L.M.L. v. State
| Decision Date | 27 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | CR-20-0157 |
| Parties | L.M.L. v. State of Alabama |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Morgan Circuit Court (CC-17-1235)
In September 2017, L.M.L. and her husband, M.W.L., were jointly charged in a 19-count indictment for numerous sex offenses against C.J., L.M.L.'s biological daughter and M.W.L.'s stepdaughter, and S.L., L.M.L.'s stepdaughter and M.W.L.'s biological daughter. Specifically L.M.L. was charged in Count 4 of the indictment with aiding M.W.L. in the first-degree rape of C.J. by forcible compulsion, see § 13A-6-61(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; in Count 5 of the indictment with aiding M.W.L. in the first-degree rape of C.J. when C.J. was less than 12 years old, § 13A-6-61(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975; in Count 13 of the indictment with first-degree sodomy of C.J. by forcible compulsion, see § 13A-6-63(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; in Count 14 of the indictment with first-degree sodomy of C.J when C.J. was less than 12 years old, see § 13A-6-63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975; in Count 15 of the indictment with second-degree sodomy of C.J. when C.J. was less than 16 years old and more than 12 years old, see § 13A-6-64(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; in Count 16 of the indictment with sexual torture of C.J., see § 13A-6-65.1(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; in Count 17 of the indictment with first-degree sexual abuse of C.J. when C.J. was less than 12 years old, see former § 13A-6-66(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975;[1] in Count 18 of the indictment with first-degree sodomy of S.L. by forcible compulsion see § 13A-6-63(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975; and in Count 19 of the indictment with first-degree sodomy of S.L. when S.L. was less than 12 years old, see § 13A-6-63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975.
A jury convicted L.M.L. of all 9 charges against her, [2] and the trial court sentenced L.M.L. to 99 years' imprisonment for each of the first-degree-rape, first-degree-sodomy, and sexual-torture convictions, to 20 years' imprisonment for the second-degree-sodomy conviction, and to 10 years' imprisonment for the first-degree-sexual-abuse conviction the sentences to run consecutively. In addition, the trial court ordered 10 years of post-release supervision, see § 13A-5-6(c), Ala. Code 1975, for the first-degree-rape conviction under Count 5 of the indictment, the first-degree-sodomy conviction under Count 14 of the indictment, and the first-degree-sodomy conviction under Count 19 of the indictment.
The evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. C.J., who was 28 years old at the time of L.M.L.'s trial in September 2020, lived with L.M.L. and M.W.L. and her 6 siblings, including her stepsister S.L., for several years when she was a child.[3] C.J. testified that she was born in 1991 and that her stepsister S.L. was "[a]bout two years" younger than her.[4] (R. 100.) C.J. said that L.M.L. and M.W.L. began molesting her and S.L. when C.J. was about 8 or 9 years old and S.L. was about 7 years old, or in either 1999 or 2000. C.J. described incidents of L.M.L. holding her down while M.W.L. engaged in vaginal intercourse with her (giving rise to the first-degree-rape charges in Counts 4 and 5 of the indictment); of L.M.L. forcing C.J. to perform oral sex on L.M.L. (giving rise to the first- and second-degree-sodomy charges in Counts 13, 14, and 15 of the indictment); of L.M.L. penetrating C.J.'s vagina with a foreign object (giving rise to the sexual-torture charge in Count 16 of the indictment); and of L.M.L. penetrating C.J.'s vagina with L.M.L.'s fingers (giving rise to the sexual-abuse charge in Count 17 of the indictment). C.J. also said that she witnessed S.L. performing oral sex on L.M.L. when S.L. was about eight or nine years old.[5] C.J. testified that the rapes and sodomies occurred "[w]ay too many times to count" (R. 97), and that the sexual torture occurred "once or twice a month" from the time she was 12 years old until she was 15 years old and was removed from the home. (R. 95.) C.J. said that if she and S.L. did not comply with what L.M.L. and M.W.L. wanted, they would be punished; that L.M.L. and M.W.L. "were really mean" (R. 106); and that L.M.L. was "a violent person." (R. 107.) According to C.J., she was scared of L.M.L. and M.W.L., and felt like she had no choice but to submit to their sexual demands.
