L. L., In re, Cr. 12699

Citation114 Cal.Rptr. 11,39 Cal.App.3d 205
Decision Date17 May 1974
Docket NumberCr. 12699
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re L.L. on habeas corpus.

Robert L. Walker, Youth Law Center, San Francisco, for petitioner.

F. Raymond Marks, Robert H. Mnookin, School of Law, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, for amicus curiae Childhood and Government Project.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim Div., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci, Ronald E. Niver, Deputy, Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

MOLINARI, Presiding Justice.

In this habeas corpus proceeding we issued an order to show cause directed to the medical director of Napa State Hospital the purpose of which was to inquire into the detention and confinement of petitioner, L.L., a minor, at said hospital.

We have been advised that subsequent to the hearing of the order to show cause in these proceedings the minor was released from Napa State Hospital and that following a dispositional hearing in the juvenile court he was placed on probation and returned to the custody of his parents. As a condition of probation the minor was directed to participate in an outpatient mental health therapy program. In view of these circumstances the Attorney General has requested that we discharge the order to show cause and dismiss these proceedings on the ground of mootness. We decline to do so on the basis that notwithstanding the minor's release from the state hospital the issues tendered in these proceedings present questions of general public interest and importance obviating mootness under the principle declared in County of Madera v. Gendron, 59 Cal.2d 798, 804, 34 Cal.Rptr. 302, 382 P.2d 342, and DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dept. of Employment, 56 Cal.2d 54, 58, 13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 P.2d 487.

The said minor, who is 16 years of age, was ordered by the juvenile court to be placed in Napa State Hospital following an adjudication making him a ward of the court pursuant to a petition and hearing thereon alleging that the minor was a person coming within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 601. 1

The minor first came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court at the age of 9 when he was found to be a dependent child of the court under a petition alleging poor nutrition and physical care. Since that time he has continuously been within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court either as a person subject to adjudication as a dependent child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 600 or as a person coming within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 601. He has never committed an act which would be a crime if done by an adult nor has he ever been found to be a delinquent within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. 2

In prior juvenile court proceedings the minor had been referred to a psychiatric clinic for a psychiatric examination and evaluation. His condition had been diagnosed as 'depressive reaction, chronic' and it was recommended to the court by two psychiatrists that a program conducted at Napa State Hospital would be most beneficial for the minor. The goals of the program were stated to be 'achievement, school and building a positive self-image.' On the basis of this report the court made its order on April 5, 1973, placing the minor in Napa State Hospital. While at the hospital the minor ran away from the institution on at least two occasions. This conduct precipitated the proceedings to have him declared a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to section 601. 3 On August 16, 1973, the minor was declared a ward of the juvenile court.

In its order declaring the minor to be a ward of the court the juvenile court ordered that 'the prior commitment to the Chief Probation Officer for out-of-home placement is to remain in effect. ( ) . . . that the minor is to be placed in Napa State Hospital; that the matter is continued to January 4, 1974, for progress report.' Pursuant to this order the minor was returned to Napa State Hospital where he was confined until his release on March 26, 1974.

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleges that at no time has the minor, or either of his parents, consented to his confinement in Napa State Hospital; that consent was solicited from the minor's father but was explicitly refused; and that the minor was 'signed into' Napa State Hospital by a deputy probation officer.

The petitioner further alleges that he is not 'gravely disabled'; that at no time was he ever informed by the court, by his probation officer, by his court-appointed counsel, or by anyone else, that he had a right to invoke the conservatorship procedure available in the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (§§ 5000--5401) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') including the right to a jury trial on the issue of whether or not he is 'gravely disabled' as a result of a mental disorder; that had he been advised of these rights he would have speedily invoked them and would have requested a jury trial; and that as a result of his unlawful confinement he is suffering restrictions on his liberty; is being stigmatized as a result of his commitment to a mental institution; has been administered an anti-psychotic and tranquilizing drugs against his will; has been tied to his bed and compelled to wear pajamas for many weeks; and is suffering severe psychic and emotional harm.

