L.G. v. Columbia Pub. Sch.
| Decision Date | 12 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-04191-NKL |
| Parties | L.G., through her parent and Next Friend, M.G., Plaintiff, v. Columbia Public Schools, et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Before the Court are motions by Defendants City of Columbia and Keisha Edwards (Doc. 23) and Columbia Public Schools ("CPS") and Tim Baker (Doc. 27) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 20) by plaintiff L.G., through her next friend, M.G. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motions are granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff L.G. is a sixteen-year-old, straight-A student at Rock Bridge High School ("RBHS"), which is operated by CPS. Doc. 20 ¶ 9. L.G. has general anxiety disorder ("GAD"), obsessive compulsive disorder ("OCD"), and clinical depression resulting from the GAD and OCD, for which she is treated by counselors both in and out of the school. Id. ¶ 10.
On the afternoon of May 22, 2019, two officers from the City of Columbia's police department ("CPD") came to RBHS to question L.G. about an alleged sexual assault that allegedly occurred at the house of a CPS student who has the same first name as L.G. Id. ¶ 11. L.G. was summoned to the office during her geometry final exam, but her teacher asked for her to be allowed to finish the test before coming to the office. Id. ¶ 12. Immediately after her geometry final, L.G. was scheduled to finish a final project in her accounting class and then take her final exam in human anatomy. Id. ¶ 13. In the break between geometry and accounting, L.G. went to the office, as requested. Id. ¶ 14.
When L.G. reached the office, CPD School Resource Officer Keisha Edwards told L.G. that two CPD officers were there to question her. Id. ¶ 15. As Edwards took L.G. to a room for the interrogation, RBHS Assistant Principal Tom Baker asked Edwards if he was needed, but Edwards said no. Id. ¶ 17. Once L.G. was inside the room with the CPD Officers (named in the complaint as John Doe I and John Doe II), Edwards left L.G. there and closed the door behind her. Id. ¶ 16, 18.
The CPD officers did not have a warrant or other court order to question L.G. Id. ¶ 20. There were no exigent circumstances requiring L.G. to be questioned in the midst of school. Id. Nonetheless, neither Baker nor any other administrator requested an explanation from Edwards or the two CPD Officers regarding the need to question L.G. during her final exams. Id. § 22.
The CPD officers asked L.G. if she knew a student with a particular name (referred to as "Mary Doe"). Id. ¶ 28. L.G. told the officers that she was generally aware of a student named "Mary Doe," but that she did not know her personally and did not know if she was the same person the police were asking about. Id. ¶ 29. The CPD officers appeared incredulous of L.G.'s statement and pressed her for information. Id. ¶ 30. L.G. asked the officers if there had been a mix-upbecause she knew nothing about any alleged assault. Id. ¶ 31. L.G. did not believe she was free to leave the room while she was being questioned. Id. ¶ 25. L.G. became increasingly distraught during the interrogation and started to shake. Id. ¶ 32. The interrogation lasted for ten to twenty minutes before officers John Doe I and II told L.G. she could leave. Id. ¶ 33.
As soon as she left the interrogation room, L.G. called her mother, M.G., in near panic. Id. ¶ 34. This was the first time M.G. learned that her daughter had been questioned by the police, and she immediately drove to RBHS to see her. Id. ¶ 35. Edwards explained to M.G. and L.G. that the police had questioned L.G. because they thought she had information about a sexual assault that had taken place over the prior weekend at the house of a student with the same first name as L.G. Id. ¶ 36. After speaking with Edwards, M.G. insisted on seeing L.G.'s counselor, Gretchen Cleppe, who was familiar with L.G.'s struggle with OCD, GAD, and depression. Id. ¶ 37. Counselor Cleppe was very surprised to learn what had happened and immediately called Assistant Principal Baker, who then met with L.G. and M.G. Id. ¶ 38. Baker told M.G. and L.G. that he had seen Edwards taking L.G. to be questioned by police and had asked Edwards if she needed anything, but Edwards had said no. Id. ¶ 39.
By the end of the conversations between L.G., M.G., Edwards, Cleppe, and Baker, L.G. had missed her accounting class and felt too traumatized to take her anatomy final. Id. ¶ 40. L.G. had to finish her accounting project over the weekend and come back to take the anatomy final the following Tuesday (after Memorial Day) when all other students had already been released for the summer. Id. ¶ 41. L.G. performed poorly on both her accounting project and her anatomy final due to the extreme anxiety caused by her interrogation by CPD officers. Id. ¶ 42. Since her interrogation, her mental health has deteriorated further. Id. ¶ 43. L.G. receives ongoing treatment in the form of medication and therapy. Id. ¶¶ 43, 77.
CPS has a written policy, adopted by the elected school board, that states, "When law enforcement officials find it necessary to question students during the school day or during periods of extracurricular activities, the school principal or designee will be present . . . ." Id. ¶ 19. The policy also states that the "[t]he principal ordinarily will make reasonable efforts to notify the student's parents/guardians." Id. Nonetheless, L.G. alleges, CPS has a regular practice of permitting law enforcement officers to seize students at school without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or exigent circumstances and to interrogate such students outside the presence of a parent or adult guardian, without notifying the students' parents. Id. ¶ ¶ 61, 63.
L.G. alleges that CPD has a custom or practice of seizing minors while they are at school without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or exigent circumstances and interrogating them outside the presence of a parent or adult guardian. Doc. 20 ¶ 56.
L.G. asserts constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CPS, the City of Columbia, Edwards and John Does I and II in both their official and individual capacities. She also asserts common law claims against Baker and Edwards in their individual capacities. In addition to compensatory and punitive damages against all defendants, L.G. seeks permanent injunctive relief against CPS and Baker, requiring (1) that a CPS official accompany any minor student while he or she is questioned by police on school grounds, and (2) that CPS immediately notify the parents of any minor student questioned by police. She also seeks permanent injunctive relief against the City, Edwards, and John Does I and II, prohibiting CPD officers from engaging in the custodial interrogation of a minor student (a) without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or exigent circumstances; or (b) outside the presence of a parent or guardian. Doc. 20, ¶¶ 12-13.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the dismissal of a complaint that fails to plead facts sufficient to state a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In determining whether a complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a plausible claim to relief, the Court accepts all factual allegations as true. See Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 492 F.3d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 2007). If the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient for the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct, the claim has facial plausibility and will not be dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Edwards moves for dismissal of the official-capacity claim against her on the ground that it is redundant of the claim against the City of Columbia. Because "a suit against a government officer in his official capacity is functionally equivalent to a suit against the employing governmental entity," where the employing entity also is named, the suit against the government official in his official capacity is redundant. King v. City of Crestwood, Missouri, 899 F.3d 643, 650 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). L.G. argues that she does not name the City of Columbia in Count I, and therefore the official-capacity claim against Edwards is not redundant. However, Count II alleges a constitutional violation against the City of Columbia based, in part, on Edwards' conduct. See Doc. 20 ¶¶ 57-58 ( ). Thus, the official-capacity claim against Edwards and the claim against the City of Columbia are duplicative, and the claim against Edwards in her official capacity is dismissed.
Edwards argues that the constitutional claim against her in her individual capacity should be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of qualified immunity.
"In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity shields government officials from liability [in their individual capacities] unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable official would have known." Bishop v. Glazier, 723 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982))).
The Court must consider two factors in analyzing qualified immunity: (1...
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