L.J. v. Balt. Curriculum Project

• Decision Date: 20 January 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. SAG-20-2433
• Citation: 514 F.Supp.3d 707
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: L.J., Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE CURRICULUM PROJECT, et al., Defendants.

514 F.Supp.3d 707

L.J., Plaintiff,

v.BALTIMORE CURRICULUM PROJECT, et al., Defendants.

Civil Case No. SAG-20-2433

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed January 20, 2021

Bryan J. Chant, LeViness, Tolzman & Hamilton PA, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

James Sunderland Aist, Gregory L. VanGeison, Anderson Coe and King LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants Baltimore Curriculum Project, Inc., Laura Doherty.

Tamal Ajani Banton, Shahrazad A. Haughton, Office of Legal Counsel, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, Rhonda Richetta.

Tara A. Taylor, Rollins Smalkin Richards and Mackie LLC, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant Timothy Korr.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Stephanie A. Gallagher, United States District Judge

Plaintiff L.J.¹ ("Plaintiff"), as Mother and Next Friend of T.G., a Minor, filed a Complaint against Defendants Baltimore Curriculum Project, Inc. d/b/a City Springs Elementary School ("BCP"); Baltimore City Board of Schools Commissioners ("BCBSC"); Laura Doherty, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Chief Executive Officer of BCP; Rhonda Richetta, Individually and in her Official Capacity as Principal of City Springs Elementary School; and Timothy Randall Korr. ECF 8. BCBSC and Richetta (the "BSBSC Defendants") moved to dismiss together, as did Korr, separately.² ECF 16, ECF 18-1. Plaintiff opposed both motions. ECF 2, ECF 25. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons that follow, both BCBSC's and Korr's motions to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

These facts are derived from Plaintiff's Complaint and are taken as true for purposes of adjudicating the motions to dismiss. During the 2016-2017 school year, T.G. was a seven-year-old first grader at City Springs Elementary School. ECF 8 ¶ 9. T.G. suffers from various disabilities such as Intellectual Disability, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and anger issues. Id. On November 28, 2016, Korr was summoned to T.G.'s classroom because T.G. was misbehaving. Id. ¶ 31. Korr began walking T.G. to the principal's office. Id. Korr then grabbed T.G. and slung him over his shoulder. Id. T.G. resisted briefly before submitting. Id. ¶ 32.

With T.G. on his shoulder, Korr continued walking and descended to the first-floor stairwell. Id. ¶ 35. At that point, Korr smashed T.G.'s face into the wall. Id. T.G. went limp and unresponsive. Id. ¶ 42. This incident was observed by three different school officials. Two of those individuals saw Korr carry T.G. on his shoulder and did not intervene. Id. ¶ 31, 34. Another saw Korr smash T.G.'s face into the wall or, at a minimum, was present for the aftermath. Id. ¶ 37-39. This man also failed to render aid to the injured T.G. Id.

The police were called to the school to investigate, at which point Richetta had already viewed a recording of the incident via the school's CCTV system. Id. ¶ 51. Richetta then showed the video to an officer on the scene and told the officer that Korr fell down the steps or lost his footing and that T.G. threw himself into the wall. Id. ¶ 51, Fig. 4. Johns Hopkins Hospital was ultimately advised that T.G. had a gun at the time of the incident. Id. ¶¶ 46, 143.

Following the incident, Korr was charged with Second Degree Child Abuse. A number of individuals at City Springs Elementary supported Korr throughout the trial, filling the courtroom during Korr's sentencing wearing shirts in his support and publishing an anonymous document indicating how school officials were devastated by Korr's absence. Id. ¶ 55, 115.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Defendants' motions to dismiss allege that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF 17, 18. A defendant is permitted to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g. , In re Birmingham , 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017) ; Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd. , 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016). Such a motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 684, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’ "); see also Willner v. Dimon , 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). But, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby , 574 U.S. 10, 11, 135 S.Ct. 346, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014) (per curiam).

Nevertheless, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown , 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it is insufficient. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if ... [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and ... recovery is very remote and unlikely." Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint" and must "draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc. , 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see Semenova v. Maryland Transit Admin. , 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017) ; Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc. , 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia , 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied , 566 U.S. 937, 132 S.Ct. 1960, 182 L.Ed.2d 772 (2012).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Immunity and Respondeat Superior

Before delving into the substance of the various claims, the Court must first address the several immunity arguments put forth by the BSBSC Defendants at various points in their Motion. First, they allege that BCBSC, as an arm of the state, enjoys immunity against state constitutional torts alleged by Plaintiff and against vicarious liability for torts committed by Korr and Richetta. See ECF 18-1 at 18 (citing Baltimore Police Dep't v. Cherkes , 140 Md. App. 282, 780 A.2d 410 (2001) ).³ Plaintiff, on the other hand, attempts to distinguish Cherkes by arguing that BCBSC is a local government entity, not a state entity, and therefore is liable for civil damages resulting from State constitutional violations. ECF 25 at 15-16 (citing Prince George's County v. Longtin , 419 Md. 450, 19 A.3d 859, 885 (2011) ). Despite Plaintiff's contention, "it is well established that the relationship between local boards of education and the State of Maryland is sufficiently close to make the boards an arm of the state." Downing v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs , No. CIV.A. RDB-12-1047, 2012 WL 6615017, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 18, 2012) (compiling cases). To that end, BCBSC "is undoubtedly a state agency because it bears all of the key indicia—state law creates and controls the Board, it serves a state purpose, and the Mayor and Governor appoint the Board members from a list of individuals submitted by the State Board of Education." Id. ; see also Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Koba Inst., Inc. , 194 Md. App. 400, 411, 5 A.3d 60 (2010) (referring to BCBSC as a "state agency").

As a state agency, BCBSC is immune from state constitutional tort claims under Cherkes . 780 A.2d at 428-429 (explaining that common law sovereign immunity for state agencies is total and covers both common law and constitutional torts). Nothing in Longtin suggests otherwise. Rosa v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles County, Md. , 2012 WL 3715331 at 10 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2012) ("The Longtin court neither stated nor intimated that plaintiffs could institute pattern or practice claims against state government agencies ... [and it is] exceedingly unlikely that the Court of Appeals of Maryland would have ushered in such a radical change in legal landscape sub silentio. "). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold BCBSC liable for state constitutional torts or common law torts, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted on common law sovereign immunity grounds.

Next, Defendants assert that Richetta individually is entitled to qualified immunity for any constitutional violations alleged arising out of the statements she made to police during their investigation, because s...