L.C. v. Waterbury Board of Education, Civil Action No. 3:00 CV 580 (CFD) (D. Conn. 3/21/2002), Civil Action No. 3:00 CV 580 (CFD).
| Decision Date | 21 March 2002 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:00 CV 580 (CFD). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | L.C., Plaintiff, v. WATERBURY BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., Defendants. |
The plaintiff, L.C., brings this action against the defendants, the Waterbury Board of Education, Roger Damerow, the superintendent of Waterbury Public Schools, the Unified School District II, and its superintendent, Donna Cambria, seeking attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B). Specifically, the plaintiff requests attorney's fees arising from a due process hearing conducted to review her daughter's request for a residential educational program.
The plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment [Doc. #18], which all of the defendants oppose. The Unified School District II defendants have also filed a motion for summary judgment [Doc. #21], which the plaintiff and the Waterbury Board of Education defendants oppose.
Congress enacted the IDEA "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Congress provides federal funding to states that develop certain policies and procedures to provide disabled children with a free appropriate education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). "The particular educational needs of a disabled child and the services required to meet those needs must be set forth at least annually in a written individualized education plan ("IEP")." M.C. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. Voluntown Bd. of Educ., 226 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2000). IEPs are formulated based on the input of the "IEP Team," which is comprised of several individuals, including the special education teacher, a regular education teacher, the child's parents, and when appropriate, the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). In Connecticut, the IEP Team is known as the planning and placement team ("PPT"). Conn. Agencies Regs. § 10-76a-1(p) (1992).
When parents are not satisfied with the IEP proposed for their child, they may file a complaint with the state educational agency; such complaints are resolved through an impartial due process hearing conducted by either the local or state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76a et seq. (). In Connecticut, the state educational agency conducts due process hearings. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-76h(c); M.C. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. Voluntown Board of Educ., 178 F.R.D. 367, 370 (D.Conn. 1998). Any party not satisfied with the decision of the hearing officer may bring a civil action in state or federal district court. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
The plaintiff's daughter, A.C., was born on December 14, 1986 and has had emotional and behavioral difficulties from a young age. She has received special education services from the Waterbury public school system since January of 1995, when she was enrolled in the second grade, through the Spring of 1998. In July 1998, she was admitted to Riverview Hospital, a psychiatric hospital operated by the Connecticut Department of Children and Families ("DCF"), for an evaluation ordered by the Connecticut Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. While at Riverview Hospital, she attended Riverview School, which was operated by the Unified School District II ("USD II"), also a part of DCF. On August 5, 1998, at a meeting of the planning and placement team for A.C. at Riverview Hospital, the team determined that A.C. needed a residential placement for her treatment needs, but not for her educational needs. In disagreement with this decision, the plaintiff requested a due process hearing under the IDEA.
A due process hearing was held in November 1998 and January 1999. The hearing officer concluded, in a written decision issued on May 26, 1999, that the Waterbury Board of Education ("the Board") and USD II had failed to comply with the IDEA. The hearing officer ordered that A.C. be placed in a residential education program. She also ordered that a PPT meeting be held within two weeks to implement such a program and ordered the state to enforce the order if no action was taken within fifteen days. A.C. was discharged from Riverview Hospital on September 23, 1999. Despite the hearing officer's ruling, A.C. chose not to enroll in a residential education program, and instead enrolled in the State Street School, a public school in the Waterbury school system.
The plaintiff subsequently filed this action for $21,700 in attorney's fees.2 The plaintiff has moved for summary judgment, claiming that there are no genuine issues of material fact that she is entitled to the fees requested. The USD II defendants have also filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there are no genuine issues of material fact that the plaintiff is not entitled to receive attorney's fees from USD II. The Board, in its oppositions to the plaintiff's and USD II's motions for summary judgment, asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to receive attorney's fees and from whom. In the alternative, each defendant also challenges the amount of attorney's fees requested.
A. Prevailing Party Status
The IDEA provides in part that a district court may, in its discretion, award reasonable attorney's fees "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The United States Supreme Court in Buckhannon v. West Virginia Dep't of Health, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), recently clarified the prevailing party standard in civil rights lawsuits. The Court, considering a claim for attorney's fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., concluded that a prevailing party is "one who has been awarded some relief by the court." Id. at 603. The Second Circuit has held that Buckhannon applies to attorney's fees cases under the IDEA. See J.C. v. Regional School Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2002).
The Court must first decide whether the relief obtained in this case, which was obtained through the final decision of the due process hearing officer, can be considered an award of relief consistent with Buckhannon. The IDEA indicates that attorney's fees may be awarded "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section," and in § 1415, the term "proceeding" often is used to refer to due process or administrative hearings. See, e.g., § 1415(d)(2)(F) and (k)(7)(C)(I) ("due process proceeding"); § 1415(i)(2)(B)(I) and (i)(3)(D)(ii) ("administrative proceeding"). Several courts writing before the Buckhannon decision concluded that the term "proceeding" refers to due process hearings and therefore that plaintiffs could recover attorney's fees if they prevailed at that level, even if no subsequent action was ever filed in state or federal district court. See, e.g., Brown v. Griggsville Cmty. Unit School Dist. No. 4, 12 F.3d 681, 683-84 (7th Cir. 1993); Barlow-Gresham Union High School Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1991); Angela L. v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1990); Upper Valley Ass'n for Handicapped Citizens v. Blue Mountain School Dist. No. 21, 973 F. Supp. 429, 434 (D.Vt. 1997). In Brown, the Seventh Circuit explained why a hearing officer's decision is similar to that of a state or federal judge:
In effect, the hearing officer appointed by the school board, and the reviewing agency, are adjuncts of the court, like a magistrate, in the administration of the federal statute. . . .
Brown, 12 F.3d at 684 (). That view appears to be consistent with Buckhannon's rejection of the "catalyst theory" of awarding attorney's fees. An adjudication by a hearing officer is a sufficient determination of "legal merit" of the prevailing party's claims. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05. Moreover, failure to award attorney's fees under these circumstances would result in the prevailing parent only recovering fees if the opposing local education agency appealed the decision of the hearing officer, a circumstance obviously not suggested by the language of the IDEA. Finally, dicta in J.C. indicating that due process hearings, or "administrative proceedings," are similar to judicial actions for purposes of determining attorney's fees under § 1415, suggests that the Second Circuit would adhere to this view after Buckhannon. Based on the this authority, Court concludes that the due process hearing in the instant case was a "proceeding" for the purposes of the IDEA provision authorizing the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party.3
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to consider whether the hearing officer's decision confers prevailing party status on the plaintiff in this case. "Plaintiffs may be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fee purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit." Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 804 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989)). At a...
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