In 2007, when C.J. was 15 years old, she and L.M.L. had a physical altercation that left C.J. with bruises on her face and neck. Officials at C.J.'s school noticed the injuries and contacted the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("DHR"). DHR removed C.J. from L.M.L. and M.W.L.'s home and placed her in the home of M.W.L.'s parents. "[W]orried about [her] sister being left … by herself" with L.M.L. and M.W.L., [6] C.J. disclosed to M.W.L.'s parents the abuse that had been happening for several years. (R. 82.) M.W.L.'s parents contacted DHR, which removed C.J.'s siblings from L.M.L.'s and M.W.L.'s home.
L.M.L. testified in her own defense. She denied that she had ever inappropriately touched, sexually abused, sodomized, or raped any of her children, and she denied aiding M.W.L. in doing so. According to L.M.L., C.J. fabricated the allegations because C.J. was upset over the events that had prompted their physical altercation, specifically, L.M.L. had punished C.J. for skipping school and having sex with her boyfriend. L.M.L. also said that C.J. was the aggressor in their physical altercation and that she only defended herself against C.J.'s attack. Further, L.M.L. testified that S.L. regularly made false allegations of abuse against her, M.W.L., and S.L.'s biological mother because, she said, S.L. resented having to share a home with her siblings.
In rebuttal, the State presented testimony from B.L., C.J.'s brother, who was 22 years old at the time of the trial. B.L. testified that L.M.L. repeatedly forced him to perform oral sex on her, beginning when he was 6 or 7 years old and continuing until he was removed from the home in 2007, when he was about 9 years old. In surrebuttal, L.M.L. denied B.L.'s allegation, stating that he had lied because he had always been close with C.J.
L.M.L. first contends on appeal that her convictions and sentences for first-degree rape of C.J. under Counts 4 and 5 of the indictment, first-degree sodomy of C.J. under Counts 13 and 14 of the indictment, and first-degree sodomy of S.L. under Counts 18 and 19 of the indictment violate double-jeopardy principles because, she says, "Counts 4 and 5 charge the same offense alternatively, Counts 13 and 14 charge the same offense alternatively, and Counts 18 and 19 charge the same offense alternatively." (L.M.L.'s brief, p. 12.) She relies primarily on Rudolph v. State, 200 So.3d 1186 (Ala.Crim.App.2015), as well as Birdsong v. State, 267 So.3d 343 (Ala.Crim.App.2017), and Childs v. State, 238 So.3d 90 (Ala.Crim.App.2017), in support of her argument. Although L.M.L. did not raise this issue in the trial court, this type of double-jeopardy issue is jurisdictional and, therefore, may be raised at any time. See Ex parte Robey, 920 So.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Ala. 2004) ( that convictions for violating alternative subsections of the same statute "when the actions described in each of those subsections are based on the same conduct of the accused" violates double-jeopardy principles and "raises questions of the trial court's jurisdiction to enter a judgment").
In Birdsong, this Court held that the defendant's convictions for three counts of first-degree burglary under § 13A-7-5(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, for a single burglary violated double-jeopardy principles where the three counts in the indictment were identical other than "the crime that [the defendant] intended to commit (i.e., kidnapping or domestic violence) and a slight variation on the clause pertaining to the entry of the victim's dwelling," and "were alternative methods of proving the same offense --burglary -- and are not three separate and distinct offenses." 267 So.3d at 351. In Childs, this Court held that the defendant's convictions for two counts of first-degree burglary for a single burglary violated double-jeopardy principles where one count charged that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, see § 13A-7-5(a)(3), and one count charged that the defendant caused physical injury, see § 13A-7-5(a)(2), and the defendant's "conduct did not constitute separate offenses." 238 So.3d at 92. Finally, in Rudolph, this Court held that the defendant's convictions for two counts of first-degree rape for a single rape violated double-jeopardy principles where one count charged rape by forcible compulsion, see § 13A-6-61(a)(1), and one count charged rape of a child less than 12 years old, see § 13A-6-61(a)(3), both counts arose "out of the same incident," and the defendant's conduct "did not constitute two separate offenses." 200 So.3d at 1192.
Each of those cases was based on the long-standing premise that "'where there are two different methods of proving the offense charged in one statute, they [do not] constitute separate offenses.'" Birdsong, 267 So.3d at 350 (quoting Sisson v. State, 528 So.2d 1159, 1162 (Ala. 1988)). However, each of those cases also involved only a single act or transaction. The threshold inquiry in any double-jeopardy analysis is whether the convictions arise from the same act or transaction. See Birdsong, 267 So.3d at 448, and Williams v. State, 104 So.3d 254, 257 (Ala.Crim.App.2012).
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