title therefor, having received it from the former owner, ...