L'Esperance v. HSBC Consumer Lending, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 June 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 11-cv-555-LM,Opinion 2012 DNH 104
• Parties: Linda L'Esperance v. HSBC Consumer Lending, Inc.; HSBC Finance Corporation; HSBC Group a/k/a HSBC Bank, NA a/k/a HSBC North American Holdings, Inc.; Household International, Inc.; Beneficial Corporation; Beneficial New Hampshire, Inc.; and Manhattan Mortgage Corporation
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

Linda L'Esperance

v. HSBC Consumer Lending, Inc.; HSBC Finance Corporation;HSBC Group a/k/a HSBC Bank, NA a/k/a HSBC North American Holdings, Inc.;Household International, Inc.; Beneficial Corporation;Beneficial New Hampshire, Inc.; and Manhattan Mortgage Corporation

Civil No. 11-cv-555-LM

Opinion 2012 DNH 104

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

June 12, 2012

ORDER

In her amended complaint, Linda L'Esperance asserts thirteen claims against seven defendants. Those claims all arise out of the origination and servicing of a pair of loans. Before the court are two motions to dismiss: (1) document no. 24, filed by HSBC Group; and (2) document no. 25, filed by all the defendants other than HSBC Group and Manhattan Mortgage Corporation ("Manhattan Mortgage"). Notwithstanding the pendency of two motions to dismiss, L'Esperance has filed a pleading titled "Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss," document no. 27, that is supported by a memorandum of law that addresses document no. 25 but does not address document no. 24. For the reasons that follow, HSBC Group's motion todismiss is granted in part and the second motion to dismiss is granted in full, with prejudice.

The Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), requires the court to conduct a limited inquiry, focusing not on "whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). To pass that test, the complaint "must contain 'enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence' supporting the claims." Fantini v. Salem State Coll., 557 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a trial court "accept[s] as true all well-pled facts in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiff[ ]." Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 771 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 441 (1st Cir. 2010)). But, "naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement need not be accepted." Plumbers' Union, 632 F.3d at 771 (quoting Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st Cir.2009)). Moreover, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" United Auto. Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." United Auto. Workers, 633 F.3d at 40 (citation omitted). On the other hand, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted if "the facts, evaluated in [a] plaintiff-friendly manner, [do not] contain enough meat to support a reasonable expectation that an actionable claim may exist." Andrew Robinson Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). That is, "[i]f the factual allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal." Plumbers' Union, 632 F.3d at 771 (citation omitted).

Background

Much of the relevant background has been set out in the court's previous order in this case, document no. 11, and is not repeated here in detail. L'Esperance's claims arise out of herdissatisfaction with the origination and servicing of: (1) a $385,699.40 loan to refinance the mortgage on her home; and (2) a personal credit-line account with a credit limit of $11,500. Both loans were extended by "Beneficial New Hampshire Inc." Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A (doc. no. 25-2), at 3; Ex. B. (doc. no. 25-3), at 2). To secure the refinancing loan, L'Esperance granted a mortgage on her home to "Beneficial New Hampshire Inc." Id., Ex. C (doc. no. 25-4), at 2. The personal credit-line account, which L'Esperance alleges was extended to her as a source of funds to cover her closing costs, is not secured by a mortgage. The court will introduce additional factual allegations from L'Esperance's amended complaint as they are relevant to the disposition of specific claims for relief.

Discussion

A. HSBC Group's Motion to Dismiss

In document no. 24, HSBC Group moves to dismiss on grounds that L'Esperance has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that it is an entity capable of being sued. In the alternative, it joins in document no. 25. L'Esperance has not responded to HSBC Group's motion to dismiss or any of the arguments advanced therein. While L'Esperance's silence in response to document no. 24 could be taken as a concession that HSBC Group is entitled to dismissal of all the claims againstit, the court will, nonetheless, address the merits of the arguments raised in document no. 24.

