L.L.N. v. Clauder

Decision Date23 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-2084,95-2084
Parties, 65 USLW 2774 L.L.N., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. J. Gibbs CLAUDER, Defendant, Roman Catholic Diocese of Madison, Inc., Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant-Petitioner, ABC Insurance Company, Defendant, Research Products Corporation, a Wisconsin Corporation, Subrogated Party.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the defendant-respondent-cross appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Donald L. Heaney, Kenneth B. Axe, Peter A. Martin and Lathrop & Clark, Madison and oral argument by Donald L. Heaney.

For the plaintiff-appellant-cross respondent there was a brief by David E. McFarlane, Melanie Cohen and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison and oral argument by David McFarlane.

¶1 N. PATRICK CROOKS, Justice

L.L.N. alleges that J. Gibbs Clauder, a priest assigned as a hospital chaplain by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Madison, Inc. (Diocese), abused his position as chaplain to engage her in a sexual relationship. Based on this, L.L.N. filed suit against the Diocese, claiming that: (1) the Diocese negligently supervised Clauder; and, (2) the Diocese is vicariously liable for Clauder's actions. 1 The Circuit Court for Dane County, George A.W. Northrup, Judge, entered an order granting summary judgment 2 to the Diocese on all counts. In a published decision, 3 the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Diocese on the vicarious liability claims. However, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on the negligent supervision claim. The Diocese seeks review of this reversal.

¶2 Accordingly, the only issue before this court is whether the Diocese is entitled to summary judgment on L.L.N.'s claim that it negligently supervised Clauder. We conclude that it is. First, we hold that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim. Second, even if we assume that the First Amendment does not preclude L.L.N.'s claim, we conclude that the undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom do not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Diocese knew or should have known about Clauder's alleged propensity to use his position as chaplain to sexually exploit patients whom he counseled. Thus, the Diocese is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this basis as well. We therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

I.

¶3 In 1984, the Diocese assigned Clauder to serve as the chaplain at Meriter Hospital 4 in Madison, Wisconsin. While working at Meriter, Clauder resided at St. Bernard Catholic Church in Madison. Father John Hebl was the parish pastor at St. Bernard. 5 While Clauder lived at the parish, Hebl had no supervisory authority over him. In addition, Clauder had no parish responsibilities at St. Bernard, although he did occasionally assist when asked.

¶4 In November 1988, L.L.N. was hospitalized at Meriter Hospital for complications with her pregnancy. Hebl asked Clauder to visit L.L.N., who was a member and employee of St. Bernard. Clauder met with L.L.N. at least once in the hospital, during which time they discussed her pregnancy, politics, and their interest in the pro-life movement.

¶5 In December 1988, L.L.N. was again hospitalized at Meriter Hospital. After having a miscarriage, L.L.N. asked Clauder to visit her, which he did on one or two occasions. They discussed her grief over losing the baby. After L.L.N. was discharged, Clauder telephoned her at home to check on her recovery. L.L.N. subsequently sent Clauder a thank-you note and invited him to lunch, an invitation which he accepted.

¶6 In the following months, L.L.N. and Clauder continued to meet outside the hospital. They dined together, visited art museums, attended pro-life rallies, exchanged gifts, and discussed politics, personal problems, and life in general. L.L.N. alleges that she viewed Clauder as her pastoral counselor and therapist during these meetings, because he gave her advice to help her cope with stress and depression.

¶7 On June 29, 1990, Clauder invited L.L.N. to his family's cabin near Rhinelander, Wisconsin. During this visit, they engaged in sexual intercourse at a hotel in Rhinelander. They continued their sexual relationship until May 1991.

¶8 Both Clauder and L.L.N. attempted to keep their relationship secret, often using aliases. However, on June 16, 1991, after she had ended the relationship, L.L.N. notified Bishop Cletus O'Donnell by letter of her sexual involvement with Clauder. It is undisputed that the Diocese had no actual knowledge of Clauder's involvement with L.L.N. before this time.

