L. A. Police Protective League v. City of L. A.

Decision Date19 May 2022
Docket NumberB306321
PartiesLOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC676283 Robert B. Broadbelt III, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Blithe S. Bock, Managing Assistant City Attorney and Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Appellants.

Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Richard A. Levine, and Michael A. Morguess for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SEGAL J.

INTRODUCTION

California requires law enforcement agencies to investigate complaints against peace officers. (See Pen. Code, § 832.5, subd (a)(1).)[1] Section 148.6, subdivision (a)(1), makes it a crime to file a knowingly false allegation of misconduct against a peace officer. And section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2), requires law enforcement agencies, before accepting a complaint alleging misconduct by a peace officer, to require the complainant to sign an advisory informing the complainant that filing a knowingly false complaint may result in criminal prosecution.

In 2002 the California Supreme Court upheld section 148.6 against a challenge the statute was an impermissible content-based speech restriction under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (People v. Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497, cert. den. 538 U.S. 120 [123 S.Ct. 1944, 155 L.Ed.2d 861] (Stanistreet)). Three years later, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached a different conclusion. The Ninth Circuit ruled section 148.6 was an impermissible viewpoint-based speech restriction under the First Amendment because the statute criminalized false statements that accused a peace officer of misconduct, but not false statements, made by the officer or a witness during the investigation, that supported the officer. (Chaker v. Crogan (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 1215, cert. den. 547 U.S. 1128 [26 S.Ct. 2023, 164 L.Ed.2d 780] (Chaker).)

Until 2013 the City of Los Angeles and the United States were parties to a consent decree in the United States District Court that prevented the City from requiring complainants to sign the advisory required by section 148.6. After the consent decree expired, the City continued to not require complainants to sign the advisory. The Los Angeles Police Protective League filed this action against the City and its Chief of Police, Charlie Beck, seeking an injunction requiring them to comply with section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2).[2] Following a court trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the Police Protective League. Concluding it was bound to follow Stanistreet, the trial court rejected the City's First Amendment challenge to section 148.6 and enjoined the City from accepting any complaint alleging misconduct by a peace officer unless the complainant has signed the advisory required by section 148.6.

The City appeals, asking us to hold, as the Ninth Circuit held in Chaker, section 148.6 is an impermissible viewpoint-based speech restriction. The City correctly points out that the arguments the California Supreme Court rejected in Stanistreet are not entirely identical to the arguments the Ninth Circuit accepted in Chaker. The City also argues the injunction requires the City to enforce a statute federal courts have found is unconstitutional. That's a real problem. But the Supreme Court's analysis in Stanistreet of why section 148.6 does not violate the First Amendment applies to the City's Chaker-based arguments here. Because the United States Supreme Court has not ruled section 148.6 or an analogous statute is unconstitutional, we must follow Stanistreet. Therefore, we do, and we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Legislature Enacts Section 148.6

The California Supreme Court in Stanistreet explained the circumstances that prompted the Legislature to enact section 148.6: After "'the Rodney King incident in March 1991, law enforcement agencies throughout the state . . . "revised their citizen complaint procedures to promote greater accountability on the part of their line officers."'" (Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 502.) But, according to the Legislature, "'a "glaringly negative side-effect [was] the willingness on the part of many of [California's] less ethical citizens to maliciously file false allegations of misconduct against officers in an effort to punish them for simply doing their jobs." [Citation.] Against this backdrop, the Legislature enacted section 148.6 in an attempt to curb a perceived rising tide of knowingly false citizens' complaints of misconduct by officers performing their duties.'" (Id. at pp. 502-503.)

Section 148.6, subdivision (a)(1), states: "Every person who files any allegation of misconduct against any peace officer, . . . knowing the allegation to be false, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2), states: "A law enforcement agency accepting an allegation of misconduct against a peace officer shall require the complainant to read and sign the following advisory, all in boldface type:

"YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST A POLICE OFFICER FOR ANY IMPROPER POLICE CONDUCT. CALIFORNIA LAW REQUIRES THIS AGENCY TO HAVE A PROCEDURE TO INVESTIGATE CIVILIANS'

COMPLAINTS. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO A WRITTEN DESCRIPTION OF THIS PROCEDURE. THIS AGENCY MAY FIND AFTER INVESTIGATION THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO WARRANT ACTION ON YOUR COMPLAINT; EVEN IF THAT IS THE CASE, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE COMPLAINT AND HAVE IT INVESTIGATED IF YOU BELIEVE AN OFFICER BEHAVED IMPROPERLY. CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS AND ANY REPORTS OR FINDINGS RELATING TO COMPLAINTS MUST BE RETAINED BY THIS AGENCY FOR AT LEAST FIVE YEARS.

"IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUTED ON A MISDEMEANOR CHARGE.

"I have read and understood the above statement.

"Complainant___ ."

B. A Consent Decree Prevents the City from Requiring Complainants To Sign the Advisory

In 2000 the United States filed a lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles alleging the City had failed to implement appropriate management practices, resulting in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct that violated title 42 United States Code former section 14141.[3] The following year the United States and the City of Los Angeles entered into a consent decree that resolved the lawsuit. Under the decree, the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department agreed to receive complaints against peace officers "in writing or verbally, in person, by mail, by telephone . . ., [by] facsimile transmission, or by electronic mail . . . ." The City of Los Angeles also agreed to receive anonymous complaints and to "prohibit officers from asking or requiring a potential complainant to sign any form that in any manner limits . . . the ability of a civilian to file a police complaint with the [Department] or any other entity." The consent decree ended in 2013.

C. The Trial Court Orders the City To Comply with Section 148.6, Subdivision (a)(2)

In 2017 the Police Protective League-an employee organization[4] that represents peace officers employed by the City-filed this action, seeking a declaration section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2), was "legally valid [and] enforceable." The Police Protective League also sought an order "enjoining the [City] from accepting an allegation of misconduct against" peace officers represented by the Police Protective League "without the complainant being required to read and sign" the required advisory.

The parties stipulated at trial that, after the consent decree ended in 2013, the City declined to require complainants filing allegations of police misconduct to sign the advisory required by section 148.6. The Police Protective League called one witness, Officer Steve Gordon, the director of the Police Protective League, who testified that serious complaints against officers may result in the Los Angeles Police Department removing the officers from an assignment pending an investigation. Therefore, Officer Gordon stated, gang members try to "get rid of an officer" by "continually mak[ing] complaints." Gordon testified that false complaints against an officer "could" adversely affect the officer's opportunity for promotion, but that he was not aware whether the police department had ever denied an officer a promotion because of a false complaint. He also testified that, if a complaint against an officer were adjudicated false, it would not affect the officer's ability to transfer to a different unit or division.

In its trial brief the City argued the court should not issue an injunction requiring the City to comply with section 148.6 because the statute violates the First Amendment. Citing Chaker, supra, 428 F.3d 1215, the City argued the statute was an impermissible content- and viewpoint-based speech restriction because it criminalized knowingly false complaints against police officers, but not "false statements by police officers or witnesses in the same context."

The trial court ruled section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2), was not unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court ruled the California Supreme Court held in Stanistreet, supra, 29 Cal.4th 497 that "section 148.6 falls within all the categories of permissible 'content discrimination' identified by the [United States] Supreme Court . . . ." Recognizing "a split of authority between the California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit," the trial court...

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