L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co.
| Decision Date | 15 November 1906 |
| Citation | 133 Ky. 148 |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
| Parties | L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co. |
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (Chancery Branch, First Division).
From the judgment the defendant railroad company appeals — Affirmed.
HELM, BRUCE & HELM and CHARLES N. BURCH, for appellant.
W. M. SMITH and DODD & DODD for appellee.
In this action the appellee, Central Stockyards Company, sought and was granted by the court below a mandatory injunction against appellant, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, compelling it to switch and deliver to the Southern Railway Company in Kentucky, at points of connection between the tracks of the two railroads, in or near the city of Louisville, certain car loads of live stock which had been shipped over appellant's road to appellee, and also requiring appellant, in like manner, to make future delivery of like freight shipped over its roads and consigned to appellee, or that might be offered it for shipment and delivery to appellee's stockyards. The plant of appellee, known as the "Central Stockyards," is located upon the line of the Southern Railway in Kentucky, about nine miles from its terminus in the city of Louisville, near and outside the city limits. The plant is modern and well equipped for appellee's business, which is that of feeding, watering, loading, unloading, and handling live stock of every description on commission. The break-up yards of appellant railroad company are near the intersection of Fourth and C. streets, in South Louisville, and not more than 100 yards from appellee stockyards. At the point indicated the tracks of appellant and those of the Southern Railway intersect. At Seventh and Magnolia streets, about 1½ miles northeast of the break-up yards, there is also physical connection by switch between the tracks of the two railroads, and for quite a while it has been their custom to transfer cars at this place of connection. It appears that appellant's lines of railroad extend through more of the counties of Kentucky than those of any other railroad operated in the State, that these are the counties in which live stock is principally raised, and that more than 50 per cent. of all the live stock raised in the State can only reach the stock markets over appellant's line.
It is charged in the petition that appellant has declined to receive, and announced its purpose to continue to reject, at any station on its line any live stock billed or to be transported, transferred, or switched to the Southern Railway Company, or any other connecting carrier at Louisville, for delivery by such railway or carrier to appellee stockyards, and that in keeping with its past conduct and future intentions in this regard appellant has distributed printed circulars throughout the country advising stock shippers and dealers not to ship, and instructing its station agents and employes not to receive, bill, transport, transfer, or switch, any live stock at or to any of the points of physical connection between its lines and those of the Southern Railway Company in Kentucky, at Louisville, for delivery by that company to appellee or at its yards, and that appellant will receive, bill, and transport to Louisville live stock tendered it for shipment to appellee or to any person at its stockyards, but when such stock reaches Louisville it refuses to deliver it to the connecting common carrier, the Southern Railway Company, or to deliver to the latter company the instructions of the consignor, and in all such instances, over the protest of the consignor, makes delivery thereof to the Bourbon Stockyards Company in Louisville, a rival and competitor in business of appellee, whose place of business is at a point distant several miles from that of appellee. It is further alleged in the petition that the acts and conduct of appellant complained of were and are violative of the provisions of Sections 213 and 214 of the State Constitution, and otherwise unlawful, arbitrary, and discriminative against appellee and other persons doing business with it; that the injury thereby inflicted was and is of a continuing and irreparable character, not susceptible of actual pecuniary estimation; that resort to actions at law will involve a multiplicity of suits which would not end the litigation; and that the only available or adequate remedy is that which may be afforded in equity and by injunction.
The answer, as amended, interposes the following matters of defense: (1) That appellee cannot maintain the action, though the shipper, if injured by the acts complained of in the petition, may do so; (2) that compliance on appellant's part with the requirements of Sections 213 and 214 of the Constitution would not only put it to great inconvenience and delay its traffic, but the switching to be performed would entail unreasonable and extraordinary expense; (3) that having established the Bourbon Stockyards, with its facilities for the handling, feeding, and caring for all live stock shipped to Louisville, it is not required to establish or help maintain any other live stock depot in Louisville; (4) that to compel it to recognize the right of owners, consignors, and consignees to change destination in transitu would be an interference with, or regulation of, interstate commerce, and therefore violative of the Federal Constitution and interstate commerce act; (5) that its charter forbids any other company, or any person, to use its road, and makes it unlawful for them to do so, and that in accepting the charter it entered into a contract with the State, which contract is violated by the provisions of Sections 213 and 214 of the Constitution; (6) that to compel it to perform switching duties in conformity with Sections 213 and 214 State Constitution, and the injunction granted by the court, would be to exact of it performance, at less than the cost thereof, of switching duties which can only be required of a transfer company, and this will amount to the taking of its property without due process of law, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, particularly the fourteenth amendment thereof; (7) that to compel it to perform switching duties as required by the provisions of the State Constitution, supra, would necessitate its parting with the possession and control of its cars to another and competing company, and in effect thereby deprive it of its property without due process of law.
No reason is perceived for sustaining appellant's contention that this action cannot be maintained by appellee. It will not do to say, as argued by counsel that only shippers of live stock or commission merchants injured by the conduct of appellant complained of may maintain an action against it. If the alleged arbitrary and discriminatory acts of appellant set forth in the petition have injured appellee's business in the manner and to the extent therein averred, and such acts were violative of the provisions of the State Constitution, it goes without saying that it may maintain an action against the wrongdoer, without regard to any injury that may have resulted to any of its patrons from the same acts or to their right to sue therefor. Moreover, if the alleged wrongful acts of appellant were of daily recurrence, and their continuance would cause further and irreparable injury to appellee's business, as charged, it made no mistake in applying through a court of equity for the writ of injunction to prevent the wrongs complained of, and at the same time to compel appellant as a common carrier to perform the duties it owes appellee and its patrons, under and by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution. Obviously, a separate action for the damage occasioned by each wrong would involve appellee and appellant, as well, in a multiplicity of suits, none of which would necessarily end the litigation. Besides, the injury to appellee's business being of a continuing character, it is not susceptible of accurate pecuniary estimation. For these reasons, appellee, in bringing this action, availed itself of the only means of obtaining adequate relief. A court of equity will not interfere by injunction where there is an adequate legal remedy, but where there is no adequate legal remedy, and the ends of justice require it, it will do so to prevent irreparable injury. And by the express provisions of the Civil Code of Practice (Sections 271-276) the injunction may be preventive, or if necessary, mandatory; that is, affirmatively direct the party enjoined to do the thing or act necessary or proper to be done. Mason, etc., v Byrley, 84 S. W. 767, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 487; Interstate Stockyards Company v. Railroad Cos. (C. C.) 99 Fed. 483; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. P. & K. Coal Co., 111 Ky. 960, 23 R. 1318; 64 S. W. 969, 55 L. R. A. 601, 98 Am. St. Rep. 447; Bedford Bowling Green Stone Co., etc. v. Oman, etc., 115 Ky. 369, 73 S. W. 1038, 24 R. 2274. In view of the averments of the petition, we conclude that the interest of appellee as consignee and the party injured by the discrimination complained of is sufficient to entitle it to maintain the action.
Appellee bases its right to the relief asked in this case upon Sections 213 and 214 of the State Constitution, which read as follows:
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