The minor contends that he could only be treated involuntarily in a state mental institution as provided in the Act; that the procedures therein provided were not followed; and that the juvenile court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by ordering him committed to a state mental institution without following the procedures of the Act. The minor also contends that his commitment cannot be upheld as a 'voluntary' commitment under section 6000 because neither he nor his parent has consented to the commitment.

We here observe that an involuntary detention or commitment under the Act may be had or ordered only where the person, 'as a result of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself, or gravely disabled, . . .' (§§ 5150, 5152, 5200, 5250, 5300.) There is no contention in the present case that the minor, as a result of mental disorder, is a danger either to himself or to others. We also observe that no determination was ever made that the minor was gravely disabled as the result of a mental disorder and that he was not afforded the procedural safeguards provided for under the Act. Accordingly, the issue presented is whether the juvenile court has jurisdiction to order that a ward of the court be placed in a state mental hospital for treatment of a mental disorder under its juvenile court power or whether it was required in such a case to invoke the provisions and procedures of the Act.

In considering the issue presented we first observe that presently there is no provision in the Juvenile Court Law specifically providing for the commitment of juvenile court wards for mental illness. Under former section 703, which was a part of the Juvenile Court Law, the juvenile court was empowered to commit a minor to a state mental institution for not more than 90 days for observation and recommendations. If the minor was found to be affected with any mental illness, disorder or other mental disability for which the minor might be committed former section 703 directed the juvenile court to file a petition in the superior court for placement in any state institution. The statute provided, further, that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor was suspended during the time the minor was subject to the jurisdiction of the court in which the petition for commitment and the order of commitment was filed. (Former § 703.)

In 1965 section 703 was amended and the provisions alluded to in the proceeding paragraph were removed therefrom and placed in section 5725. (Stats.1965, ch. 391, § 2, p. 1630, § 8, p. 1678.) Section 5725, entitled 'Juvenile Court Wards,' was then a part of the Welfare and Institutions Code providing for 'Commitments and Admissions' and of the chapter specifically providing for 'Judicial Commitments.' (See Stats.1965, ch. 391, at pp. 1644 and 1678.) Section 703, as amended, provided that if the juvenile court was in doubt concerning the state of mental health or the mental condition of the minor it could commit the minor to the Department of Mental Hygiene in the manner and under the conditions set forth in section 5725. The identical procedures formerly contained in section 703 were now to be found in section 5725. This situation continued until 1967 when section 5725 was repealed. (Stats.1967, ch. 1667, § 36.5, p. 4107, operative July 1, 1969.) The subject procedures were then incorporated in section 6550. (Stats. 1967, ch. 1667, § 37, p. 4137, operative July 1, 1969.) In 1969 section 6550 was repealed. (Stats. 1969, ch. 722, § 51, p. 1446, operative July 1, 1969, effective Aug. 8, 1969.) Section 6550 was replaced by two new sections, 6550 and 6551, which were enacted concurrently with the Act. (Stats. 1969, ch. 722, §§ 52, 53, pp. 1447--1448, operative July 1, 1969, effective Aug. 8, 1969.) The Act was made operative on July 1, 1969. 4 (Stats. 1967, ch. 1667, § 36, p. 4074.) In 1970 section 703 was repealed in its entirety. (Stats.1970, ch. 1627, § 4, p. 3440.)

Sections 6550 and 6551 are contained in that part of the Welfare and Institutions Code providing for 'Judicial Commitments' (part 2 of div. 6) and are to be found in article 6 thereof entitled 'Juvenile Court Wards.' Section 6550 provides: 'If the juvenile court, after finding that the minor is a person described by Section 600, 601, or 602, is in doubt concerning the state of mental health or the mental condition of the person, the court may continue the hearing and proceed pursuant to this article.' The procedure referred to is that provided in ...

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