HSBC Group relies on Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules"), which provides, in pertinent part:

Capacity to Sue or Be Sued. Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows:

(1) for an individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law of the individual's domicile;

(2) for a corporation, by the law under which it was organized; and

(3) for all other parties, by the law of the state where the court is located, except that:

(A) a partnership or other unincorporated

association with no such capacity under that state's law may sue or be sued in its common name to enforce a substantive right existing under the United States Constitution or laws . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). Plainly, HSBC Group is not an individual, and, as it correctly points out, L'Esperance has not adequately alleged that it is a corporation. Thus, in HSBC Group's view, its capacity to be sued is governed by the law of New Hampshire, under which "[a] voluntary association, except as provided for by statute . . . has no legal existence apart from the members who compose it," Brooks v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 161 N.H. 685, 691 (2011) (quoting Shortlidge v. Gutoski, 125N.H. 510, 513 (1984)) (emphasis added by Brooks). The problem with HSBC Group's argument is that it seems not to account for Rule 17(b)(3)(A), which allows suits against unincorporated associations to enforce rights existing under federal law. Because many of L'Esperance's claims are based on federal statutes, HSBC Group's motion to dismiss is granted, but only in part. HSBC Group is entitled to dismissal of the state-law claims asserted in Counts III,¹ VI, VII, IX, X, XI,² and XIII.

B. The Second Motion to Dismiss

In document no. 25, HSBC Consumer Lending, Inc.; HSBC Finance Corporation; Beneficial New Hampshire ("Beneficial NH"); Beneficial Corporation; and Household International, Inc. move to dismiss. As noted, HSBC Group joins in this motion to dismiss. The moving defendants first argue that L'Esperance has again impermissibly relied on group pleading, and then they identify specific deficiencies in each of her claims.

Based on L'Esperance's failure to specifically identify anyconduct by any defendant other than Beneficial NH, all the moving defendants other than Beneficial NH are entitled to dismissal of the claims against them. Beneficial NH, in turn, is entitled to dismissal of all the claims asserted against it because none of them can withstand the scrutiny demanded by Rule 12(b)(6).

1. Group Pleading

In her amended complaint, L'Esperance describes various interactions with Jennifer Halteman and/or Cathy Maranhao at an office located at 75 Congress Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, that resulted in the two loans at issue here. The loan agreements for both loans identify the lender as:

Beneficial New Hampshire

75 Congress Street

Portsmouth, NH 03801

Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A (doc. no. 25-2), at 3; Ex. B (doc. no. 25-3), at 2. With regard to the relationships among Beneficial NH and the other moving defendants, L'Esperance alleges:

In connection with the two loans at issue in this litigation, that closed on October 23, 2008, the Plaintiff presented at the Portsmouth location of Household International, Inc. to refinance the existing mortgage on her Seabrook, New Hampshire home.

While at the time the location of the branch office was identified as Household International, Inc., the nature of the loan originator wasrepresented on documentation provided to Plaintiff as being HSBC/Beneficial.

These documents were provided to the Plaintiff by Jennifer Halteman, Assistant Vice President and Branch Sales Manager of "Beneficial, Member HSBC Group," and/or Cathy Maranhao, both of HSBC Group and Beneficial branch office location 75 Congress Street, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Plaintiff was additionally provided with cards for these persons associated with her loan identifying them to be employees of "Beneficial, Member HSBC Group." These individuals and other individuals at this branch office were agents of Defendants HSBC Lending, HSBC Finance Corporation, HSBC Group, Household International Inc. and Beneficial Corp. Though Beneficial NH, Inc. now appears to Plaintiff to have been a separately incorporated entity and identified on the mortgage and some loan documentation, on information and belief, Beneficial NH, Inc. was a "branch office," and agent and wholly owned subsidiary of Defendants HSBC Lending, HSBC Finance Corporation, HSBC Group, Household International Inc. and Beneficial Corp. Thus, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendants HSBC Lending, HSBC Finance Corporation, HSBC Group, Household International Inc. and Beneficial Corp. are responsible for the representations and actions of Ms. Halteman and Ms. Maranhao, are responsible for the acceptance and origination of the Plaintiff's loans, and are additionally independently

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