¶9 Subsequently, Auxiliary Bishop George Wirz asked Hebl whether he had ever noticed anything suspicious in regard to Clauder. Hebl informed Wirz of an incident he had observed several years earlier between Clauder and another woman, T.E. Specifically, one evening around 9:00 p.m., Hebl heard Clauder yell for help from his private room in the rectory. When Hebl entered Clauder's room, he found Clauder restraining a woman on the floor by straddling her body and holding down her hands. Clauder was bleeding from a bite on his wrist. Hebl recognized the woman as T.E., whom he had met on a few occasions when Clauder had invited her to the rectory for meals. Hebl separated Clauder from T.E., and escorted T.E. out of the rectory.

¶10 Hebl did not report this incident to anyone until after L.L.N wrote the letter revealing her relationship with Clauder to the Bishop. In addition, Hebl never investigated the matter any further. In his deposition, Hebl explained his perception of the incident in this manner:

Q. Among other things, did it raise the question in your mind about whether there were some sexual activities going on between Father Clauder and [T.E.]?

A. Let me put this kind of spin on it ... obviously she attacked him, it seemed that way, and he was defending himself. You can put any interpretation you want on that. I saw no visual signs, none whatsoever of any sexual attack or intimacy or behavior, none whatsoever. Now, a person out there could say, "Well, that must have happened or could have happened." I did not put that spin on it.

Q. Was that a concern or suspicion that you had or did you dismiss that as not a realistic possibility?

A. I never accused him ever of anything along this line, any of the priests. I just don't, wouldn't think that's their behavior....

Q. Now, even though you didn't accuse [Clauder] of any sexual involvement with [T.E.], was that a thought that was in your mind as a possibility?

A. Oh, yeah, I think with the circumstances under which this happened, there could be that possibility, ... but ... I would never, never accuse him of it....

(R.30 at 116-17.)

¶11 If Hebl had investigated this incident further, he would have discovered that T.E. and Clauder did not have any sexual contact on that day. However, Hebl also would have discovered that Clauder and T.E. were involved in a sexual relationship. Specifically, Clauder had become friends with T.E.'s family approximately fifteen years earlier, while Clauder was assigned as a priest at St. Dennis Catholic Church in Madison, at which T.E. and her family were members. Subsequently, T.E. and Clauder developed a more intimate relationship. They frequently dined together, went to social events, and Clauder even traveled to Japan to meet T.E. on one occasion. According to Clauder, T.E. wanted to marry him, but he refused.

¶12 L.L.N. alleges that, because of the T.E. incident that Hebl witnessed, the Diocese knew or should have known that Clauder posed a risk of abusing his position as a hospital chaplain to sexually exploit patients whom he counseled. Accordingly, L.L.N. filed a claim for negligent supervision against the Diocese on May 28, 1993. On May 31, 1994, the Diocese filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the negligent supervision claim is precluded by the First Amendment because it would require the court to determine the standard of care owed a parishioner in the supervision of clergy. At a hearing held on January 3, 1995, the circuit court granted summary judgment to the Diocese on this basis. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that "[t]o resolve L.L.N.'s claim, a factfinder need not interpret or weigh church doctrine but merely determine, under neutral rules of law, whether, under the facts, a reasonable person would know or should have known that Clauder's placement as hospital chaplain was likely to result in harm." L.L.N. v. Clauder, 203 Wis.2d 570, 585-86, 552 N.W.2d 879 (Ct.App.1996).

II.

¶13 Procedurally, this case is before the court pursuant to the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Diocese. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standards set forth in Wis.Stat. § 802.08(2) in the same manner the circuit court applies them. See, e.g., Kafka v. Pope, 194 Wis.2d 234, 240, 533 N.W.2d 491 (1995); Voss v. City of Middleton, 162 Wis.2d 737, 748, 470 N.W.2d 625 (1991). Specifically, a court first examines the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief is stated and whether a material issue of fact is presented. See, e.g., Voss, 162 Wis.2d at 747, 470 N.W.2d 625; Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis.2d 332, 338, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980). When examining the sufficiency of a complaint, a court takes as true all facts pleaded by the plaintiff and all inferences that can reasonably be derived from those facts. See Voss, 162 Wis.2d at 748, 470 N.W.2d 625.

¶14 If the pleadings state a claim and demonstrate the existence of factual issues, a court next considers the moving party's affidavits or other proof to determine whether the moving party has made a prima facie case for summary judgment under § 802.08(2). 6 See, e.g., Voss, 162 Wis.2d at 747-48, 470 N.W.2d 625; Grams, 97 Wis.2d at 338, 294 N.W.2d 473. If a moving party has...

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