L.R. v. Leon Cnty. Sch. Dist., Margot Palazesi, an Individual, & Palazesim, LLC
| Decision Date | 14 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:18cv72-MW/CAS |
| Parties | L.R., Parent, Plaintiff, v. LEON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, MARGOT PALAZESI, an individual, and PALAZESIM, LLC, in her capacity as Contractor, ESE Program Manager, Litigation, and Section 504 Officer, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
Plaintiff L.R., a parent,1 filed a pro se second amended complaint [hereinafter "complaint"], ECF No. 14, asserting claims against the three Defendants under the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. ECF No. 14 at 4. Service was carried out on the Leon CountySchool District ("LCS"), ECF No. 12, which filed an answer to the complaint. ECF No. 18. The remaining two Defendants (Palazesi and Palazesim) filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ECF No. 17. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion, ECF No. 24, and the motion is ready for a ruling.2
Plaintiff "LR" is the parent of child "K," a minor student attending a middle school within the Leon County School District. ECF No. 14 at 1-2.3 "K has been since fourth grade, and continues to be, eligible for special education and related services pursuant to the IDEA." Id. at 6-7.
The complaint alleges that Defendants have violated the Individual with Disabilities Act (IDEA)4 and subjected LR to discrimination and retaliation under Section 504 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.5 Id. at 2. Only Count II of the complaint, the ADA and § 504 claims, are brought against Defendants Palazesi and Palazesim; Counts I and II are brought against the LCS. ECF No. 14 at 27-31; see also ECF No. 17 at 2.
The factual allegations of the complaint as related to the claim brought against the Palazesi Defendants assert that K was enrolled in the Leon County School District in January 2015. ECF No. 14 at 14. An evaluation was requested under the IDEA in February 2015. Id. at 14-15. Defendant Palazesi "oversaw K's eligibility determination meeting" but the LCS improperly "designated K as eligible for the autism category" and failed to "consider K for eligibility for SLD ("specific learning disability"), even though SLD was the initial suspected disability." Id. at 15.
The complaint alleges that the evaluation was found by the Florida Department of Education to be in "noncompliance" with "the IDEA and state implementation rules." Id. at 17. Additionally, LR disagreed with the evaluation and the eligibility determination issued by Defendant Palazesi which designated K in the autism category rather than SLD. Id. at 10, 15-16. In response to LR's disagreement, Defendant Palazesi suggested that LR send K to a private school and said that having "an Independent Educational Evaluation (IEE) would not change anything for K." Id. at 19.
LR maintains that the LCS has "done practically nothing to help" K, who is regressing academically in spelling and writing. Id. at 25. LR challenges the determination that "K did not qualify as having a Specific Learning Disability in accordance with IDEA." Id. at 27. LR challenges the "Due Process Order" entered by the ALJ and the findings made therein. Id. at 27-29.6
LR asserts that the LCS and Defendant Palazesi violated her rights by "denying her a remedy under Section 504 to address her concerns and present evidence." ECF No. 14 at 29. LR also alleges that DefendantPalazesi discriminated and retaliated against LR by "withholding records and causing and/or knowingly permitting false documentation to be produced to impede K's rights to a fair and impartial due process hearing, and subsequent court and regulatory proceedings." Id. at 30-31. Further, Defendant Palazesi "discriminated and retaliated against LR by knowingly categorizing and continuing to categorize K for a disability that is unsupported by required records, which has resulted in him being unfairly stigmatized and prevented his access to needed social, emotional and academic opportunities." Id. at 31. Finally, LR contends that Defendants discriminated against her "by utilizing IDEA Part B funds to fund a portion of the LCS defense of K's due process case." Id.
Defendants Palazesi and Palazesim, LLC [hereinafter "Palazesi Defendants"], argue that Count II of the complaint should be dismissed because LR did not exhaust administrative remedies as to that Count prior to initiating this lawsuit. ECF No. 17 at 5. Defendants contend that LR's prior complaints and hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) involved three issues under the IDEA but did not include a claim under the ADA or § 504. Id. at 2-3. Furthermore, it is argued that the Palazesi Defendants were not parties in the DOAH proceeding and LR proceeded pro se on behalf of K, but did not bring a claim on LR's own behalf. Id. at 8.
Additionally, the motion to dismiss seeks dismissal because Count II fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the Palazesi Defendants. ECF No. 17 at 13-14. Furthermore, these Defendants argue that an ADA claim is properly brought against the public entity, but not a private or contractual entity, and is redundant. Id. at 16.
The issue on whether a complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is whether the Plaintiff has alleged enough plausible facts to support the claim stated. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (retiring the standard from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955).7 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health, 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010). "The plausibility standard" is not the same as a "probability requirement," and "asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that "pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability," falls "short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Iqbal, 129 556 U.S. at 677 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The pleading standard is not heightened, but flexible, in line with Rule 8's command to simply give fair notice to the defendant of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (). Prose complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by an attorney. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). Nevertheless, a complaint must provide sufficient notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests so that a "largely groundless claim" does not proceed through discovery and "take up the time of a number of other people . . . ." Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 125 S.Ct. 1627, 161 L.Ed.2d 577 (2005) (quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558). The requirements of Rule 8 do "not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, but Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation." 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003).
One additional principle should be noted. Defendants' motion to dismiss relies upon a final order entered in the DOAH proceeding. ECF No. 17. The order was attached to the initial complaint filed by LR, see ECF No. 1 at 36-123. Because that hearing is relevant and central to Plaintiff's complaint, a copy of that order and the record on appeal has been provided. ECF No. 25. Additionally, because personally identifiable information is included in that record, the parties' consent motion to file the record under seal, ECF No. 25, was granted. ECF No. 27.
Analysis of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the face of the complaint and any attachments. Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 at 590-92 (1969) (Wright & Miller)). "However, where the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those documents are central to the plaintiff's claim, then the Court may consider the documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the defendant's attaching such documents to the motion to dismiss will not require conversion of the motion into a motion for summary judgment." Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Venture Assoc. Corp. v. Zenith Data...
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